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This thesis contributes to our understanding of the implications of global liquidity and cross-
border spillovers to emerging economies and its policy implications. First, it analyses the
empirical regularity on the impact of the United States (US) Quantitative Easing (QE) -as a
compelling case of the international dimension of monetary policy- on the global stability and
policymaking. It then utilises a more theoretical framework to examine the empirical findings.
We find that the effectiveness of QE varies across episodes, with QE1 having a substantially
positive influence on the global economy, but the impact of QE2 and QE3 were moderate.
There is evidence that US QE periods were responded by monetary easing in the rest of the
world that materialised through the long and short rates. This monetary easing response slows
down capital inflows, an expected effect if inflows are destabilising. However, the impact can be
detrimental if the inflows are used to fund investment in the domestic economy. Then we focus
on the reverse policy action, the Fed lift-off, to examine how the monetary authorities in other
economies should respond by considering not just monetary policy but also macroprudential
policy. We find that, without macroprudential policy, the less financially integrated economies
are affected less by the lift-off, but those applying a fixed exchange rate regime are affected
more. Nevertheless, macroprudential policy is significantly effective in reducing fluctuations
in both types of economies. We then empirically study the determinants of global banking
liquidity and establish an international banking connectedness map. We find that an increase
of global liquidity is significantly caused by a rise in the US policy rate and global credit-to-
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The world economy has witnessed a process of ever-deepening international financial integra-
tion since the end of the 20th century. The integration has allowed the great majority of coun-
tries to become open economies actively involved in the international trading of financial assets.
Openness to international markets has brought many opportunities for emerging economies in
advancing their national developments by broadening the scope of financing resources. The
establishment of international financial institutions in host economies also introduces the local
financial institutions to healthy competition and allows them to learn from the international
best practices in financial services, thus improving the local financial markets’ efficiencies. As a
healthy financial market is pivotal for economic development, the increasing financial markets
efficiency helps in ensuring stable economic growth in the long run.
Despite the opportunities that financial integration has to offer, the integration also comes
with significant challenges for small open emerging economies. In particular, the openness
to international financial markets exposes these economies to external financial shocks. A
high financial integration facilitates monetary condition spillovers as revealed by an increasing
tendency of asset price co-movement across different economies. This global asset price co-
movement tends to evolve in line with global liquidity dynamics, but opposite to global financial
risk measures. The 2007-08 global financial crisis has demonstrated the importance of global
financial spillovers, where a credit tightness in some advanced economies led to massive capital
outflows from the other economies and thus generated credit tightness worldwide. The policy
stance taken by the United States’ (US) authority to resolve the problem at the time shows
that not only does integration facilitate financial spillovers during a crisis, it may also transmit
policy spillovers beyond its national borders.
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Against this development, policymakers in the emerging economies face increasingly critical
challenges of maintaining the benefits of financial integration for domestic development, but
at the same time minimising its negative consequences. They also need to comprehend the
role of the US policy stance -whose currency is the most significant reserve currency- and the
role of the international financial institutions in determining the global liquidity dynamics.
As international financial shocks affect emerging economies differently, it is also crucial to
understand how some inherent characteristics of the emerging economies differentiate the effect
of external financial and policy shocks to these economies. More importantly, what set of policy
strategies do the small open emerging economies need to possess to be prepared for negative
consequences of the external shocks? Motivated by these questions, this thesis consists of four
main chapters aiming to investigate the implications of cross-border monetary spillovers on
the development of open emerging economies, also to shed some light on the determinants
and ramifications of global liquidity, and to analyse the appropriate policy strategies for the
emerging economies.
The United States (US) Quantitative Easing (QE) is a compelling case of international
dimensions of monetary policy. Hence, the second chapter is dedicated to studying the implica-
tions of the QE on the monetary and financial conditions in the other advanced and emerging
economies. In addition, we investigate whether the QE alters monetary policymaking in non-
US economies. The QE was introduced when the US policy rate was bounded by the zero
lower bound following an aggressive monetary policy easing with no significant improvements
in the credit condition. The Federal Reserve utilized QE to pull market interest rates down
by reducing long-term market yields through the purchase of long-term government securities
and risky assets from the market, thus reducing the term and risk premiums. Due to the large
scale of the asset purchases, policymakers -particularly in Latin America and Asia- maintain
that the QE gave rise to a significant increase in global liquidity which led to destabilising
capital inflows into many emerging economies (Borio, 2011; Ahmed and Zlate, 2014; Barroso
et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2015). They argue that the massive capital inflows have increased
the macroeconomic and financial market instability due to higher fluctuations in the exchange
rates, asset prices, and inflation rates.
If inflows are large, there is an increasing demand for capital and financial assets in domestic
markets which, pushes asset prices up. The large inflows also instigate domestic currency
appreciation which is disadvantageous for export competitiveness. In this situation, monetary
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authorities face a policy dilemma: whether to contain inflationary pressures by increasing
domestic policy rate or to avoid further inflows by lowering policy rate. Increasing the rate
in times of massive inflows will more likely invite further unstable inflows leading to more
inflationary pressures, unless some capital flows management policies are implemented. Hence,
monetary authorities may opt to lower the domestic interest rate. This dilemma suggests
that if the domestic financial market is open, the loose monetary policies of advanced major
economies during QE may loosen monetary policy everywhere else, particularly in the emerging
economies, thus generating a sequence of monetary policy contagious effect across the world.
In order to investigate the impact of QE, the second chapter utilizes a Global Vector Auto
Regression (GVAR) framework due to Pesaran et al. (2004). The dataset we use is a monthly
data for industrial production, consumer price index, stock price, exchange market pressure,
short rates, and long rates in 17 advanced and 12 emerging economies from January 1995 to
February 2015. Impulse responses, forecast error variance decompositions, and counterfactual
analyses are utilized to evaluate the implication of US QE on the global economic conditions
and monetary policymaking.
Although some studies have attempted to analyse the effect of QE on the global economy,
their choices of US QE measurement neglect the actual intensity of QE market operations
which is indicated by the massive expansion of the Federal Reserve balance sheet. For instance,
Chen et al. (2015) assumes the reduction of US term or corporate spreads as the proxy for
the magnitude of QE. We argue that these spreads do not fully represent the extent of real
market QE operations, thus risking a misleading conclusion about the impact of QE. The
increasing magnitude of the Federal Reserve balance sheet was often not fully followed by the
term spread reduction due to the following: (1) term premium is merely an indirect target of
the QE, not a direct instrument the Federal Reserve uses in operating the QE; and (2) the
term premium fluctuations are not affected only by the QE, but also by other factors which the
Federal Reserve cannot control completely. Considering the Federal Reserve balance sheet as
a measurement of QE is also important because the QE unwinding (the reverse policy action
of the QE) is also going to be operated by the Federal Reserve balance sheet reduction, also
through open market operations. Moreover, according to Fratzscher et al. (2013), the Federal
Reserve’s actual QE operations is important and had a comparatively larger effect than the
QE announcement.
Our challenge is then to correctly measure the magnitude of the US monetary policy
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stance when the policy rate hits the zero lower bound, and the QE is implemented. Our
strategy to overcome this problem is to utilize a combination of 23 variables from a set of US
monthly data series from McCracken and Ng (2015) and then utilize the principal component
analysis to produce a single US monetary policy variable that best captures common factors
behind the movement of the variables. Each of our 23 chosen variables represents one of
these three categories of US monetary policy or condition, i.e. (a) monetary base; (b) policy
rates and yields; and (c) spreads. We extract the principal component of the US monetary
policy variable in two steps in order to maintain the short run dynamics particularly in the
spread variables and be reflected in the principal component series. First, we extract the (first)
principal component from each of the three groups. Therefore, we have three series where the
first series represents the US monetary base conditions, the second represents yields, and the
third represents spreads. We then extract the (first) principal component from the said three
series to come up with our monetary policy measurement.
Our second contribution is regarding how the weighting matrix is developed. Chen et al.
(2015) constructs a same matrix for the construction of all foreign variables in all country
models. Our study utilises two distinct matrices for two groups of variables. In particular, the
trade matrix is used as weighting matrix for variables that we consider as real variables: indus-
trial productions and price indexes, while the financial matrix is used for financial variables:
interest rates, stock prices, and exchange market pressure. The using of financial matrices for
financial variables reflects the fact that domestic financial variables are more susceptible to the
fluctuations of cross-border bilateral ownership of financial assets, instead of from trade rela-
tionships, and vice versa. Moreover, there are differences in response timing of financial and
real variables, with financial variables respond to shocks more swiftly than real variables. Thus,
by differentiating the weighting matrices for the construction of different foreign variables, we
capture the channel of contagion better for each variable.
We find an asymmetric impact of the three QE episodes, with QE1 having the most
substantial positive impact on the US, the other advanced and emerging economies compared
to QE2 and QE3. QE1 appears to have been successful in halting recession periods following
the global financial crisis in the global economy by increasing industrial production, stock
prices, and price levels in all groups of economies. The results show the effectiveness of QE1 in
reducing the long-term rates not only in the US economy as expected, but also in most other
economies. This finding suggests that there has been a significant policy spillover of term and
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risk premium from the US to the global economy through long rates. There is also a tendency
of monetary policy contagion through the short rates as accommodative monetary policy moves
by the Federal Reserve tend to be trailed by lower monetary policy rates everywhere else. As
the positive impact of QE1 begins to come into effect, inflationary pressures seem to increase
particularly in the emerging economies. Hence, when QE2 and QE3 were implemented, the
contagion of the short and long-term interest rates from the US to the economy were not as
strong. During this period, domestic inflationary pressure appears to be the more pressing
concern for emerging economies. Thus these economies opted to increase domestic rates and
possibly had to deal with the potential for more inflows using other measures, such as capital
flows management or macroprudential policy.
The third chapter develops an open economy, two-sector Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium (DSGE) framework featuring financial frictions a` la Bernanke et al. (1999) to ex-
amine theoretically the findings in the second chapter. Although some studies have attempted
to analyse the impact of the US QE on the global economy in a DSGE framework (see, for
example, Haberis and Lipinska (2012) and Alpanda and Kabaca (2015)), these studies fail to
consider the implications of US QE on monetary policymaking particularly in the emerging
economies: something we find empirically significant in the second chapter. This finding and
the analyses on the policy response by the emerging economies have important policy impli-
cations. First, if the implementation of monetary policy by a centre economy alters monetary
policymaking in the other economy, even after adopting a flexible exchange rate regime, then
monetary policy in periphery economies may not be as independent as suggested by standard
open economy macroeconomic theories. Second, if the cross-border monetary policy spillovers
from the core country exist and are significant, then monetary policymakers should increas-
ingly become aware of the global dimension of their tasks, and thus need to internalise each
others’ economic condition and policy stances in policymaking as suggested by Borio (2011)
and Caruana (2012). This chapter attempts to address these omissions. In particular, we
utilize a DSGE framework to trace out how this policy contagion materialises in order to un-
derstand the reason behind the policy stance pursued by emerging economies, and then discuss
the ramifications of such policy stance.
In this chapter, we firstly study the implication of monetary policy relaxation in the centre
economy on the macroeconomic and financial stability of the emerging economy. We then
discuss how the common features of a typical small open emerging economy, such as financial
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friction and liability dollarization, may exacerbate the impact of a foreign policy shock on
the domestic economy. Subsequently, this chapter traces the implication of a monetary easing
response by the small economy following the US monetary easing as observed particularly
following the first round of QE.
The economy in the model is ”small” in the sense that it can be affected by the rest of
the world, but not vice versa. It is also ”open” as it embeds households that engage in the
international risk-sharing activity through international bond holdings and firms that borrow
foreign currency to fund their investments. A large amount of foreign currency denominated
borrowing is typical of emerging market economies -also known as the ”liability dollarization”
problem- which exposes the country to risks related to exchange rate fluctuations and shifts in
investors’ confidence. In the economy, there are also firms that export to the rest of the world,
making them dependent on global demand and the international price for its product. Also,
the fluctuation of its domestic currency adds more risks to the export goods’ competitiveness,
and thus affects internal macroeconomic stability. In addition to liability dollarization, the
domestic financial market in this economy also exhibits financial market imperfections via the
inability of investors to examine the investment results by borrowers. In order to cover the
risks of asymmetric information, there is an external risk premium which raises the costs of
obtaining external funds above internal one. This external finance premium is linked to the
leverage ratio and the net worth (i.e. collateral) of the borrowers.
Our results indicate that a foreign monetary policy reduction widens the wedge between
domestic and foreign interest rates, increasing capital inflows to the emerging economy and
inducing a domestic currency appreciation. The currency appreciation makes the cost of invest-
ment in domestic economy cheaper and thus increase foreign borrowing by entrepreneurs. As
the external finance premium decreases, domestic entrepreneurs take more risks by borrowing
more and then invest more in capital production. This is in line with the international risk-
taking channel of monetary policy (Bruno and Shin, 2015a), which maintains that, a domestic
currency appreciation following a centre country monetary easing makes lending in foreign
currency cheaper. Thus, domestic credit providers take more risks by providing more lending
in foreign currency. Although lower foreign interest rates appear to profit entrepreneurs, the
production of export goods reduces due to lower export product competitiveness following
currency appreciation.
The implications of a responsive domestic monetary policy easing depend on the scale of
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the liability dollarization problem and the ratio of the capital-intensive sector to the rest of
the economy. A domestic monetary policy reduction appears to be able to slow down capital
inflows, which is desirable when capital inflows are destabilising and mainly go to financial
markets such as stocks or bonds. If capital inflows are the source of funding for capital in-
vestment projects however, the effect of domestic monetary easing can be detrimental. Hence,
the entrepreneurs’ high dependency on foreign lending makes capital production sensitive to
changes in interest rate differential and exchange rate fluctuations. Moreover, the effect is
worse to the rest of the economy if the relative size of the capital-intensive sector is immense.
Nevertheless, a responsive monetary easing reduces inflation rate. Thus, if inflationary pres-
sures and asset price bubbles following the foreign interest rate reduction are the pressing
concern, then responsive monetary relaxation might ease the pressure of the foreign monetary
policy on the domestic economy.
These findings underline the reason behind domestic monetary policy easing response
by emerging monetary authorities following substantial monetary relaxation by the centre
economy: the domestic policy stance is expected to reduce destabilizing capital inflows, avoid
domestic currency appreciation, and ease the domestic inflationary pressures. Nevertheless,
this policy stance has negative consequences if the inflows is used for capital investment project
and the capital-intensive sector is immense in the economy. Hence, an emerging economy might
need to consider alternative policy measures to strengthen domestic economy against foreign
financial and policy spillover, for instance by implementing macroprudential policy, as analysed
thoroughly in the next chapter.
Contrary to the second and third chapters, the fourth chapter focuses on the reverse policy
action, the Federal Reserve lift-off, where the US policy rate is increased and the near-zero
interest rate policy is ended. The first rise in December 2015 showed that the US interest
rate rise was led to a substantial withdrawal of capital from emerging economies. Although
the significance of the Fed lift-off is well-understood in policy circles, there is, as yet, no
systematic analysis of how best a country can respond to an external shock of the kind. This
chapter contributes in this respect by studying the implication of Fed lift-off on emerging
economies with different levels of financial integration, the exchange rate regimes, and the
degree of financial developments. We then propose a set of macroprudential policy measures
and systematically evaluate the effectiveness of each measure in the domestic economy’s defence
against the foreign rate rise. Subsequently, we analyse whether the level of financial integration,
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the type of exchange rate regime and the degree of financial development alter the effectiveness
of macroprudential policies. As a measure of effectiveness, we calculate the volatilities of
leading macroeconomic and financial variables and examine whether a combination of monetary
policy with a particular macroprudential policy is effective in dampening fluctuations in those
variables.
In this fourth chapter, we expand the scope of the third chapter in several directions: (a)
it is a two-country advanced-emerging DSGE model; (b) it features financial institutions a´ la
Gertler and Karadi (2011) and incorporates interactions between global and local banks; (c) it
enlarges the policy armoury of the emerging economy by establishing a set of macroprudential
policies and considering fixed exchange rates. In the model, the global banks in the advanced
economy receive deposits from the advanced economy’s households. These banks then use
the deposits together with their own net worth to invest in the advanced economy’s capital
production and the emerging market banks. The local banks in the emerging economy use
the funds from the global banks together with their own net worth to fund domestic capital
production. This cross-border bank lending and borrowing is the global liquidity which serves
as a key channel for the international propagation of shocks from the advanced to the emerging
economy, linking monetary policy in the centre economy with capital flows into the recipient
economies. The emerging economy implements a standard monetary policy rule and macro-
prudential policy measures to maintain domestic stability. The macroprudential measures are
tied to a range of financial indicators (i.e. the loan-to-GDP ratio, leverage ratio, credit growth,
and foreign banking borrowing) as their bases for the macroprudential tax/subsidy, focusing on
lender’s side restrictions. The lender-side of macroprudential policies tackle key externalities
and market failures, directly affecting financial institutions’ ability and willingness to lend to
the real sector.
We find that an emerging economy with lower financial integration experiences a smaller
reduction in the foreign liquidity flows, thus less reduction in aggregate credit to the real sec-
tor. Although being a less financially integrated economy appears beneficial in this situation,
impediments to capital mobility hold back this economy from reaping the benefits of financial
integration in the long run, as their steady state cross-border borrowing rate is higher and
capital inflows in the banking sector is lower. We find that monetary policy combined with
the macroprudential policy that targets foreign banking capital inflows performs best in most
scenarios, suggesting that a policy that focuses on the main channel of cross-border monetary
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spillovers is preferable. The effectiveness of macroprudential policy improves under restricted
capital mobility, reducing fluctuations in most financial variables quite significantly. The choice
of the exchange rate regime also plays a crucial role in the impact of the Fed lift-off on the
domestic outcomes, with the unfavourable impact of the foreign interest rate rise on the do-
mestic outcomes more significant under a fixed exchange rate regime. Interestingly, however,
limiting the exchange rate flexibility improves the effectiveness of macroprudential policy. In
sum, our results highlight the importance of adopting a combination of policies against global
financial disturbances including macroprudential measures, restrictions to capital flows, and
restricting exchange rate flexibility.
Following the study on the role of the global-local banks interactions on the global liquidity
dynamics in the fourth chapter, the fifth chapter focuses on the empirical regularity on the
crucial role of international banks in providing the global liquidity, a condition the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) generally defines as a ’global ease of financing’. Our research
objective is to examine how the activities of global banks and monetary policy decisions by
the centre economy affect global liquidity and facilitate spillovers across borders. The results
of the study hold some significant policy implications. The understanding of the drivers and
ramifications of the aggregate global liquidity is vital for successful macroeconomic manage-
ment. In particular, knowing the origin of global liquidity dynamics in any circumstances
prompts more accurate policy recommendations. The global banks’ connectedness map that
we establish can also inform policymakers with a bigger picture of the cross-border interna-
tional banking connection. In particular, it reveals which countries or groups of countries are
important in this interconnection, implying that a banking problem in the particular coun-
tries or groups of countries may generate massive global consequences. Another critical policy
implication is that, if the cross-border liquidity spillover is substantial, the extent to which
domestic monetary policy can affect the domestic economy is jeopardized by the intense in-
fluence from foreign monetary conditions. For instance, an expansionary external monetary
spillover may undermine the channel of domestic monetary policy transmission that is directed
towards contractionary stance. On the other hand, an expansionary spillover may exaggerate
a domestic expansionary monetary policy.
The current empirical literature on the decision of the volume and direction of cross-border
bank lending often focuses on a small number of countries and is even limited to particular
banks (see, for example, Galema et al. (2016), Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012a), Cetorelli and
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Goldberg (2012c), Haas and Lelyveld (2014), Frey and Kerl (2015)). Although it is important
to comprehend how international banks make international decisions to manage liquidity within
a limited number of countries, an understanding of the problem from an aggregate global scale
can shed more light on how the connections materialise among a large set of countries. Our
study attempts to fill this gap by drawing a helicopter view of banking interconnection across
the globe.
To study the determinants of global liquidity dynamics, we utilize a Vector Auto Regression
(VAR) framework on the global liquidity, US monetary policy, US Dollar value against major
trading partners, T-Bill Euro Dollar (TED) spread, and the global credit-to-GDP gaps. Then
we establish a network connectedness map of cross-border banking dynamics across economies
by utilizing the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Locational Banking Statistics (LBS)
of 35 countries and offshore financial centres from the fourth quarter of 2003 to the third
quarter of 2016. We first use the GVAR to produce the forecast error variance decomposition
(FEVD). Then we utilize the FEVD to build the global banks’ connectedness network using
the Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) method. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first
to use the BIS LBS in a GVAR framework. Our other novelty is that: we are the first to
exploit the BIS LBS to establish the global banking connectedness networks and draw them
into layered graph presentation. The layered graph presentation allows us to rank countries
(or groups of countries) -represented by nodes- neatly according to their degree of importance,
with the top node being the most influential.
The impulse responses show that the US monetary policy rate, US Dollar, global credit-
to-GDP gaps, and TED spread are all significant determinants for the global liquidity variable
at the 90% confidence level. On impact, positive shocks to the US policy rate and global credit
to-GDP gaps increase global liquidity, while an appreciation of the US Dollar and an increase
in the TED spread have the opposite effect. A positive shock to the US monetary policy
rate significantly increases global aggregate cross-border lending on impact with maximum
effect in 1.5 years, but the effect become negative in around 2.5 years. This increase in global
liquidity seems to be dominated by higher cross-border banking lending to the US banking
system following higher US interest rate expectation. This conjecture is supported by the
USD appreciation in the medium term following the same positive US policy rate shock. The
global credit-to-GDP gaps is a proxy for global banks’ capital position and their willingness to
take risks from lending to the non-financial sector. A higher global credit extension to the real
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sector is associated with higher global cross-border banking lending, and the effect is significant
on impact for around two years after the shock, which implies that the worldwide banks’
willingness to extend credit to the real sector is associated with a higher cross-border supply of
funds and vice versa. The TED spread variable is a proxy for credit risk of the counterparty,
where a larger TED spread indicates higher credit risk and thus tighter interbank market
condition. A positive shock to the TED spread is associated with significant lower global
liquidity. This result shows that a higher perception on counterparty banks’ credit risks causes
a significant reduction in the cross-border banking lending internationally with the strong effect
remaining until around two years post the shock. A USD depreciation causes global liquidity
to increase, which supports the international transmission via the ’risk-taking channel’, where
a cheaper dollar tends to cause international banks to take more risk and, thus, to lend more.
Our cross-border banking connectedness network shows that the globally aggregated within
connectedness measure recedes overtime, while the spillover effects tend to grow, suggesting
that the international transmission of banking shocks occurs gradually. US monetary policy is
the most significant net transmitter of cross-border banking position across the globe, followed
by the value of the US Dollar, and the aggregate global liquidity variable. This result once
again underlines the significance of the US policy stance in determining the global banking
liquidity. The groups of economies ordered by their degree of systemically significant financial
institutions in the global banking system are the advanced economy group, followed by the
Eurozone, the offshore financial centres, and the emerging countries group. This finding implies
that emerging economies group is the most prone to shocks from external monetary conditions.
This group is even less important than the offshore financial centres’ group in the global banking
interconnection. When we analyse the data in the country level, among the economies with
the largest cross-border banking positions, the USA is the globally most influential, followed
by France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Japan is the least influential among
the major economies even though it continues to be the largest net lender globally.
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Chapter 2
US Quantitative Easing and the
Global Monetary Policymaking
2.1 Introduction
This paper empirically analyses how the US Quantitative Easing (QE) affects the economic
and financial condition of the US economy, the other advanced, and emerging economies; and
whether it alters monetary policymaking in non-US economies. This research question brings
about an important implication to theoretical research in open economy macroeconomics. If the
implementation of monetary policy by a core economy is able to alter monetary policymaking
in the other economies with flexible exchange rate regime, then monetary policy in periphery
economies may not be as independent as suggested by standard open economy macroeconomic
theory.
There are two major challenges in this study. The first challenge is related on how to
effectively measure the extent of US monetary policy on the zero lower bound. Secondly,
in order to model the international connectedness and contagions, we need to work with 6
macroeconomic variables from each of 29 countries and 3 global variables. Thus we have to
deal with a dimensionality problem due to the large number of variables involved which makes
it practically problematic to use a regular vector auto-regression framework in the study.
In order to tackle the first difficulty, we use a principal component analysis of 23 US
monetary variables to construct a variable that measures the extent of QE as the conventional
Fed Fund policy rate stays on the zero lower bound. The objective of using principal component
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analysis is to extract the common component across the 23 US monetary variables as the
component is mainly driven by the extent of QE implementation. Using a consistent way
to measure the extent of the QE is the challenge faced by empirical studies in the era of
quantitative monetary policy. Including QE policy in a dataset that is started way before the
QE era is problematic simply because the policy has not been implemented before. There is
in principle a number of ways to measure QE. First, one can use event studies to study the
impact of QE announcement on the financial market, such as (Gagnon et al., 2011; Fratzscher
et al., 2013; Bauer and Neely, 2014). However, the announcement effect may only last for a
short period -thus, more suitable for research on daily financial data- and may not capture
the size of real market operation performed by the Federal Reserve. Second, one can use the
Federal Reserve balance sheet size as an indication of Federal Reserve real market intervention.
However, the Federal Reserve balance sheet is almost constant for the whole period before the
QE era which makes it difficult to produce meaningful empirical results as there is no dynamics
that could explain the relationship between balance sheet size and macroeconomic variables.
Another way to measure the QE is by using the risk, corporate, or time spreads. The idea of
using spreads as QE measurement lies on the fact that the Federal Reserve implemented the
QE to reduce these spreads. By combining indicators of the US monetary policy stance into
a single variable, this study aims to capture the common components that, we believe, are
driven by QE.
The constructed monetary policy measurement is then used in a Global Vector Auto-
Regression (GVAR) framework which we believe is the ideal model to tackle the second chal-
lenge concerning the dimensionality problem. The GVAR tackles dimensionality problem by
constructing a set of ”foreign variables” for each variable in each country model that is con-
structed according to the bilateral trade/financial pattern of an economic under consideration
with the rests of the economies in the sample. Through the construction of the ”foreign
variables” we utilize a matrix of trade/financial bilateral relationships which define how the
connectedness and contagions triggered by the US monetary policy materialize in the global
economy. Using the GVAR model we are able to perform counterfactual analysis, impulse
response analysis, and forecast error-variance decompositions in order to answer the research
question on how the QE affects the global economy and financial condition and whether it
alters global interest rate setting.
The reason why the QE was introduced was because the policy rate touched the zero lower
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bound. In the aftermath of the 2007/08 global financial crisis the Federal Reserve cut policy
rates down from 5.25 in April 2007 to 0.25 in December 2008 since when the Fed Fund Rate
becomes mute in indicating the extent of monetary policy. The Federal Reserve then introduced
QE which affects its balance sheet size and composition. The US QE involves a massive amount
of USD 3.5 trillion until early 2015, resulting in approximately 750 percent increase in the size
of the Federal Reserve balance sheet. The enlargement of the Federal Reserve balance sheet
materializes in three sequences: QE1 started in late November 2008 when the Federal Reserve
decided to buy USD 600 billion in mortgage-backed securities (MBS); QE2 began in November
2010 with the Federal Reserve buying USD 600 billion of treasury securities; and QE3 began
in June 2012 with the Fed buying on a monthly basis USD40 billion worth of MBS and USD85
billion of treasury and agency bonds starting in December 2012.
The QE was aimed at pulling the nominal market interest rates down by reducing long-
term market yields through its purchase of longer-term government securities in the market,
and thus reducing term premium. In addition, it can also reduce the risk premium of risky
assets over Treasury securities by acquiring risky assets from the markets (Blinder, 2010).
These operations can be performed by the authority through (a) the selling of the Treasury
securities from its balance sheet, i.e. changing the composition of its balance sheet; and/or (b)
creating new base money, i.e. expanding the size of its balance sheet.
The channels through which the QE may influence international economies is through
the announcement effects and by expanding the global liquidity facilitated by the increas-
ing interconnection of the global financial markets. Earlier studies argue that the additional
global liquidity from the QE has resulted in an increase of capital inflows in most of emerging
economies, particularly Latin America and Asia (Borio, 2011; Ahmed and Zlate, 2014; Chen
et al., 2015; Barroso et al., 2015). The massive capital inflows have increased the macroeco-
nomic and financial market instability due to higher fluctuations in the exchange rates, asset
prices, and inflation rates. Extending beyond the QE, earlier studies also find that US mon-
etary policy announcements have significant efect on US stock prices Bernanke and Kuttner
(2005), and also on the international stock markets (Conover et al., 1999; Didier et al., 2012;
Madeira and Madeira, 2015).
To address the increasing vulnerability emanating from volatile flows, the government of
many emerging economies resorted to a combination of monetary policy, capital flows manage-
ment, and a wide range of macroprudential measures. Monetary policy alone is not sufficient,
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because in times of large inflows, prices tend to increase and monetary authorities face policy
dilemma whether to contain inflationary pressures by increasing policy rates, or accommodate
by lowering their policy rate in order to avoid further inflows. Increasing rates in times of large
inflows will more likely invite further unstable inflows, unless some capital flows management
policies are implemented. This suggests that if domestic market is open and exchange rate
volatility is reduced by intervention, the loose monetary policies of advanced major economies
during the QE may instigate loose monetary policy stances everywhere else, particularly in the
emerging economies, thus generating a sequence of monetary policy contagious effect across
the world. If this is true, then monetary policy is not independent in emerging economies.
Gray (2013) notes that the contagion in monetary policymaking is in fact not a new
phenomenon. He shows that there is a tendency for monetary policy stances of the countries
to follow each other going back at least to the last two decades (Figure 2.1). This indicates
that in addition to domestic variables like output gap and inflation target, global economic
conditions and monetary policy stances of the other economies also play a major role in the
monetary policy formulations of many countries.
There are at least three possible explanations for why a lower policy rate in one (centre)
economy is more likely to induce lower rates in other economies. First, a decrease or expected
decrease of interest rate in one major country will tend to depreciate its exchange rate towards
others, which is undesirable for other countries due to the loss in their export competitiveness.
Thus, one way to combat large appreciation is to cut policy rates (Gray, 2013; Taylor, 2013).
Hofmann and Bogdanova (2012) suggest that international monetary policy spillover is a result
of mutual resistance to higher instability due to capital inflows and exchange rate movement.
Second, as argued by Bruno and Shin (2015a), lower US dollar interest rates which cause an
appreciation of exchange rates of the other economies increase banks’ ability to lend more in US
dollars to firms with the same level of local currency loan, thus increasing risk-taking behaviour
in financial markets. The monetary authority will more likely be inclined to reduce interest
rates in order to discourage firms and banks borrowing US dollars. Third, the global low policy
rates may also have been caused by common global factors, like the increase in the Emerging
Markets’ (EMs’) saving rate combined with the limitations in the available financial assets
in EMs that might induce shortages in the global assets markets (Hofmann and Bogdanova,
2012).
If the monetary policy contagion exists and is significant, monetary policymakers should
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Figure 2.1: Monetary policy rates, Source: Datastream
increasingly become aware of the global dimension of their tasks, and thus need to internalize
each other’s economic condition and policy stances in policymaking as suggested by Borio
(2011) and Caruana (2012). Taylor (2013) go even further by suggesting that there is a
scope of the first-best solution for every country involved in an establishment of monetary
policy coordination. Although monetary policy coordination across countries seems politically
unfeasible, at least a second-best solution which is an internalization of each others’ monetary
policy stance is worth considering (Eichengreen, 2013; Taylor, 2013).
The extent to which the accommodative policy actions of the advanced economies (AEs)
influenced the domestic and global economy, has been a source of growing interest in both
academic and policy circles. With respect to the domestic impact of US QE, d’Amico et al.
(2012) consider three channels through which the Large Scale Asset Purchase (LSAP) program
affects the longer term US Treasury yields, i.e. the expectations or signalling channel, the
scarcity or local supply channel, and the duration channel, and conclude that the LSAP has
been effective in reducing the yield by about 35 to 45 basis point. On the real economy side,
Chen et al. (2012a) using a medium-scale DSGE model find a modest impact of LSAP program
on the US GDP growth and inflation with lasting impact on the level of GDP.
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In general, studies show that US unconventional monetary policy has an asymmetric im-
pact on the advanced and emerging economies (Chen et al., 2015; Eichengreen, 2013). Chen
et al. (2015) who focus on the US term and corporate spreads as an intermediate target of
QE find uneven distributions of benefits and costs of the QE, with the successful of the QE to
avoid prolonged recessions and deflation in the advanced economies, but diverse impact on the
emerging economies. Chinn (2013) underlines the macroeconomic challenges faced by emerging
economies following the unconventional monetary policy particularly through the more volatile
capital inflows and its impact on the exchange rates, but he casts doubt on unconventional
monetary policy real positive impact on the advanced economies.
There are generally two distinct views on how the US QE has influenced the emerging
economies. Some argue that the unprecedented accommodative monetary policy is necessary
to recover the US economy in order to regain US product demands to emerging economies, thus
allowing the emerging economies to recover as well (Lavigne et al., 2014). Others believe that a
major proportion of the QE has contributed to a significant increase of capital inflows pressure
to other countries, and then created a significant adverse spillover impact in the form of higher
inflation, asset bubbles, risks of sudden stops, and export product competitiveness, especially
to emerging Latin America and emerging Asia (Borio, 2011; Chen et al., 2015; Barroso et al.,
2015; Ahmed and Zlate, 2014). Ahmed and Zlate (2014) find that the key drivers of net
capital inflows to emerging economies are the growth differentials, interest rates differentials,
and global risk aversion. Although most studies agree on the ‘excessive’ QE impact to emerging
economies, they observe evidence of positive spillover through trade and confidence channel
from countries that implement the QE especially on GDP recovery in emerging economies.
Our paper is closest to (Chua et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2015), which also use a GVAR
to measure the impact of the QE. The main difference between our and these papers is on
how the QE is identified. Chua et al. (2013) use the growth in US M2 as the indicator of US
monetary policy which also includes the QE era. Chen et al. (2015) assumes the reduction of
US term or corporate spreads to measure the magnitude QE. In particular, they conduct event
studies near the Federal Reserve announcements to determine the magnitude of US term or
corporate spreads reduction following the QE announcements, and subsequently use these to
perform counterfactual analyses. We argue that the term spread may not fully describe the
extent of real market operations associated with the QE as shown in Figure 2.2. As can be
seen, the increasing magnitude of the Federal Reserve balance sheet, which is an indication
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Figure 2.2: Term Spread 3 Months - 10 Years US T-Notes and Fed’s Balance Sheet
Source: The term spread and T-Notes data is from Datastream, while the Fed’s Balance Sheet
is from The Federal Reserve website https://www.federalreserve.gov/data.htm.
of the QE market operation intensity, is often not fully followed by the reduction in the term
spread due to the following: (1) term premium is merely an indirect target of the QE, thus it
is not a direct instrument the Federal Reserve uses in implementing the QE; and (2) the term
premium fluctuations are not affected only by the QE, but also by other factors, therefore the
Federal Reserve cannot control the term premium completely.
Our study also differs from these studies in some other important respects. Regarding
the weighting matrix construction, Chen et al. (2015) constructs the matrix by aggregating
bilateral trade and capital flows together to come up with a single matrix. Therefore, they
use the same matrix for the construction of all foreign variables in all country models. Chua
et al. (2013) use only the portfolio flows to construct the weighting matrix. In our study, we
use two different matrices for two groups of variables. In particular, the trade matrix is used
as weighting matrix for variables that we consider real variables i.e. industrial productions
and price indexes, while the financial matrix is used for financial variables i.e. interest rates,
stock prices, and exchange market pressure. By differentiating the weighting matrices to use
in constructing different foreign variables, we hope we are able to better capture which channel
of contagion matters more for each variable. For instance, the using of financial matrices for
financial variables reflects the fact that domestic financial variables in a country are more
susceptible from the fluctuations of cross-border bilateral ownership of financial assets, instead
of from trade relationships.
With regards to the global risk measurement, we define the global risk appetite by sub-
tracting the CBOE VIX Volatility Index from the realized variance of S&P500, that is:
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GRA = SP500− V IX, (2.1)
where GRA is the global risk appetite, SP500 is the realized variance of S&P500, and V IX is
the CBOE VIX Volatility Index), while other studies use the CBOE VIX as volatility index.
The reason why we use the method is that CBOE volatility index is the market expectations
of near-term volatility, i.e. the implied volatility. Our global risk appetite variable is aimed at
capturing the realized volatility in the market after the implied volatility is taken into account,
therefore the risk appetite variable combines both the measurement of realized and implied
volatility. As a robustness check, we also obtain GVAR results using CBOE VIX as one of
global variables replacing our global risk measurement variable. It turns out that the results
are not extremely different. Some other differences between our study and others relate to
different dataset used and modelling specification, i.e. the countries included in the sample,
the choices of macroeconomic variables, and some other specification issues concerning the
GVAR modelling framework.
Another study that is close to ours is Olson and Young (2015) who also use the principal
component analysis to construct the US monetary policy measurement. Our study differs
from theirs in the scope of the study as they use Ordinary Least Square (OLS) to estimate
the impact of US monetary policy innovations on the US domestic labour share, while our
study is much broader as we consider cross-border effect of the QE on many countries and
several macro variables. Secondly, we also differ on the choice of variables included in the US
monetary policy measurement variable. In particular, they include some US private credits and
loans variables, which we exclude from our US monetary policy measurement. We believe that
although the amount of credits and loans are affected by US monetary policy, such variables
are not directly linked to US monetary policy and are affected by many other macroeconomic
variables like the domestic business cycle. In addition, we include some variables of US term
and risk spreads, that do not enter in Olson and Young study. Our reason for including the US
spreads variables is due to the importance of risks and term spreads as intermediate objectives
of US QE which works through QE announcements and real market operations. To the best of
our knowledge, our paper is the first to use the principal component-constructed US monetary
policy variable in a GVAR framework.
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2.2 Data and Methodology
2.2.1 Data and Measurement
This study uses monthly data from January 1995 to February 2015 (20 years). We include
all countries with data available over this 20-year period, which comprises of 17 advanced
economies and 12 emerging economies according to the IMF classification as follows:
Advanced economies: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, Japan, South Korea, Netherlands, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United King-
dom, United States;
Emerging economies: Brazil, Chile, China, Hongkong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico,
the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey.
Both the advanced and emerging economies groups possess reasonably wide geographical
spreads and are thus geographically representative. In particular, the advanced economies
group consists of the Americas, European, and Asian countries, while the emerging economies
group comprises of some countries that belong to the Americas, Europe, Asia, and Africa. The
total GDP Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) of these countries made up 79 percent of the world
GDP PPP in the last twenty years according to the World Bank data.
The source of our data are Datastream, International Monetary Fund (IMF), The Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Stat, the Federal Reserve
Economic Data (FRED), and national sources. We use the seasonally adjusted logs of indus-
trial production as an indicator of domestic real economic activity. For prices measurement,
we use the logs of Consumer Price Index (CPI) for all items of goods from the IMF database
where 2010 is the base year for all countries. The stock price data is the logs of real stock
price index obtained from local currency stock prices which is available from Datastream for
all countries.
The inclusion of the short-term interest rates variable is intended to represent the domestic
monetary policy stance. Where possible, policy rates are used, but if data are incomplete, we
use the domestic 3-month interbank interest rates as the proxy for policy rates based on the
notion that the monetary authority can freely adjust it (Sousa and Zaghini, 2008). Most of the
long rates are 10-year domestic government bond yields if available, or alternatively, shorter
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bond yields. Both the short and long-term interest rates data are transformed into monthly
log of interest rates.
The Exchange Market Pressure Index (EMPI) variable is constructed in order to capture
the intensity of external pressure that a country is exposed to, particularly as a result of capital
flows pressures and global risks. We use the Real Effective Exchange Rates (REER), official
reserve assets, and short-term interest rates to construct the index. The inclusion of official
reserve asset into the EMPI is intended to capture the pressure to domestic exchange rate even
if monetary authorities resist nominal exchange rate volatility. The EMPI here is constructed
as a variation of the index proposed by Eichengreen et al. (1995): EMPt = 100(−wt,eet −







for X = e, res, ir; et = log(Et)− log(Et−12);
rest = log(Rt) − log(Rt−12); irt = log(IRt) − log(IRt−12); where Et is the REER, Rt is the
official international reserve assets, and IRt is the short-term interest rates. σt is the standard
deviation of the corresponding variable in the previous five years, for weights of the sixth
year onwards. For weights of the first five years, the standard deviation computed from data
covering the first five years is used. We use the inverse of standard deviation (σ−1t,X) to avoid
the most volatile variable from dominating the index.
REER and official reserve assets enter the index as negative because exchange rate ap-
preciation and higher official reserve assets position reflect lower exchange market pressure.
In contrast, the log differenced of the short-term interest rates enters the index in positive
because higher interest rates are observed when there is higher pressure to a country’s money
or credit market.
We include three global variables in our study, namely the US monetary policy variable,
’world financial oil’ index, and global risk appetite variable. The US monetary policy variable
is constructed by a method explained in Section 2.2.4.2. The world financial oil index is
an average of Brent crude oil price and Datastream world financial index that describes the
equity index of firms in financial sectors across the globe. The global risk appetite variable is
constructed by subtracting the standardized CBOE VIX Volatility Index from the standardized
realized variance of S&P500 . The CBOE VIX is a leading measure of market expectations
of near-term volatility conveyed by S&P500 Index (SPX) option prices. Subtracting the VIX
from the realized variance of S&P500 allows us to obtain the measure of market’s appetite
towards global financial risks which affects the pattern of capital flows fluctuations in the
global economy. Figure 2.3 presents the plot of world financial oil and global risk appetite.
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Figure 2.3: Global variables: World financial oil index and global risk appetite, Source: Datas-
tream
Each variable is tested for the presence of a unit root by weighted symmetric Augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. The unit root tests are implemented to each individual country
variables, foreign variables, and global variables in order to check the integration order of up
to I(2). Table 2.1 shows the order of the integration of every variables in every countries’
models. Stock price data are I(1) for all countries. Industrial production, price index, short
term rate, and long term rate data is I(1) for more than 80% of the countries. For Mexico and
Turkey, the price index are I(2). Only EMP which has higher percentage of countries with
stationary EMP variable with only 30% of the countries’ EMP are I(1). Because most of the
data is integrated of order at least 1, we expect to observe cointegration among variables in a
country model or cointegration between variables in different country models, which is useful
for our Global Vector Error Correcting Model (GVECM) estimation as explained in the next
sub section.
2.2.2 Global Vector Auto Regression (GVAR) / Global Vector Error Cor-
recting Model (GVECM)
The GVAR, initially developed by Pesaran et al. (2004), is a macroeconometric model that
exploits advances in the analysis of cointegration systems in order to perform analysis in a
global modelling framework. The reason why we choose the GVAR in our study is because:
(a) it tackles the dimensionality problem of our data which involves handling 29 countries, 6
domestic variables, 3 global variables, and 242 time points; (b) it allows the use of pre-defined
matrices to impose the strength of bilateral relationship for each pair of countries in the study;
and (c) it provides counterfactual analysis framework that allows us to study the impact of a
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policy by experimenting on what would be the outcomes of the macro variables if the policy
was not implemented.
The GVAR tackles the dimensionality problem by constructing “foreign variables” for each
variable in each country model that are constructed according to the bilateral trade/financial
pattern of an economy under consideration with the rests of the economies in the sample.
The country-specific equations are then estimated in VAR setting which involve domestic
macroeconomic variables (e.g. industrial production, price index, interest rate, etc) together
with the corresponding foreign variables. This country-specific model is then combined together
with other country models comprehensively in the GVAR model to produce simultaneous
forecasts or impulse response analysis for all variables of every country/region.
In our study we have 29 economies, indexed by i = 0, 1, 2, ..., 28. Country 0 is the ref-
erence country (USA). There is a vector of xit of ki domestic variables for each economy.
xit is the set of endogenous variables which for each economy include: industrial produc-
tion (ipit), consumer price index (piit), stock prices (spit), short-term interest rates (srit),
long-term interest rates (lrit), and exchange market pressure index (empit). Therefore we
set xit = (ipit, cpiit, spit, srit, lrit, empit)
′, so the number of the endogenous variable for each
economy ki = 6 or less, according to data availability. The k
∗
i foreign variables of country i
model are constructed as a weighted average of the corresponding variables belong to the other
countries’, weighted by country i international trade / financial pattern with the remaining





























for i, j = 0, 1, ..., N , are based on trade and/or financial shares, i.e. the share of country j in
the total trade or financial flows of country i with respect to total trade or financial shares of
country i with the rest countries. For each economy, there is a VAR model containing a set of
equations that relates the vector xit of ki domestic variables to the global economy via foreign
variables x∗it plus deterministic variables such as time trends and global exogenous variables
(here, world financial oil and VIX index). The full derivation of the GVAR model is presented
in the Appendix A.1. In general, the GVAR estimation is performed in two steps. First, for
each economy a vector error correction model (VECM) is estimated using reduced regression
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techniques. Below is an example of the model which is a VECM with one lag.
∆xit = ci0 −αiβ′i[zi,t−1 − γi(t− 1)] + Λi0∆x∗it + Γi∆zi,t−1 + ui,t (2.3)





′, αi is a ki × ri matrix of rank ri, βi is a (ki + k∗i)× ri matrix of rank
ri, and γi is the time trend coefficient. In this case, x
∗
it are treated as ‘long-run forcing’ or I(1)
weakly exogenous with respect to the parameters of the VARX* model. The VARX* model is
estimated for each country separately conditional on x∗it.
Second, although estimation is done on a country by country basis, the GVAR model is
solved for the world as a whole, i.e. in terms of a k × 1 global variable vector, k = ∑Ni=0 ki,
taking account of the fact that all the variables are endogenous to the system as a whole.
Through some derivations, the GVAR(p) model is obtained:
xt = b0 + b1t+ F1xt−1 + · · ·+ Fpxt−p + εt. (2.4)
This GVAR model is used for impulse response and conditional forecasting analysis1. It
can be shown that the GVAR model associates domestic variables with the global economy via
three distinct but inter-connected channels: (a) The direct relationship between xit on x
∗
it and
its lagged values; (b) The relationship between xit on x
∗
it through the common global exogenous
variables i.e. the oil price, world financial index, and volatility index; (c) Specific national or
sectoral shocks; (d) Non-negligible contemporaneous dependence of shocks in country i on the
shocks in country j, measured via the cross country covariances, Σij .
2.2.3 Specification and Estimation of the Country-Specific Models
Our study makes use of a set of domestic variables, which includes industrial productions,
price indices, short-term interest rates, long-term interest rates, stock prices, and exchange
market pressure indices, for each country’s VARX model. However, not every country’s model
contains all these domestic variables for two reasons, (a) some data series are not available in
some countries; and (b) the US model is specified differently due to the dominant role of the
US economy and thus reflected in our model. All foreign variables enter the country-specific
models in all country models, except for the US. For all non-US economies, all foreign variables
enter into every country-specific model as weakly exogenous variables. In addition, the three
1We use the procedures provided in the GVAR Toolbox provided by Smith and Galesi (2014).
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global variables, i.e. US monetary policy, world financial oil, and global risk appetite are also
included in every VARX country model (except the US) as weakly exogenous.
The specification of the US country models is different from the rest to reflect the US’s
major role in the global economy and to measure the global impact of the US QE which is the
objective of this study. For US country models, we exclude foreign short-term interest rates,
foreign long-term interest rates spread, and foreign equity price, assuming that these foreign
variables are more likely to be endogenous for the US economy. US monetary policy, world
financial oil variable, and global risk appetite enter the US VARX models as endogenous.
The rank orders of the VARX models are estimated based on Johansen’s trace statistic
with some adjustments made according to the visual inspection of the persistence profiles.
We restrict the trend coefficients to lie in the cointegrating space and leave the intercepts
unrestricted (case IV in the GVAR toolbox and Pesaran et al. (2000)). The lag orders for
the VARX models are determined by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) subject to a
maximum lag order across models of 3 and 2 for xit and x
∗
it, respectively. Specification tests
related to the GVAR models have also been performed.
2.2.4 Constructing Weighting Matrices and US Monetary Policy Variable
2.2.4.1 Weighting Matrices
The construction of the weighting matrix is important in a GVAR model because the matrix
defines how variables between two countries are related. The modelling of foreign variables
provides a channel through which the variables in all other countries influence the corresponding
variable of a country’s model. Therefore, the construction of the weight matrix for country
i should reflect this by means of assigning higher weights to a counterpart country with a
higher trade or financial relationship, while lower weights should be given to less important
counterpart countries.
It is common in GVAR studies to use the trade matrix for all the variables (including
the financial variables). With the availability of the financial matrix, we would like to analyse
whether the using of financial matrix in combination with the trade matrix improves our model.
Hence, we compare the results produced by a GVAR model with trade matrix only and that
with a combination of trade and financial matrices. The second model utilizes trade matrix
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to construct foreign variables for foreign industrial production and inflation variables for each
country model, while the financial matrix is employed for foreign short term interest rate,
long term interest rate, stock prices, and exchange market pressure index variables. In order
to choose between the two competing weighting schemes, we compare the root mean squared
forecast error (RMSFE) of the forecast variables and select a scheme which produces lower
RMSFE as the benchmark weight:







, h = 1, 2, . . . , 12, (2.6)
where yt+h is the actual value and yˆt+h|t is the forecast, h = forecast horizon, and n= size of
forecast sample.
We calculate cross-country average RMSFE for each endogenous variable for the data series
which we randomly choose to stop at June 2012 for 1-month to 12-months ahead forecasting
horizon. As shown in Figures 2.4, the RMSFE results show that the trade-only and the trade-
financial weighting scheme perform equally well in general. However, the cross-country RMSFE
averages for the short term interest rate and long term interest rates models show that the
trade-financial weighting is significantly superior compared to the trade-only weighting matrix.
This result reflects the ability of the financial matrix to capture the fluctuations in the interest
rates better than the trade matrix. For this reason, we use the trade-financial weighting matrix
as our benchmark model.
Bilateral trade matrix is constructed as the summation of the export and import figures
between two countries. The annual bilateral trade data is available from the IMF Direction of
Trade Statistics (DOTS) for a period from 1998 to 2014. The trade matrix data is available
for all countries in the sample. We take an average of the bilateral trade matrix throughout
these periods to come up with a single trade matrix.
For the financial matrix, we take an average of the financial liabilities matrix and financial
asset matrix. The two financial weighting matrices provide distinct interpretation on how one
country’s domestic variables are affected by the movements of the other country’s domestic
variables. The financial liabilities matrix which is the gross bilateral financial liabilities on
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Figure 2.4: 1-month to 12-months ahead RMSFE comparison of two weight matrices schemes.
Note: The bold line represents RMSFE using trade-only weighting matrix, whereas the dotted
line represents RMSFE using the combination of trade and financial weighting matrices. ip =
industrial production; cpi = consumer price index; sr = short term interest rates; lr = long
term interest rates; sp = stock prices; emp = exchange market pressures.
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total inward portfolio equity and debt investment positions, and total inward direct investment
positions to country i from the rest of the countries in the sample. Therefore, this liabilities-side
(inward) financial matrix reveals the risks of foreign capital inflows fluctuations, e.g. sudden
stops and large surges. The financial assets exposures is gross bilateral financial claims data
on total outward portfolio equity and debt investment positions, and total outward direct
investment positions of the country i to the rest of the countries in the sample. Thus, this
weight indicates the risks emanating from fluctuations in asset valuation and default risks from
financial investment abroad.
Both financial assets and liabilities matrices data are constructed using raw data from
IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Positions (CDIS) and Coordinated Portfolio Investment
Positions (CPIS). CDIS data is annual data that is available from 2009 to 2013, while CPIS
data is from 2001 to 2014. The two financial matrices are averaged across available data period.
2.2.4.2 US Quantitative Easing Measurements
One of the main challenges in this area of study is measuring the magnitude of monetary policy
stances when the central bank implements the QE. Traditionally monetary policy stances are
reflected through the movement of the policy rate or the size of monetary aggregates. When
the policy rate is bounded by the zero lower bound, the indicative stances of monetary policy
through policy rates become practically unavailable. As the QE is implemented through the
Federal Reserve balance sheet market operation, there is a scope to use the size of the Federal
Reserve balance sheet as the measurement of the monetary stance during the QE. However,
the use of only the Federal Reserve balance sheet as US QE measurement is problematic empir-
ically because the balance sheet was almost constant before the QE but expand dramatically
afterwards.
Our strategy to overcome this problem is to utilize a combination of some chosen US
monetary series and then apply principal component analysis to produce a single US monetary
policy variable that best captures common factors behind the movement of the chosen variables.
We first choose 23 variables from a set of US monthly data series from McCracken and Ng
(2015). They develop FRED-MD2, a macroeconomic database that contains 135 US monthly
series obtained originally from Global Insights Basic Economics Database (GSI) and the Con-
2FRED-MD database can be obtained from http://research.stlouisfed.org/econ/mccracken/
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ference Board. Each of our 23 chosen variables represents one of these three categories of
US monetary policy or condition i.e. (a) monetary base; (b) policy rates and yields; and (c)
spreads. The US monetary base series include all variables that describe the monetary size of
the US economy like money stock, monetary base, and Fed’s balance sheet. Monetary policy
has long been associated with how the monetary authority controls the money supply in order
to stimulate or restrain macroeconomic condition. Therefore, we believe that including mea-
surements of nation-wide money stock in our benchmark US monetary policy measurement is
essential. The inclusion of measurements of money base size and the Federal Reserve balance
sheet is even more important in a US QE study because according to Fratzscher et al. (2013),
the Fed’s actual LSAP operations which are reflected in its balance sheet is important and had
a comparatively larger effect than the Federal Reserve LSAP announcement.
The second group of our chosen variables contains the effective Fed funds rate (EFFR),
3-month to 10-year risk-free bonds yields, and high rating corporates yields. The EFFR was
traditionally known as the sole indicator of monetary policy stance before the Zero Lower
Bound (ZLB) but becomes effectively zero afterwards.
The third group contains spreads between various term yields and the Fed funds policy
rate. We consider five term spreads i.e. spreads of the 3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 5-year,
and 10-year risk-free government securities yields, all against the EFFR. In addition, we also
include the risk spreads from the high-rating Aaa and Baa corporate bond yields to the EFFR.
As Blinder (2010) points out, the Federal Reserve’s effort to push down the risk premiums to
stimulate credit and growth is of great relevance during the QE.
The full list of variables included in the US monetary policy variable is presented in
Table 2.2. We take inverses of every series in the monetary base group (a) to be consistent with
the other two groups where increases in the variables indicate policy contraction and decreases
indicate accommodation. Figure 2.5 show the standardized values of variables included in our
measurement of US monetary policy.
We use principal component analysis as a statistical procedure to reduce data dimension
of a set of observable variables to construct the US monetary policy measurement variable.
The explanation on principal component analysis is presented in Appendix A.2. We extract
the principal component of the US monetary policy variable in two steps in order to maintain
the short run dynamics particularly in the spread variables and be reflected in the principal
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Figure 2.5: Standardized 23 US Monthly data series to construct our US monetary policy
variable
Source: FRED-MD database from http://research.stlouisfed.org/econ/mccracken/ built by
McCracken and Ng (2015).
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component series. First, we extract the (first) principal component from each of the three
groups. Therefore, we have three series where the first series represents the US monetary base
conditions, the second represents yields, and the third represents spreads. We then extract the
(first) principal component from the said three series to come up with our monetary policy
measurement. The estimated US monetary policy variable is used from January 2009 when
the ZLB period starts, while for prior to January 2009 the standardized US Effective Federal
Fund Rate is utilized. The plot of our benchmark US monetary policy measurement variable
along with the counterfactual paths is in Figure 2.6.
2.2.4.3 US Quantitative Easing Measurements: Counterfactual Paths
The counterfactual analyses compare an actual realized set of economic conditions with the
same set of economic conditions under some pre-determined values in one or more variables
that are imposed on the system. Thus, counterfactual analyses in the GVAR context are
basically forecasting exercises conditional on a set of predetermined values in one or more
variables. As we intend to analyze the outcome of some macroeconomic variables if QE was
not implemented, we need to have counterfactual paths of US monetary policy in a particular
period under the assumption of no QE implementation. The predetermined paths are then
imposed to the GVAR system in order to obtain the paths of every other variable in the system
within the same period. The full derivation of conditional forecasts is available at Appendix
A.3.
To determine the counterfactual paths of the US monetary policy variable under the as-
sumption of no QE implementation, we believe that we can rule out any increasing path because
the increasing path is highly unlikely under counterfactual of no QE condition. In particular,
we assume that US monetary base is at most constant under the no QE scenario. Similarly,
under the no QE scenario, increasing US interest rates are highly unlikely even if the Fed took
no action when the policy rate hit the zero lower bound, thus we assume that the set of US
interest rates and yields are either constant or decreasing in the counterfactual scenario. Due
to this consideration, we only consider two possible paths that may have been realized under
the no QE scenario, i.e. the constant path which is the maximum possible path that could
have happened if the Fed did not implement the QE and a decreasing path.
The counterfactual paths are presented in Figure 2.6. For the constant path, the level of
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Figure 2.6: Counterfactual scenarios of the US monetary policy variable
the US monetary policy variable is assumed to remain at the same level in the month before
the QE implementation up to 24 months for QE1 and QE3, and up to 12 months for QE2
due to the smaller and shorter period of QE2 implementation. For the decreasing path, there
are many possible paths that we can choose from that can fit anywhere between the constant
and the actual path. Our construction of the decreasing path is rather ad hoc. The idea is
to reflect the immediate effect of QE and subsequently maintain the short run dynamics of
the actual path. We estimate the actual path using the quadratic equation, then we increase
the slope to produce the path. As can be observed in the result section, it turns out that the
counterfactual results from imposing the two paths on the US monetary policy variables are
not significantly different.
2.3 Estimation Results
2.3.1 Domestic and Cross-border Impact of the Three Periods of US QE:
Counterfactual Analyses
The sets of counterfactual results are available from our GVAR analysis for each country in the
sample. We then group the countries according to their level of economies and regions. In order
to aggregate the country results, we take the cross-country averages of the counterfactual results
for every variable and weight the results by these countries’ 1990-2013 GDP, PPP (Purchasing
Power Parity). For every figure in the counterfactual analyses, the solid lines plot the actual
paths, the dotted lines are counterfactual paths of no QE scenario where the US monetary
policy variable is assumed to be constant, and the dashed-lines are from the quadratic path.
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2.3.1.1 Exchange Market Pressures
First thing to remark from our counterfactual graphs is that the difference between the constant
and quadratic counterfactual paths for the US monetary policy measurement is not particularly
significant. A second remark is that, in addition to the US QE, the European Central Bank
(ECB) and the Bank of England (BoE) also introduced QE measures around the period of US
QE. As a result, the result of our counterfactual analysis of the US QE impact on the global
economy may to some extent is affected by the QE introduced by the ECB and BoE.
Figure 2.7 shows the counterfactual plots on EMP index to groups of economies, where
increasing index indicates exchange market depreciation pressures and vice versa. Both the
constant and quadratic monetary policy counterfactual analyses show that periods of US QE
are associated with appreciation pressures in other economies which show the sign of capital
inflows pressure, although there are some exceptions in each QE episode. In general, the
appreciation pressures seem to have been experienced by the advanced and emerging economies
alike as the counterfactual paths are higher in general compared to the actual paths. QE1
appears to cause the biggest appreciation pressures compared to the later QE episodes. For
Latin American and advanced European countries, the exchange market appreciation pressures
are delayed until around six months after QE1. The appreciation pressures reached the peak
at around the fourth quarter of 2009.
Similarly, QE2 and QE3 also create appreciation pressures in all economies outside the
US, except emerging Asia for QE2 and advanced Asia for QE3. What appears to happen in
emerging Asia amidst QE2 is that, the governments of emerging Asia countries attempt to
increase short-term policy rates in an attempt to curb inflationary pressures built up after
QE1. As the short-term rates are included in the EMP index, the increasing domestic short
rates in emerging Asia push up the EMP. The depreciation pressure for advanced Asia during
QE3 is due to Japan’s plan to expand the fiscal and monetary policy.
2.3.1.2 Stock Prices
Figure 2.8 shows the counterfactual plots on stock prices of the groups of economies. Our
counterfactual analyses show that QE1 has been successful in recovering the stock markets in
the US, other advanced economies, and emerging economies, which were adversely impacted
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Figure 2.7: Conditional Forecasting - Exchange Market Pressures
by the global financial crisis in 2007. For the advanced Asian stock markets, although there
has been an increase in stock market indices following QE1, our counterfactual calculation
also produce plots similar to realized data. For other groups of economies, stock prices are
more likely to remain subdued and even to decrease for a longer period in the absence of
QE1 implementation. This finding indicates that the expansionary US QE policy is largely
effective in boosting confidence in the domestic US stock market. Furthermore, as the global
stock prices show a strong tendency to comove, the rebound of the US stock market confidence
appears to spillover to the emerging and other advanced markets.
The impact of QE2 and QE3 in global stock markets is also quite positive in all groups
of economies, although to a much lesser extent compared to QE1. QE3 appears to benefit all
advanced stock markets in our data, i.e. the US, advanced Asia, the Euro Zone, and the UK
stock markets. Emerging Asia, Latin America, and China seem to also benefit from the earlier
phase of QE3 but the announcement of the tapering plan in mid-2013 affects market indices in
these economies negatively through the intensified global risks, therefore the overall positive
impact of QE3 is smaller in emerging economies.
The cross-border impact of QE to emerging economies’ stock markets is more likely to
occur through the signalling channel, where the indication delivered by the Federal Reserve
to keep US interest rates low for a longer period is more likely to cause investors to search
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Figure 2.8: Conditional Forecasting - Stock Prices
for yields in overseas markets, including through riskier investment alternatives. Therefore,
although the increase in stock indices is a sign of positive recovery in the financial markets, it
may also be an indication of asset price inflation pressures due to higher demand for financial
assets. The result supports earlier studies suggesting the significance of the US monetary policy
announcement on the US stock prices such as Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) who find that,
on average, a hypothetical unanticipated 25-basis-point cut in the federal funds rate target is
associated with about a one percent increase in the US broad stock indexes. Moreover, the US
monetary policy announcement is also an important factor for the international stock markets
(Conover et al., 1999; Didier et al., 2012; Madeira and Madeira, 2015).
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2.3.1.3 Price Indices
An observation of the counterfactual graphs indicates that QE1 has a considerably larger
effect than the other QE episodes in the four groups of economies. The implementation of
QE1 appears to be successful in discontinuing substantial deflationary phases following the
global financial crisis as the actual paths are in general higher than the counterfactual paths.
The impact of QE1 is particularly large for the US and advanced Europe as their counterfactual
paths are largely stable making the discrepancies with the actual paths wide. In contrast, the
divergence of the actual and counterfactual paths of the emerging Asia group is not as wide
because the counterfactual paths are also increasing.
QE2 also has the same impact on price indices in the US, advanced Europe, and emerging
Asia. Nonetheless, the impact of QE3 on price indices appears negligible everywhere, even for
the US economy. Although a price indices upsurge subsequent to any recession periods is a sign
of economic recovery, this can also indicate higher inflationary pressures especially if recession
periods have passed for quite some time. This has been a source of objection from some
emerging economies’ governments particularly in QE2 when the maximum negative impact of
the global crisis has appeared to pass, and the rise of prices is perceived as the build-up in
inflationary pressures. Therefore, this finding supports the conclusion of some studies that QE
episodes tend to cause capital inflows pressure to EMs, which then induce the increase in asset
prices and credit activities, and put higher inflationary pressures in EMs (Borio, 2011; Barroso
et al., 2015).
2.3.1.4 Industrial Production
As it is the case for other variables, the effect of US QE to industrial production for the
emerging and the other advanced economies are not identical in the three QE periods, with the
first QE having the largest positive impact compared to the other two QE episodes. Industrial
productions in all groups of economies were severely impaired following the squeeze in US
credit markets and drops in income due to the global financial crisis in 2007. The decline in
industrial production is particularly severe in the advanced and US economies particularly in
2009 when the drop in industrial production was the worst for over ten years.
All groups of economies seem to have benefited from QE1 as the policy appears to have
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been successful in halting recessions period following the crisis as illustrated by the gradual
rebound of their industrial production after the policy. In fact, emerging economies are able to
return the level of industrial production back to its pre-crisis level only in 11 months period,
unlike the advanced economies which until recently are still not able to return the industrial
production to the pre-crisis level. This result suggests that the increase in import demand
by the US economy to the emerging economies after QE1 may have had outweighed the loss
in export competitiveness due to exchange rate appreciation pressures, suggesting that QE1
impact on EMs via the trade-flow channel is higher than the exchange rate channel.
2.3.2 The Impact of US QE on Interest Rates and Global Monetary Poli-
cymaking: Counterfactual Analyses
2.3.2.1 Long-Term Interest Rates
When the US Fed Funds policy rate becomes the zero lower bound after several stages of uncon-
ventional monetary policy accommodation, the Federal Reserve’s target is shifted to reducing
the long-term market rates through the buying of longer-term and riskier bonds. The inability
to further decrease the short rates drove the Federal Reserve to influence credit creation and
real economic activities by reducing the further end of market yield curves. Thus, as opposed
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to the usual monetary policy implementation where the short rates is the intermediate target,
the term spread becomes the policy target during unconventional monetary policy execution.
In most emerging economies, short-term interest rates are still quite distant from the zero
lower bound, thus monetary policy still works through the conventional domestic monetary
policy transmission where monetary authorities attempt to influence the economy through
short-term policy rates. However, the global long rates are also important for the level of long
rates in emerging economies (Jain-Chandra and Unsal, 2012). Therefore, the spillover impact
from US QE implementation on emerging economies’ monetary policy and interest rates can
materialize through either the short or long rates.
Our counterfactual analyses show that QE1 tends to decrease long-term interest rates in
the US with a tendency to spread to other economies. In fact, the decrease in long rates appears
to be quite sharp in the US and emerging Asia, and more gradual in advanced Europe and
advanced Asia. In contrast, the implementation of QE2 and QE3 does not seem to produce the
expected results. Counterfactual plots around QE2 suggest that in the absence of QE2 long-
term rates are most likely lower than actual plots which means that QE2 is associated with
higher long-term rates, which is counterintuitive. A closer look at the counterfactual analysis
shows that long-term interest rates hikes is associated with QE announcement, whereas long-
term interest rates decrease followed the actual Federal Reserve’s real market operation which
is started around January 2011. The same pattern as in the US long-term interest rates around
QE2 is also observed in other groups of countries outside the US, suggesting the importance of
US long-term interest rates in affecting domestic interest rates fluctuations in these economies.
The impact of QE3 on long rates are counterintuitive particularly in the US itself, where QE3
does not lead to lower long-term rates, which also happens in emerging Asia. On the contrary,
QE3 appears to reduce the long-term interest rates in advanced Europe and, to a smaller
extent, in advanced Asia.
The results show the effectiveness of QE1 in reducing the long-term rates in the US econ-
omy as expected. The tendency of lower rates in the longer end of US yield curves and
the reduction in global risks seem to spillovers to other economies including the emerging
economies, in line with the finding by Jain-Chandra and Unsal (2012) that emerging markets
long rates are influenced by foreign interest rates and global risks. In addition, this finding
provides some support on the “portfolio-balance channel” of the US QE impact on emerging
markets due to Lavigne et al. (2014). The reduced supply of US long-term securities following
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the Federal Reserve open market operations lead investors to seek an alternative investment
with the same maturity in emerging economies, and therefore increase demand and reduce the
yield of long-term securities in the emerging economies.
The spillovers of global interest rates to domestic rates may complicate monetary policy
conduct in these economies by weakening the connection between short-term policy rates and
long rates/yields, especially when the domestic policy rule suggests a different direction of
rates compared to the realized global long rates. For instance, domestic monetary authorities’
stances in increasing the short policy rates may not necessarily translate into higher domestic
long-term rates as expected, if global long rates are decreasing.
2.3.2.2 Short-term Interest Rates
Having bounded by the zero lower bound, the Federal Reserve continue with QE to reduce
term and risk spreads. In a shadow interest rate setting where policy rates are allowed to
go beyond zero, the Federal Reserve action is translated into further decreasing movement in
the negative territory. Our study indicates quite a significant impact of QE1 on the reduction
of short-term interest rates in the emerging and advanced economies. The results also show
a tendency that the implementation of QE1 as monetary policy accommodation of the US
economy is trailed by monetary policy accommodation everywhere else. The counterfactual
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analysis shows an otherwise higher level of short-term interest rates in all groups of economies
in the absence of QE1, albeit to a lesser extent for Latin American countries.
Subsequent to the contagion of short rates reduction periods following QE1, there is a
period where short-term interest rates in some economies seem to detach from the US monetary
policy stance. In fact, starting from the third quarter of 2009 monetary policy stances in some
groups of economies start to pick up, despite further accommodation in the US monetary policy.
This movement is particularly noticeable in the emerging Asian economies and to some extent
in advanced Europe and advanced Asia. This indicates that economic recovery is assumed
around one year after QE1 outside the US economy and the inflationary pressures build up.
This is what seems to drive monetary authorities outside the US to start increasing policy
rates. This also explains why the effect of QE2 episode in the other economies’ short rates
are quite negligible, and even counterintuitive for emerging Asia because an otherwise lower
short-term interest rates are likely to materialize in emerging Asia if QE2 is not implemented.
In contrast to QE2, QE3 affects foreign economies similarly to QE1 where the US monetary
policy accommodation appears to have been followed by other economies, albeit with a lot lesser
magnitude. Another important feature is the sharp increase in short-term interest rates in the
emerging countries from June to October 2013 following the ‘Fed talks’ on QE tapering plan,
which does not impact advanced economies short rates.
Our results provide evidence to our presumption following general cases of monetary policy
contagion as highlighted by Gray (2013) and Hofmann and Bogdanova (2012). In particular,
following QE1 there is a tendency for monetary policy contagion in the global economy led by
the US economy. A series of accommodative monetary policy moves by the Federal Reserve
in order to bolster domestic economic recovery tends to be trailed by monetary policy rates
everywhere else. However, the linkage is not equally strong for every period and for every
country. When QE2 is implemented, domestic inflationary pressures outside the US economy
appears to be significant suggesting emerging markets’ authorities to increase short rates. Thus,
there are periods when cross-country short rates linkages are weakened, i.e. when domestic
conditions like growth and inflation become more of a concern. In periods where the linkage
between foreign and domestic policy rates is weaker, and thus interest rates differentials are
widened, emerging economies policy implication is to implement capital flows management and
macroprudential policies to help contain the risks from volatile capital flows.
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2.3.3 Impulse Response Analyses
In order to study how global macroeconomic variables and monetary policy reacted to US
monetary policy in a wider context that also includes non-QE periods, we study the impact of
US monetary policy stance on macroeconomic variables in the US and other economies using
full data from January 1995 to February 2015. We use the method of Generalized Impulse
Response Functions (GIRFs) of Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998) to avoid the
problem of having to determine the orderings of the variables according to the theory, which is
particularly challenging in a multi-country setting. In order to analyse the impact of monetary
policy accommodation, we impose one standard error of negative shock to US monetary policy
variable. To put into perspective, the magnitude of one negative standard error shock to the
US monetary policy variable in the impulse response analysis is approximately equivalent to
a decrease of 28 bps of US policy rate (EFFR). The same size of the standard deviation of
the US monetary policy variable is also equivalent to an increase of around USD 140 billion
of the US Federal Reserve balance sheet size. We perform bootstrapping method with 2,000
bootstrap replications to produce the impulse response functions as well as the 90% bootstrap
confidence intervals.
Our impulse response functions are available in individual countries and in region group-
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ings. For simpler discussion, in the impulse response analysis part we group the countries
into three classifications only, that is the US, advanced, and emerging economy groups. Fig-
ure 2.14, 2.15, and 2.16 show the impulse response functions of the US, advanced, and emerging
economies as groups. Figure 2.17 and 2.18 show the range of maximum and minimum impact
of impulse response function for each country in the groups.
The one negative standard error shock in the US monetary policy variable on impact
has a small negative effect on risk appetite index but then becomes positive after 4 months,
but then back to approximately normal level in around 6 months (Figure 2.13). In the long
run, the effect of negative US monetary policy shock is to lower global risk appetite. This
lower risk appetite poses risks of higher capital inflows pressures to non-US countries. There
is significant decrease in the index of financial stock and oil prices by around 0.05 index to
negative US monetary policy shock equivalent to a decrease of 28 bps of US policy rate or an
increase of around USD 140 billion of the US Federal Reserve balance sheet size.
Responding to the same magnitude of negative US monetary policy shock, the exchange
rate in both the advanced and emerging countries appreciates as shown in Figure 2.15 and 2.16,
although the confidence interval for impulse response function in exchange market appreciation
is quite large for both groups. The largest appreciation pressure impact is experienced by South
Africa and Mexico for the emerging country group, and Japan and Australia for the advanced
country group (Figure 2.17 and Figure 2.18).
A 28 bps US monetary policy accommodation shock affects the stock price with a decrease
by 0.4% and 0.5% in the stock prices of the emerging and advanced economies, respectively,
in one-year period after the shock, with China and Greece experiencing the lowest decrease
compared to other countries in their respective group. In the long run, the pattern of GIRF
on the stock prices following a negative standard error shock to US monetary policy rate is
largely similar to industrial production. The effect of negative shock to US monetary policy
is to decrease industrial production within the first 12 months period after the shock with a
maximum impact of 0.4% and 0.5% negative change in the emerging and advanced groups,
respectively. This relationship reflects the policy stance of the Federal Reserve and other
central banks to reduce short-term interest rates during periods of low prices and slow economic
activities, where in such situation monetary policy accommodation is expected to encourage
real economic activity. After 12 months period, stock prices and industrial productions start to
slightly pick up indicating that the expected effect of short-term policy rate reduction begins
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to materialize.
The effect of one standard error negative US monetary policy shock is to increase inflation-
ary pressures in emerging economies group of around 0.03% change on impact, but a slightly
lower inflationary pressure of around 0.02% change on impact in the advanced economies. For
the advanced economies, the prevailing relationship between low interest rates and low prices
seems to explain monetary authorities’ effort to encourage real economic activities as suggested
by monetary policy rule. In contrast to the advanced economies, the opposite relationship of
low interests rate and higher prices in the emerging economies provides evidence that a lower
US policy rate is likely to be problematic for emerging economies due to the higher inflation
pressures following lower rates.
The negative one standard error in monetary policy shock on impact, equivalent to a 28
bps decrease or expansion in USD 140 billion, has 6 bps and 2 bps negative effects of long rates
in the emerging and advanced economies, respectively. Similarly, the same shock is also more
likely to reduce short-term rates by about 5 bps and 7 bps on impact for both the advanced
and emerging country groups, respectively. It can be seen that the impact of the shock to the
advanced economies’ long rates is dominated by Greece.
The GIRFs of the short-term policy and long-term rates provide evidence of monetary
policy contagion from the US economy to other economies across the globe. Monetary policy
expansion in the US is more likely to be followed by lower short-term policy rates elsewhere in
order to maintain domestic stability, decrease interest rate differentials, and reduce exchange
market appreciation pressures. The long-term interest rates are also more likely to be con-
tagious globally due to freer capital flows which allow higher interconnection between global
markets. A decrease in the long-term yield in the advanced economies will likely induce in-
vestors to find alternative investments in emerging economies, thus increasing the demand for
long-term bonds and decreasing long-term yields in these economies. Thus, this result supports
our counterfactual analysis that US monetary policy tends to spread to other economies by
influencing the formation of the short-term policy rate in other economies. Also, the long-term
interest rates are interconnected across the globe. Therefore, when the US monetary policy
aims to reduce the US long-term rates, it will be followed by lower long-term rates elsewhere,
thus complicating the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in the non-US countries.
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2.3.4 Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (GFEVD)
Figure 2.19 shows the GFEVD of the US monetary policy variation that are calculated to assess
the importance of US domestic and global variables in the US monetary policy determination,
and the number adds up to 100% in each month period. The first observation from the GFEVD
result is that the relative contribution of the US domestic and global variables are significant
for the US monetary policy determination, whereas the relative contribution of all non-US
variables are very low. This is not surprising as by construction the US variables and the
global variables are important for the US monetary policy variations.
The second stand-out observation is that the US monetary policy is itself that mostly
explains the forecast error variance decomposition of the historical shocks from 95% relative
contribution on impact which then reduces to around 65% relative contribution after two years.
This suggests that US monetary policy tends to have a strong auto-correlation component.
The second most important contribution to explain forecast error variance decomposition of US
monetary policy is the US industrial production with an average contribution of 6% throughout
the two-year period. The next important variables determining US monetary policy are the
global risk appetite variable, US stock price, the world financial oil index, and the US CPI
with the relative contribution of around 3% for each variable throughout the two-year period.
2.4 Conclusion
Our study aims at analyzing the macroeconomic and financial impact of US QE episodes on
the domestic and global economy and how they affect global monetary policymaking. We find
an asymmetric impact of QE episodes, with QE1 having the biggest impact on the US, the
other advanced, and emerging economies macroeconomic variables compared to QE2 and QE3.
We find evidence of large appreciation pressures in non-US countries following QE1 which may
suggest the existence of massive influx of capital flows. QE1 appears to have been successful in
halting recession periods following the global financial crisis in the global economy by increasing
industrial production, stock prices, and price levels in all groups of economies. However, as the
impact of QE1 begins to come into effect, inflationary pressures seem to increase particularly
in the emerging economies.
The counterfactual analyses and GIRFs show some evidence of monetary policy contagion
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from the US to other economies across the globe that materialize through either the long or
short rates. The results show the effectiveness of QE1 in reducing the long-term rates in the
US economy as expected. The tendency of lower rates in the longer end of US yield curves and
the reduction in global risks seem to spillovers to other economies. This finding provides some
support for the “portfolio-balance channel” that the reduced supply of US long-term securities
lead investors to seek alternative investment in emerging economies, and therefore increase
demand and reduce the yield of long-term securities in other economies.
There is also a tendency of monetary policy contagion through the short rates as accom-
modative monetary policy moves by the Federal Reserve tends to be trailed by lower monetary
policy rates everywhere else. However, the generalized forecast error variance decomposition
shows that, on impact the variables that contribute mostly to the variance of US monetary
policy shock are US domestic and global variables. Whereas the relative contribution of every
single foreign economy variables to US monetary policy determination is less than 1% each.
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(a) US Monetary Policy (b) Risk Appetite
(c) World Financial and Oil
Figure 2.13: GIRF of one standard error negative shock to US monetary policy variable on
risk appetite and world financial oil variable (in index unit)
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Table 2.1: The order of integration
IP PI STR LTR SP EMPI
Australia 1 1 1 1 1 0
Austria 1 1 1 1 1 1
Belgium 1 1 1 1 1 1
Brazil 1 1 - - 1 0
Canada 1 0 0 1 1 1
Chile 1 1 1 1 1 0
Hongkong 1 1 1 1 1 -
China 1 1 - - 1 0
France 1 1 1 1 1 0
Germany 0 0 1 1 1 1
Greece 1 1 1 1 1 1
India 1 1 1 1 1 0
Indonesia 1 1 0 - 1 0
Italy 1 1 1 1 1 -
Japan 0 1 1 1 1 1
South Korea 1 1 1 1 1 0
Malaysia 1 0 1 1 1 0
Mexico 1 2 0 - 1 1
Netherland 1 1 1 1 1 0
Phillippines 1 1 0 - 1 0
Singapore 0 1 1 1 1 1
South Africa 1 1 1 1 1 0
Spain 1 1 1 1 1 0
Sweden 1 1 0 1 1 0
Switzerland - 1 1 1 1 0
Thailand - 1 1 - 1 0
Turkey 1 2 - - 1 0
UK 1 1 1 1 1 0
USA 1 1 1 0 1 -
Total I(1) or I(2) 24 26 21 21 29 8
Total variables 27 29 26 22 29 26
Note: IP = industrial production; PI = price index; STR = short term rate; LTR = long term
rate; SP = stock price; EMPI = exchange market pressure; 0 = I(0); 1 = I(1); 2 = I(2); - =
data is unavailable.
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Table 2.2: Series from McCracken and Ng (2014) for the US monetary policy measurement
Classification Code Description
US Monetary Base
M1SL M1 Money Stock
M2SL M2 Money Stock
M2REAL Real M2 Money Stock
AMBSL St. Louis Adjusted Monetary Base
TOTRESNS Total Reserves
NONBORRES Nonborrowed Reserves
MZMSL MZM Money Stock
US Policy Rates, T-Bills & Bond Yields






AAA Aaa Corporate Bond Yield
BAA Baa Corporate Bond Yield
Spreads
COMPAPFFx CP – FFR spread
TB3SMFFM 3 Mo. – FFR spread
TB6SMFFM 6 Mo. – FFR spread
T1YFFM 1 yr. – FFR spread
T5YFFM 5 yr. – FFR spread
T10YFFM 10 yr. – FFR spread
AAAFFM Aaa – FFR spread
BAAFFM Baa – FFR spread
49
(a) Stock Price (b) Industrial Production
(c) Price Index (d) Long Rates
Figure 2.14: GIRF of 1 SE negative shock to US monetary policy on US domestic variables
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(a) EMP (b) Stock Price
(c) Industrial Production (d) Price Index
(e) Long Rates (f) Short Rates
Figure 2.15: GIRF of 1 SE negative shock to US monetary policy on all advanced economies
variables
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(a) EMP (b) Stock Price
(c) Industrial Production (d) Price Index
(e) Long Rates (f) Short Rates
Figure 2.16: GIRF of 1 SE negative shock to US monetary policy on all emerging economies
variables
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(a) EMP (b) Stock Price
(c) Industrial Production (d) Price Index
(e) Long Rates (f) Short Rates
Figure 2.17: Range of impact of 1 SE negative shock to US monetary policy on all individual
emerging economies variables
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(a) EMP (b) Stock Price
(c) Industrial Production (d) Price Index
(e) Long Rates (f) Short Rates
Figure 2.18: Range of impact of 1 SE negative shock to US monetary policy on all individual
advanced economies variables
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(a) US Monetary Policy (b) US and Global Variables
(c) Advanced Economy Variables (d) Emerging Economy Variables
Figure 2.19: Generalized forecast error-variance decompositions: a negative standrad-error
unit shock to US monetary policy variable
Note: ip = industrial production; cpi = price index; sr = short term rate; lr = long term rate;




Spillovers to Emerging Economies
3.1 Introduction
Financial liberalization and globalization have brought opportunities for emerging economies
to advance their national development by broadening the scope of financing resources. Apart
from this positive impact, financial liberalization and globalization also come with great chal-
lenges to emerging economies as they face greater exposure to external financial shocks that
may jeopardize domestic financial stability. The openness to international financial markets
also triggers cross-border policy spillovers from the advanced to emerging countries. The imple-
mentation of unconventional monetary policy by the US Federal Reserve is a notable example
of how the policy stance of a center economy, whose currency is the key reserve currency in
the world, may affect monetary conditions in the rest of the world, and thus their monetary
policymaking.
Following the US credit markets failure in 2007, the Federal Reserve swiftly responded
through conventional monetary policy by means of interest rate reduction, which were then
followed by the unconventional measures in the form of large-scale asset purchases program as
the policy rate hit the zero lower bound (Figure 3.1). The policies were implemented to reduce
the strain in the credit market by minimizing risk and term premium of long-term bonds to
encourage financial markets to restore its function as a liquidity provider in private credit
markets. Although the objective of the policy was largely domestic, international financial
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market integration allows the impact of any policy implementation in a centre economy to
spillover across borders. In particular, the first episode of unconventional monetary policy
(QE1) which was started in late November 2008 appears to not only able to avoid the US
economy from further recession, but also to improve the global economic condition.
Figure 3.2 presents the macroeconomic and financial conditions of emerging and developing
economies, calculated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The positive effect of QE1
appears to have helped the global economy recover from the crisis, which started to materialize
in emerging economies around one year after implementation. This can be seen by an increase
in export and import activities, and the slowing down of inflation, which led to GDP recovery.
Following QE1, the Federal Reserve introduced QE2, which began in November 2010,
followed by QE3 in June 2012. As opposed to the outcomes after the first episode of quantitative
easing, the next two rounds of quantitative easing did not seem to impact the developing and
emerging economies positively. Earlier studies argue that the extended periods of monetary
policy easing has resulted in an increase of capital inflows in most of emerging economies,
particularly Latin America and Asia (Borio, 2011; Chen et al., 2012b; Barroso et al., 2015;
Ahmed and Zlate, 2014; Sahay et al., 2014).
Unlike capital inflows in the form of foreign direct investment, capital inflows in the form
of short-term portfolio investment are less preferable because of its destabilizing features. An
increase in capital inflows to emerging economies induces domestic exchange rates appreciation.
If the emerging economy implements a fully flexible exchange rate regime, the destabilizing
capital inflows will eventually recede as domestic currency appreciation makes the investment
in emerging countries more expensive. Also, because domestic appreciation damages export
competitiveness, most emerging economies may want to intervene in their foreign exchange
market to keep the exchange rate largely stable. As a result, the destabilizing capital inflows
continue and the foreign reserves enlarge. In order to discourage more destabilizing capital
inflows, the monetary authority of an emerging country may decide to reduce policy rate, thus
decreasing the interest rate differential with the centre economy. This suggests that if the
domestic financial market is open, then the large monetary policy easing of advanced major
economies may instigate loose monetary policy stances everywhere else, particularly in the
emerging economies, thus generating a sequence of monetary policy contagion effect across the
world. Previous works like Gray (2013), Taylor (2013), and Hofmann and Bogdanova (2012)
study the contagion in monetary policy stance. They find that monetary policy contagion is in
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Figure 3.1: US monetary policy stance, blue line: US federal fund rate, orange dashed line:
US Federal Reserve total asset (in inverted plot), Source: Datastream.
fact not a new phenomenon as there is a tendency for monetary policy stances of the countries
to follow each other going back at least to the last two decades (Figure 3.3).
Against this background, this paper investigates the challenges faced by emerging countries
arising from monetary policy decisions of the centre economy by utilizing a small open economy
model in a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) framework with financial friction
a la Bernanke et al. (1999). In particular, it aims to trace the responses of a typical emerging
country during the periods of large US monetary policy easing in the aftermath of the great
financial crisis in 2007-8. First, it studies the implication of monetary policy relaxation in
the centre economy on the macroeconomic and financial stability of the emerging economy.
It then discusses how common features of a typical small open emerging economy, such as
financial friction and liability dollarization, may exacerbate the impact of foreign policy shock
on the domestic economy. Subsequently, this paper analyses the implication of a monetary
easing response by the small economy following the foreign rate shock as observed particularly
following the first round of QE (as shown in the second graph of Figure 3.3). The aim of this
exercise is to study the implications of contagion for the emerging economy.
Although some studies have attempted to analyse the impact of the US QE on the global
economy in a DSGE framework (see, for example, Haberis and Lipinska (2012) and Alpanda
and Kabaca (2015)), these studies fail to consider the implications of US QE on monetary
policymaking particularly in the emerging economies: something we find empirically significant
in the second chapter. This finding and the analyses on the policy response by the emerging
economies have important policy implications. First, if the implementation of monetary policy
by a centre economy alters monetary policymaking in the other economy, even after adopting
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Figure 3.2: Emerging and developing economies aggregated data, aggregation calculated by
the IMF.
Note: GDP is in percentage change year-on-year; Consumer prices are for all items in per-
centage change year-on-year; The values of export and import is first differenced of the log of
export and import values in USD; The official foreign reserve assets is first differenced of the
log of foreign reserve value in USD. Source: Datastream.
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a flexible exchange rate regime, then monetary policy in periphery economies may not be
as independent as suggested by standard open economy macroeconomic theories. Second, if
the cross-border monetary policy spillovers from the core country exist and are significant,
then monetary policymakers should increasingly become aware of the global dimension of
their tasks, and thus need to internalize each others’ economic condition and policy stances
in policymaking as suggested by Borio (2011) and Caruana (2012). This chapter attempts to
address these omissions. In particular, we utilize a DSGE framework to trace out how this
policy contagion materializes to understand the reason behind the policy stance pursued by
emerging economies, and then discuss the ramifications of such policy stance.
In order to study the challenges faced by a small open emerging economy, a DSGE frame-
work is chosen because it allows us to analyse the possible impact of current economic choices
on the future outcome of all macroeconomic and financial variables in the system. The model
also allows us to include different economic players, e.g. consumers, firms, and entrepreneurs,
and to study how their aggregate behaviour affects macroeconomic variables. Certain charac-
teristics that we would like to include in the model are embedded in model specification and
the choice of parameter values. For instance, the inclusion of financial friction in the model is
aimed at studying the impact of financial market imperfection on domestic financial stability,
in particular, whether the financial market imperfection amplifies the impact of external shocks
on the financial condition of an emerging economy.
For calibration and parameter values, the model has characteristics that resemble a typical
emerging Asian country, in particular Indonesia. Although the specific characteristics of Asian
emerging countries are quite diverse, these countries share a similar economic environment and
often face the same set of challenges in maintaining domestic financial stability. During the
period of 1997-8 Asian financial crisis, these countries experienced a foreign credit mismatch
problem that led to currency devaluations and a drop in foreign investor confidence, which
then brought about massive capital reversals. As a result, these economies underwent a period
of economic recession and financial restructuring. A decade following the Asian financial
crisis, these economies experienced the impact of the global financial crisis that was originated
externally. The 2007-8 global financial crisis shows how damaging external shocks can become
to financial stability in an open emerging economy. Despite the relatively benign conditions in
emerging economies prior to the global crisis, the crisis that was originated in the credit market
failures of the advanced economies was capable of producing recessions in many emerging
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economies.
Asian emerging countries possess several characteristics that are typical of a small open
economy. The economy is ”small” in the sense that it can be affected by the rest of the
world, but not vice versa. It is ”open” in the sense that it embeds households that involve in
international risk-sharing activity through international bond holdings and firms that borrow
foreign currency debt to fund their investment activities. The economy also has firms that
produce export products for the rest of the world. This makes the country dependent on
global demand on its export and the price of its exported products in international markets.
Also, the fluctuation of its domestic exchange rate against major reserve currencies adds more
risks to export goods competitiveness, and thus affects internal macroeconomic stability. In
general, these openness features of the emerging economy increase its exposure to external
financial conditions.
The small open economy has a large number of entrepreneurs who borrow externally in
order to finance their investment projects. The high volume of foreign currency denominated
borrowing is typical of emerging market economies, i.e. ”liability dollarization” problem, expos-
ing the country to risks related to exchange rate fluctuations and shifts in investors’ confidence.
In addition to liability dollarization, the domestic financial market in this economy also
exhibits financial market imperfections. Financial market imperfections take the form of im-
perfect information in credit market via the inability of investors to examine the results of
investments performed by borrowers. In order to cover the risks of asymmetric information,
there is an external risk premium which raises the costs of obtaining funds externally above
costs from raising funds internally. This external finance premium is linked to the leverage
ratio and the net worth (i.e. collateral) of the borrowers. During unfavourable financial con-
ditions, where the leverage ratio is high and net worth is low, the external finance premium
increases, which then leads to a higher probability of default by firms. Gertler (1988) argues
that financial market conditions and fluctuations are not simply passive reflections of the busi-
ness cycle, but are in themselves major factors contributing to the severity of booms and busts
in economic activity. Similarly, Bernanke et al. (1999) show that the existence of financial
friction can significantly amplify the effect of shocks.
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Figure 3.3: Monetary policy rates, source: Datastream
3.2 Literature Review
In a frictionless capital market, the financial structures of firms do not influence their invest-
ment decision and the cost of acquiring internal funds is the same as external funds. If there is
an information asymmetry between the lenders and borrowers however, the lenders are unable
to observe the outcome of investment decisions and so will require higher returns on lending
or a high level of collateral to support the lending. As a result, the financial structures of
borrowing firms, such as net worth, will determine their investment decision. Furthermore, in
order to cover the risks arising from informational asymmetries, external financing becomes
more expensive forming a wedge between the external and internal cost of finance.
The implication of financial market friction is that, a relatively small shock in the financial
markets can exert a persistent and amplified impact on the real economy. Also, the implication
of this mechanism for policymaking is that the credit market channel of the monetary policy
transmission mechanism may be undermined by the presence of financial market friction.
Because of the potential importance of credit market frictions in explaining the behaviour
of real macroeconomic data, many studies, especially those using the DSGE framework, have
built credit market friction mechanism into DSGE models such as (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997;
Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1997; Bernanke et al., 1999). These models can be distinguished by the
different ways financial friction is introduced.
Among the earliest work on financial friction is Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). The study is
a theoretical work that is intended to explain the transmission mechanism of an endogenous
development in credit limits which interacts with asset prices. The problem arises from the
inability of lenders to force borrowers to pay their debts unless the debts are secured by
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certain assets. Thus, the credit limit of borrowers is affected by the price of the assets owned
by borrowers. At the same time, the asset prices are affected by the credit limits. Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) show that the dynamic relationship between credit limits and asset prices
generates a transmission mechanism that makes shocks persist, amplify, and spread.
Another early work on credit market imperfection is Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), which
focuses on the presence of agency costs to explain the hump-shaped aggregate output be-
haviour. Following a shock to productivity, the return from internal funds increases, which
reduces agency costs gradually. Households delay investment decisions to wait until agency cost
is at its lowest, which creates the hump-shaped aggregate output and net worth as observed
in empirical data.
Although both studies work on financial friction, the difference between the two earlier
financial friction studies is that, in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) borrowing is so tightly linked
to the net worth level that default does not exist in equilibrium, while in Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997) lending exceeds net worth, therefore, a default is an equilibrium phenomenon.
Another paper introducing financial friction is Bernanke et al. (1999) (BGG). Similar to
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke et al. (1999) explore the role of credit market frictions on
business cycle fluctuations. The key mechanism of the BGG model is the existence of a direct
linkage between the external finance premium and the net worth of potential borrowers. This
study also introduces money and price stickiness into the model to study how credit market
frictions affect the monetary policy transmission mechanism. They show that the financial
friction is significant in explaining business cycle dynamics.
Gertler et al. (2007) continue the work of previous studies on financial friction with an
emphasis on an emerging economy context, especially to mimic the behaviour of the Korean
economy during the financial crisis in 1997-8. They conclude that the existence of financial
frictions is significant, explaining around half of the downturn in overall economic activity.
They also perform a counterfactual analysis on the impact of a fixed exchange rate regime and
conclude that fixing exchange rates will more likely cause a substantially higher welfare losses
following a financial crisis than under a flexible exchange rate regime.
As with Gertler et al. (2007), Devereux et al. (2006) extend earlier works in an open
emerging economies context, stressing the balance-sheet related financial friction. Using this
balance-sheet related friction, they examine the response to shocks to world interest rates and
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the terms of trade, and compare the results under alternative monetary rules. In addition, they
also compare the impact of different speeds of exchange rate pass-through on the response of
real variables.
Ozkan and Unsal (2017) include the financial friction into a two-country DSGE model in
order to examine the transmission of the global financial crisis from advanced countries with
financial friction into emerging market countries. They find that the effectiveness of monetary
policy is determined by the degree of financial contagion, the degree of trade openness, and
the scale of foreign currency denominated debt in emerging economies.
Merola (2010)’s work is built on Gertler et al. (2007) and Devereux et al. (2006) which adds
two features of emerging economies. First, she extends the model to a two-sector economy:
a non-tradable and a tradable sector. This allows different price staggering mechanisms to
influence the model. While the non-tradable sector firms are monopolistic competitors, which
can set their optimal price, tradable sector firms are the price taker in the export sector.
The second feature is liability dollarization which adds vulnerability of emerging economies to
external shocks.
Harmanta et al. (2014) build a banking sector DSGE model for the Indonesian economy
with financial accelerator mechanism that is extended from Gerali et al. (2010) and Christiano
et al. (2005). The aims of this study are to explore alternative policies in order to mitigate
shocks from banking sectors. The core framework of this paper is different to ours, however we
refer to some of their parameter values for the Indonesian economy for our calibration purpose.
Despite that many DSGE studies have adopted financial friction mechanisms into DSGE
frameworks, it is also worth mentioning that there are some studies that do not find much
support for financial friction mechanisms such as (Christensen and Dib, 2008; Gelain et al.,
2009; Brzoza-Brzezina and Kolasa, 2013). Christensen and Dib (2008) finds that the presence of
the financial accelerator amplifies and propagates the effects of demand shocks on investment,
but the importance of the financial accelerator for output fluctuations is relatively minor.
Gelain et al. (2009) concludes that theoretical financial accelerator model are not supported
by the data, whereas Brzoza-Brzezina and Kolasa (2013) concludes that BGG model does not
make a clear improvement over the New Keynesian benchmark in terms of marginal likelihood
and similarity of impulse responses to those obtained from a Vector Auto-Regression model.
Our paper is closest to Devereux et al. (2006) and Merola (2010) in terms of the model
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framework. While Devereux et al. (2006) focus mainly on the degree of exchange rate pass-
through and the implications for the ranking of monetary rules, this paper focuses on discussing
the implication of foreign monetary policy stance on domestic stability. Our paper is distinct
from Merola (2010) as our analysis focuses on foreign shocks, whereas Merola (2010) focuses on
domestic shocks. This paper also differs from Devereux et al. (2006) and Merola (2010) with
regard to calibration of the parameters. Where possible, we use Indonesian data to determine
the parameters and steady state values, for instance, in order to determine the relative size
of the non-traded and export sectors. When Indonesian data are not available, we use the
parameter or steady state values of other emerging Asian economies.
3.3 Model Presentation
The core framework of this study is an open economy model with a financial friction along the
lines of Bernanke et al. (1999), Devereux et al. (2006), Merola (2010) and Ozkan and Unsal
(2017). The financial friction links the condition of a borrower’s balance sheet to capital de-
mand. This mechanism allows asset prices to affect the borrower’s balance sheet and magnifies
the effect of the external shock to the domestic economy.
The structure is a standard two-sector small open economy model. Two goods are pro-
duced, a domestic non-traded good and an export good, the price of which is fixed on world
markets. Within the model there exist four domestic agents, households, firms, entrepreneurs,
and the monetary authority. The households work, save, and consume non-tradable and im-
ported tradable goods. In addition, there exists ”rest of the world” sector where the export
product is consumed, foreign-currency prices of export and import goods are set, and lending
rates are determined.
Firms in both sectors hire labour from consumers-households and rent capital from en-
trepreneurs to produce goods which are consumed by domestic households and foreign im-
porters. Firms in the non-traded sector face monopolistic competition, therefore they set
prices in a staggered way. We assume Rotemberg (1982) price-setting mechanism where firms
face a small direct cost of price adjustment. This way we introduce nominal rigidities that
allow for monetary policy effect. Entrepreneurs borrow from foreign lenders under contracts

















where Ct is a composite consumption index, Ht is labour supply, Et is the mathematical
expectation conditional upon information available at t, β is the representative consumer’s
subjective discount factor where 0 < β < 1, σ > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, ψ is the elasticity of labour supply, and η is just the coefficient of labour in
utility.
Households consume a composite good which consists of non-traded and imported goods













where ρ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between the consumption for non-traded goods
and import goods, a is the share of non-traded goods price in the price index, CNt is the
consumption of non-tradable goods and CMt is the consumption of imported goods.
Similarly, the price index is a composite of non-traded and imported goods prices also
using the CES function:
Pt = (aP
1−ρ
Nt + (1− a)PM t1−ρ)
1
1−ρ , (3.3)
where PNt is the price of non-tradable goods and PMt is the price of import sector goods.
Households consumption for both the non-traded and imported goods is differentiated across








is the elasticity of substitution across varieties of goods.
The households borrows foreign-currency external debt Dt which is subject to small port-
folio adjustment cost Pt
ψD
2 (Dt+1 − D¯)2, where D¯ is an exogenous steady state level of net
foreign debt, at a given interest rates i∗t . The households can also borrow in the domestic
66
denominated bond market Bt at an interest rates it, without investment adjustment costs.
Thus, the households’ revenue flow comes from the wages Wt from the hour labour supply,
foreign and domestic denominated borrowings. The total revenue is used for consumption and
paying the debt including the interests. Thus, the households’ budget constraint is as follows:
PtCt = WtHt+Tt+ Πt+StDt+1 +Bt+1−PtψD
2
(Dt+1− D¯)2− (1 + i∗t )StDt− (1 + it)Bt. (3.4)
The households choose the amount of non-traded and import consumption to maximize












































Equation 3.7 and Equation 3.8 is the Euler equation arising from the purchase of foreign and
domestic currency bonds, whereas Equation 3.9 is the labour supply equation.
3.3.2 Production Firms
Firms in the non-traded and export sectors operate with different production technology, with
AN and AX the productivity parameter for the non-traded and the export sector, respectively.
These final goods firms produce goods using labour hired from households at wages Wt, and
capital hired from entrepreneurs, where they pay rent RNt and RXt. It is assumed that labour
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is mobile across sectors, therefore, the wage in non-traded and export sectors are equal. The







where α and γ are the share of capital in the non-traded sector and export sector, respectively.
The firms’ cost minimising behaviour implies the following optimality conditions:














Equations 3.12 and 3.14 define the optimal level of employment by the households for the
non-traded and export sector, whereas Equations 3.13 and 3.15 determine capital demand in
each sector. MCNt is the marginal cost of production in the non-traded sector, PXt is the
price of traded export goods and because this sector is competitive then PXt is also the cost
of production.
Capital goods firms produce capital (KNt in non-tradable sector and KXt in export sector)
by combining new investment and existing capital stock (net of depreciation δ) to produce new
unfinished capital goods which evolve according to Equations 3.16 and 3.17 and can also be

























KXt + (1− δ)KXt. (3.17)
There are investment adjustment costs so then the marginal return on investment in terms
of capital goods is declining in the level of investment undertaken. Investment in new capital
requires imports and non-traded goods in the same mix as the households’ consumption basket.
Therefore the nominal price of a unit of investment is Pt in either sector.
Competitive capital producers will ensure that the price of capital sold to entrepreneurs is
QNt =
Pt
1− ψI(INt/KNt − δ) , (3.18)
where QNt is the price of capital.
3.3.3 Local Currency Price Setting
The firms in the non-traded sector operate as monopolistic competitors, choosing their output
price to maximise profits. We follow Rotemberg’s (1982) assumption of small direct price
adjustment costs that apply to every non-traded goods firm. The existence of price adjustment
costs makes firms adjust prices gradually to demand or marginal costs shocks.
As the firms are owned by households, then a firm will maximise its profit stream using




















The optimization problem of the firms is to choose price PNt to maximise profit stream
(Equation 3.20). After imposing symmetry due to the assumption that all firms are alike, the
































The import firms buy foreign goods in foreign currency prices StP
∗
Mt, and then sell the
goods in domestic prices PMt to domestic market. The imported goods firms are also mo-
nopolistic competitors, so that they choose price PMt to maximise their profit stream. This
mechanism causes the existence of delays between movements in the exchange rate and the
imported goods prices adjustments. Thus, the imported good’s price index for domestic con-

































The interpretation of the imported good price index is that the monopolistic competitive
importers set the price of domestic imported goods as a markup over the foreign price. In
addition, importers face a quadratic adjustment cost so that they adjust their prices only
gradually towards the desired price. The parameter from the quadratic adjustment costs ψPM
thus acts as the degree of exchange rate pass-through.
3.3.4 Entrepreneurs
There are two types of entrepreneurs in the economy, one transforms the unfinished capital
goods into finished capital goods for the use of the non-tradable sector, and the other produces
finished capital goods for the traded sector. In order to produce finished capital goods, en-
trepreneurs borrow from foreign lenders. This reflects the liability dollarization problem of the
emerging economies. The entrepreneurs’ behaviour is similar to that proposed by Bernanke
et al. (1999), which is extended into the open economy version in this study.
The mechanism of Bernanke et al. (1999) assumes the existence of an agency problem
which makes external financing cost higher compared to internal funds. The output of the
entrepreneur is subject to an idiosyncratic random outcome. The entrepreneur costlessly ob-
serves the outcome of their project, whereas the lender incurs monitoring costs to observe the
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entrepreneur’s outcome. This reflects an information asymmetry problem. Depending on the
outcome, the entrepreneur can decide whether to continue the project and thus repay the debt,
or to default. If he defaults, the lender audits the loan and recovers the project outcome less
monitoring costs.
The representation below is for the non-tradable sector, but the same representation also
applies to traded goods sector. For both sectors, the entrepreneurs’ demand for capital depends
in the expected marginal return and the expected marginal external financing cost. The
expected marginal return to capital (equal to the expected average return due to constant
returns) is next period’s ex-post gross output net of adjustment costs, normalized by the






















where RKNt+1 is the external funds rate and RNt+1 is the marginal productivity of capital at
t+1.
Lenders charge borrowers extra costs to cover the possibility of bankruptcy in order to
receive a competitive return. This is how the lender deals with the existence of information
asymmetry. Consequently, the marginal external financing costs are equal to the opportunity
costs equivalent to the riskless interest rates plus the gross premium for external funds (i.e.
the external finance premium). In the absence of the information asymmetry problem, the
marginal external financing costs are equal to the riskless interest rates only.
The real return on capital is equal to the real cost on external funds:
EtRKNt+1 = Et
1 + St DeNt+1Pt
ZNt+1
ω (1 + i∗t+1)St+1St PtPt+1
 , (3.24)









. If the ω is equal to zero, then this relationship collapses to a condition
where capital rate of return is equal to the cost of funds, and thus there is no capital market
frictions.
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denotes the share of total real debt denominated in foreign currency hold by en-






(QNtKNt+1 − ZNt+1). (3.26)
Equation 3.24 shows that the entrepreneurs decision to acquire additional capital financed
by debt DeNt+1 leads to a higher leverage ratio,
KNt+1QNt
ZNt+1
, inducing a higher external finance
premium, and thus a higher overall marginal cost of finance RKNt+1. Due to this higher
marginal cost of finance, entrepreneurs’ demand for capital is less than the perfect capital
market case.
It is important to note that, this gross external finance premium depends only on the
aggregate leverage ratio and not on any entrepreneur-specific variables. The above relationship
shows that in general, the external finance premium depends negatively on the aggregate net
worth of entrepreneurs: the greater share of the net worth is, the lesser is the probability of
default and bankruptcy cost, and hence the smaller is the external finance premium.
This relationship also provides the financial friction, which is key. That is, the financial
position of the entrepreneur (i.e. collateral) influences the marginal cost of funds, and therefore,
the demand for capital. In addition, the price of capital QNt is also important in affecting the
leverage ratio and collateral.
The entrepreneurs are assumed to survive for the next period with probability ν. This
assumption is to ensure that the entrepreneurs will not be able to accumulate enough net
worth such that they can fully finance the new capital acquisition themselves. Thus, the
entrepreneurs’ net worth is defined as follows:
ZNt+1 = ν
[





Entrepreneurs going out of business at time t consume their remaining resources:
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The monetary authority conducts monetary policy by adjusting nominal interest rates accord-
ing to an interest rate rule:











The parameter µpi defines the importance of the CPI inflation rate which is targeted around
the target level p¯i. In addition, the parameter µS shows the degree of interest rate adjustment
by the monetary authority upon variations in the exchange rates around the target level S¯,
while µi is the degree of policy rate adjustment around an interest rate target level i. The
monetary policy shock is described by ϑt. We do not include the output of the interest rate rule
following the finding by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2005) who find that the output coefficient
in the optimized interest rate rule which is close to zero.
3.3.6 Equilibrium
The market clearing condition for non-tradable goods is defined as total demand coming from
consumption of households, firms, and entrepreneurs, including demand which is required to
pay the costs of price adjustment (of both the non-tradable and foreign exporters), monitoring,





























The households labour supply must be divided between the two sectors, so that labour
market clearing condition implies:
HXt +HNt = Ht. (3.31)
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3.3.7 Autoregressive Shocks
We introduce two exogenous shocks: foreign interest rate shock (i.e. a decrease in i∗t ) and
domestic monetary policy shock (a decrease of ϑt).





ϑt = (ϑt−1)ρϑ exp(εϑ) (3.33)
3.4 Calibration
We follow the literature in setting well-known deep parameters. The steady state rate of
depreciation of capital (δ) is set equal to 0.025 which corresponds to a rate of depreciation
equal to 10 percent annual; the discount factor β equals 0.945, which corresponds to an annual
rate in the steady state of 5.75 percent. The inverse of elasticity of substitution in consumption
is 2 following Devereux et al. (2006) and Ozkan and Unsal (2017). The steady state share of
capital in the non-tradable output (α) is equal to 0.3, while the steady state share of capital
in the tradable output is set equal to 0.6 as in Merola (2010). The investment adjustment cost
χ takes a value of 12. The probability ν that entrepreneurs will survive for the next period is
set equal to 0.94, therefore on average entrepreneurs may live for 37 years. Following Gertler
et al. (2007), the elasticity of substitution between domestic goods and imported goods in
consumption (ρ) is set equal to 1.
Some of the parameters used in the model are calibrated using the values utilized by similar
models used by Bank Indonesia. According to Indonesian data, the relative steady state size of
the non-tradable and the tradable (export) sectors are YN 0.77, whereas YX 0.23, respectively.
The share of non-tradable goods in CPI (a), is set equal to 0.63 following Indonesian figures
in Harmanta et al. (2014). The inverse of elasticity of labour supply (ψ) and the coefficient
of labour in utility (η) are both set equal to 1. The domestic retailer’s profit margin (price
markup) in Indonesia is 18%, as in Harmanta et al. (2014). This value implies the steady
state value of the elasticity of substitution between varieties of goods (λ) is set equal to 6.5, in
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both non-tradable an import sector. Keen and Wang (2007) generate a relationship between
Rotemberg price adjustment cost ψ, the constant fraction of re-optimizing firms (1 − θ), the
elasticity of substitution between varieties λ (or equivalently the price markup ratio λ1−λ), and
the discount factor β as follows:
ψ =
λ(1− θ)
(1− θ)(1− βθ) (3.34)
According to Harmanta et al. (2014), the Calvo parameter θ of firms not re-optimizing for
non-traded, import, and export sectors in Indonesia are 0.4, 0.7, and 0.6 respectively. With
price markup of 18% and discount factor 0.945, these values imply price adjustment cost of
5.89, 37.91, and 19.05 in the non-traded, import, and export sector respectively which are then
used in this study. The investment adjustment cost is at 5 and bond adjustment cost is 0.0007.
We follow Devereux et al. (2006) for the implied savings rate of entrepreneurs equal to
0.94. The monetary authority is assumed to implement an inflation targeting framework where
stable inflation is aimed, and the exchange rate is floated. Therefore, the parameters of the
policy rule assume that µpi is 20, whereas µS is 1. Shocks are persistent: the autoregressive
parameter is assumed to be equal to 0.9 for all the shocks. Finally, for both sectors, the
elasticity of risk premia to the leverage ratio (ω) is assumed to be equal to 0.02. The full list
of parameter values is presented in Table 3.1.
3.5 The Impact of US Federal Reserve Monetary Policy Easing
on Emerging Economies
In order to study the impact of foreign monetary policy easing, we consider a decrease in the
world interest rate (i∗t ) as the first shock. We then compare the outcomes of the shock under
two conditions of an economy with high and very low financial friction, which is implied in the
value of ω i.e. the elasticity of the external finance risk premium with respect to the leverage
ratio. As in Merola (2010), an economy with a financial friction is assumed to have the value
of ω = 0.015, while ω → 0 for an economy with very low financial friction. The second shock
is negative domestic monetary policy rate shock ϑt in order to study whether monetary policy
contagion in which monetary policy easing in the foreign economy is followed by domestic
policy easing is an effective response for the domestic economy.
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Figure 3.4 plots the impulse response of a set of domestic variables to a one standard
deviation negative shock to the foreign interest rate. The economy is assumed to have fully
flexible exchange rates. There is a monetary authority, which implements a standard inflation-
targeting Taylor Rule type of monetary policy. In a small open economy featuring substantial
liability dollarization and financial friction, a shock to foreign interest rates may affect domestic
stability through two main channels. First, entrepreneurs borrow externally with the rate
determined by the foreign interest rate. Second, the foreign interest rate is the ’price’ for the
international risk-sharing transaction where consumers-households involve in.
On impact, the foreign interest rate reduction widens the wedge between domestic and
foreign interest rates, causing the domestic financial market to be more attractive to foreign
investors. At the same time, capital inflows increase as shown by the balance of payment
dynamics, which is the difference between foreign asset invested in the domestic economy and
domestic asset invested abroad. Higher capital inflows lead to the appreciation of the domestic
currency as shown in Figure 3.4, although the appreciation is relatively minor. The exchange
rate appreciation reduces the competitiveness of domestic goods, decreasing the output of the
export sector.
The foreign interest rate reduction shocks can be seen as a cheaper cost of investment,
indicated by the marginal rate of return on capital. Hence, a foreign interest rate reduction
causes a drop in the expected return on capital for the entrepreneurs. As a result, there is
a drop in the external finance premium which means, borrowing from outside becomes less
expensive for the entrepreneurs-borrowers compared to raising fund internally.
The lower cost of investment induces entrepreneurs to borrow more, thus we see an increase
in entrepreneurs debt which reaches a peak four periods after the initial shock, but then
gradually falls back to the steady state level in the long run. This supports the international
risk-taking channel of monetary policy, as argued by Bruno and Shin (2015a), that lower US
dollar interest rates which cause an appreciation of exchange rates of the other economies
increase banks’ ability to lend more in US dollars to firms with the same level of local currency
loan, thus increasing risk-taking behaviour in financial markets. As entrepreneurs increase
their foreign borrowing due to cheaper borrowing costs, their level of investment is enlarged.
As a result, the capital production in the economy enlarges, although the magnitude is not
very substantial compared to the increase in entrepreneurs debt. At the same time, asset
prices increase on impact. This improves profits received by the entrepreneurs, and thus their
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Figure 3.4: Negative shock to foreign policy rate
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net worth also increases. Entrepreneurs’ leverage gradually reduces and reaches the bottom
level at around four periods after the shock. Lower leverage and increased profitability for the
entrepreneurs lead higher entrepreneurs’ consumption up to four periods following the shock.
The foreign short rate reduction influences production in the non-tradable and export-
oriented goods production differently. This is mainly due to different ratio of production factors
in the two sectors. While non-tradable is labour-intensive, the tradable (export) sector is more
capital-intensive. Although capital production enlarges in this economy, higher production
materializes in the labour-intensive non-tradable sector but not in the export sector.
The export goods production decreases following the lower foreign rates because appreci-
ation of domestic exchange rate makes the domestic export product more expensive. On the
contrary, the foreign rates reduction appears to increase non-tradable production. In compari-
son, the reduction in the output of the export sector is more than the increase in the output of
the non-tradable sector. The different effects on the two different sector is because, firstly, the
ability of entrepreneurs to borrow more externally allows the economy to produce more capi-
tal. Secondly, the non-tradable output is sold domestically, thus its price does not depend on
the exchange rate. Thus, the extent to which lower foreign interest rate impacts the domestic
economy will depend on the proportion of non-tradable goods and export goods production in
the economy, as well as their structure of production factors.
In our calibrations, the drop in the export production appears to outweigh the positive
effect of higher non-tradable goods production. As can be seen, there is an increase in unem-
ployment rate, and a drop in wage rates and consumption although consumption increases in
the long run. The lower production costs and exchange rate appreciation reduces inflation rate
on impact. This makes the domestic monetary authority to reduce domestic interest rates.
Hence, when the exchange rate is flexible and monetary authority implements an inflation rate
targeting regime, a monetary policy relaxation in the advanced country tends to be followed
by monetary policy relaxation in the domestic emerging economy.
3.6 The Impact of Financial Frictions on Domestic Economy
Figure 3.5 shows the divergent paths of impulse responses from a negative shock in foreign
interest rates in two distinct economies with different levels of financial frictions. The black
line represents an economy with the low level of financial frictions (benchmark), while the red
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Figure 3.5: Negative shock to foreign policy rate
Note: Black line is the low financial friction economy (benchmark); red asterisk line is the high
financial friction economy.
asterisk line represents a higher level. An emerging economy with higher financial frictions is
the economy where information asymmetry is more severe where the foreign lender is less able
to observe the outcome of the investment project. The implication of higher financial friction
is that the external finance premium is even more dependent on the entrepreneurs’ leverage
ratio. In other words, for the same level of foreign borrowing, an economy with higher financial
friction will have to pay more external finance premium.
The figures show that the higher the level of financial friction is, the more intensified impact
the foreign interest rate shock has on the entrepreneurs’ leverage, net worth, consumption, and
capital. The emerging economy with higher financial friction is more sensitive to foreign interest
rate changes. Lower foreign rates are perceived as a reduction in risk premium leading to a
79
lower external finance premium. As the external finance premium reduces, cost of investment
decreases more significantly in high financial friction economy compared to the lower one. The
exchange rate appreciates even more when financial friction is higher. As a result, entrepreneurs
are more willing to take more risks by borrowing more from the rest of the world, causing more
domestic capital inflows.
As there is more foreign borrowing by the entrepreneurs, investment and thus capital
production is increased even more in the high financial friction economy. Furthermore, as
entrepreneurs profitability is higher, their aggregate net worth is increased, leading to lower
leverage.
The exchange rate appreciation reduces domestic products’ competitiveness. Thus the
output of export product diminishes on impact. Nevertheless, there is more capital production
in the high financial friction economy such that the capital-intensive export sector in this
economy recovers better. In fact, the magnitude of the increase in the export production
dominates reduction in the non-tradable sector. Hence, the economy produces more in total,
implying higher income per capita. This increase in production allows more employment and
higher wages.
3.7 Domestic Monetary Policy Reaction ϑt Following Foreign
Monetary Policy Relaxation
In Section 3.5 the impulse responses show that a monetary authority of an emerging economy
with a flexible exchange rate regime and inflation targeting framework will lower the domestic
policy rate in response to a foreign monetary policy relaxation. In this section, we discuss the
implication of a monetary easing reaction by the domestic economy following the foreign rate
easing. We would like to see whether the domestic policy rate reduction is able to neutralize
the impact of monetary easing in the centre economy on the emerging economy condition.
Figures 3.6 plot the impulse responses of domestic macroeconomic variables to a negative
domestic monetary policy shock. The monetary easing shock reduces the marginal return on
capital (as a proxy for the cost of capital) on impact but then increase in around the third
quarter. Domestic monetary policy rate easing also reduces interest rate differential between
the advanced and the emerging economy. This slows down the capital inflows as there is a
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smaller magnitude of the increase in the balance of payment and the entrepreneurs’ debt.
If financial friction is higher, then this turns to capital outflows in the medium run. The
reduction of capital inflows might be an expected impact if the capital inflows are perceived
as destabilizing and there is a tendency of asset price bubbles.
From the perspective of demand and supply of capital, we expect two main but opposing
impacts coming from a reduction in domestic interest rates. On the one hand, a decrease
in domestic interest rates should be preferable by the entrepreneurs as the cost of investment
becomes cheaper. On the other hand, lower domestic interest rates mean lower profitability for
foreign lenders as can be seen from the increase of the external finance premium. Furthermore,
to produce the capital, entrepreneurs borrow fully from foreign resources and thus the extent
to which entrepreneurs depend on foreign lenders is high.
As the cost of investment is cheaper under lower domestic interest rate, entrepreneurs are
willing to borrow more and thus able to produce more. Hence, there is still an increase in the
entrepreneurs’ debt, although the increase in the debt reduces back to the steady state level
quite rapidly. In the short run, there is an improvement in entrepreneurs’ net worth and their
consumption but this effect subsides also rapidly and the level in entrepreneurs’ net worth
returns to the steady state in four quarters after the shock. In the medium to long run, the
impact of lower domestic interest rate on reduced foreign lenders’ profitability comes into effect.
In particular, because the rate of return for investing in the emerging market is lower, foreign
lenders reduce the level of lending in aggregate. As a result, entrepreneurs invest less and
thus capital production also decreases, although the reduction in the investment and capital
production is quantitatively a lot less than the foreign lenders reduction in the level of foreign
lending. In the medium to long run, the profitability of the entrepreneurs is undermined,
leading to a reduction in the net worth and consumption of entrepreneurs. This partly reflects
a liability dollarization problem where domestic business dependency on foreign borrowings
makes them prone to changes in interest rates differential and exchange rates fluctuations.
As in the result of the positive interest rate shock in the foreign economy, the negative
shock to domestic policy rate also affects production in the non-tradable and export sector
differently. Again, this is due to the different ratio of production factors in the two sectors.
A lower interest rate decreases production in the non-tradable sector on impact, but increases
output in the export sector. The dynamics of the export goods’ production seems to be affected
more by the dynamics of the return on capital as this sector is capital-intensive. In the short
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Figure 3.6: Negative shock to domestic policy rate
Note: Black line is the low financial friction economy (benchmark); red asterisk line is the high
financial friction economy.
run, a drop in the return on impact reduces the cost of capital and thus increases the production
in the export sector. However, this effect does not persist in the medium to long run as the
export production reduces back to the steady state level only in around four quarters after
the shock. Furthermore, the reduction of the export goods’ production is worse the higher
the financial accelerator mechanism is. The slowing down of the export sector in the medium
terms seems to be caused by a reduction in the supply of capital as capital production sector
deteriorates.
The negative shock in domestic interest rates appears to have a mix effect on the real
sector. In particular, there is a reduction in the employment rate, most likely due to the
reduction in the non-tradable goods production which appears to reduce labour demand in
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aggregate. The effect of reduction in the non-tradable sector on the labour market is greater
than the effect coming from the export goods’ production because the non-tradable sector is
labour-intensive. Apart from that, we observe a reduction in the inflation level which boosts
the aggregate consumption level. The increase in the consumption level is also supported by
the higher wage.
To sum up, a domestic monetary policy relaxation appears to be able to slow down capital
inflows, a desirable effect when the inflows are perceived to be destabilizing. However, if the
capital inflows are used to fund investment projects as in this model framework, the reduction
in capital inflows can be detrimental. In particular, a drop in domestic interest rates leads
to lower capital inflows which reduces domestic capital production and affects the production
sector negatively in general, although the reductions of capital production and investment are
less than reductions in capital inflows. This is a typical liability dollarization problem where
the high dependency of entrepreneurs on foreign lending makes capital production sensitive to
changes in interest rate differential as well as exchange rate fluctuations. This effect is also
enlarged in an economy where financial friction is higher. The extent to which the aggregate
output production is affected depends on the relative scale of the capital-intensive sector (the
export sector) and the labour-intensive sector (the non-tradable sector). If the capital-intensive
sector is relatively large in the economy compared to the other sector, then the effect of domestic
interest rate reduction to output production in aggregate is worse. With regard to the impact
on inflation, if inflationary pressures and asset price bubbles following the foreign interest rate
easing is more of a concern, then responsive domestic monetary policy might ease the pressure
of the foreign monetary policy on the domestic economy.
3.8 Conclusion
This study aims at analysing how external challenges combined with several common features
of an emerging small open economy affect domestic macroeconomic variables and financial
stability. In particular, we introduce a negative foreign interest rate shock in order to imitate
the periods following the global financial crisis 2007-8. In this period, the US Federal Reserve
introduced an aggressive reduction in monetary policy rate followed by unconventional mone-
tary policy easing in the form of large-scale asset purchases as analysed in the previous chapter.
We then analyse whether an emerging economy’s strategy of reducing domestic interest rate
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could stabilize the pressure from the foreign rate decrease.
We find that a foreign monetary policy reduction tends to increase capital inflows in
emerging economies, particularly due to higher foreign borrowings by entrepreneurs. Foreign
rates reduction widens the wedge between domestic interest rates and foreign interest rates
and induces a domestic exchange rate appreciation, which makes the cost of investment in
domestic economy cheaper. As the external finance premium decreases, domestic entrepreneurs
take more risks by borrowing more and then invest more in capital production although the
increase of investment in capital production is less than the increase in capital inflows. This
supports the international risk-taking channel of monetary policy. Although lower foreign
rates appear to profit entrepreneurs, the export goods production reduces due to lower export
product competitiveness following exchange rate appreciation. On the other hand, output in
the non-tradable sector increases. Consumption is also increasing in the long run.
A higher financial friction exaggerates the fluctuations of entrepreneurs’ activity in pro-
ducing capital. An emerging economy with higher financial friction is more sensitive to foreign
interest rate changes. In particular, in the economy where financial friction is high, a for-
eign monetary policy relaxation decreases the cost of investment more significantly making
entrepreneurs more willing to take risks by borrowing more from overseas market. As a result,
the economy is less stable as a higher degree of financial friction magnifies volatilities of output,
consumption, and employment rate.
The implications of a responsive domestic monetary policy easing depend on some fac-
tors, e.g. the scale of liability dollarization problem, the ratio of the capital-intensive sector
to the rest of the economy, and the main concern following the foreign negative interest rate
shocks. A domestic monetary policy reduction appears to be able to slow down capital in-
flows, which is desirable when capital inflows are destabilizing and mainly goes to financial
markets like stocks or bonds. If capital inflows are the source of funding for capital invest-
ment projects however, the effect of domestic monetary easing can be detrimental. This is a
typical liability dollarization problem where the high dependency of entrepreneurs on foreign
lending makes capital production sensitive to changes in interest rate differential and exchange
rate fluctuations. Moreover, the effect is worse to the rest of the economy if the relative size
of the capital-intensive sector is large. In particular, a slow down in capital inflows disrupts
capital production leading to a reduction in the capital-intensive sector production. If infla-
tionary pressures and asset price bubbles following the foreign interest rate reduction is more
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of a concern, then responsive domestic monetary policy might ease the pressure of the foreign
monetary policy on the domestic economy.
These findings underline the reason behind domestic monetary policy easing response by
emerging monetary authorities following large monetary relaxation by the centre economy:
the domestic policy stance is expected to reduce destabilizing capital inflows, avoid domestic
currency appreciation, and ease the domestic inflationary pressures. Nevertheless, this policy
stance has negative consequences if the inflows are used for capital investment project and the
capital-intensive sector is large in the economy. Hence, an emerging economy might need to
consider alternative policy measures in order to strengthen domestic economy against foreign
financial and policy spillover, for instance by implementing macroprudential policy, as analysed
thoroughly in the next chapter.
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Table 3.1: List of parameters and the values
Parameters Value
σ
Inverse of elasticity of substitution
in consumption
2
β Discount factor 0.945
ρ
Elasticity of substitution between
non-traded and import goods in consumption
0.9
λ
Elasticity of substitution between
varieties (same across sectors)
6.5
η Coefficient on labour in utility 1
ψ Elasticity of labour supply 1
γ Share of capital in export sector 0.6
α Share of capital in non-traded sector 0.3
δ Quarterly rate of capital depreciation 0.025
a Share on non-traded goods in CPI 0.62
ψPN




Price adjustment cost in the
import sector
37.91
ψI Investment adjustment cost 20
ψD Bond adjustment cost 0.0007
ν Aggregate saving rate of entrepreneurs 0.94
Ω




Monetary authority’s control on the
non-traded goods inflation rate
1
µpi









How Should Emerging Markets
Defend Against the Fed Lift-off?:
The Role of Macroprudential Policy
4.1 Introduction
The US Federal Reserve (Fed) has played a leading role in shaping the global monetary re-
sponses to the 2007-08 financial crisis through both conventional and unconventional monetary
policy. This has taken the form of cutting interest rate to near zero levels and enacting a large
scale asset purchasing program, widely known as quantitative easing (QE), with clear impli-
cations for the global economy. The emerging economies (EEs) have greatly benefited from
the resulting overly expansionary US monetary policy. Excess liquidity created by QE led to
substantial capital flows into these economies at the back of the very low US interest rates,
leading to EEs dollar-denominated borrowing to double since 2009 (see, for example, Tarashev
et al. (2016)).1
It is, therefore, not surprising that the reaction of EEs to the announcements of Fed’s
unwinding QE had been dramatic. Major fluctuations in both the stock and currency markets
across EEs were observed throughout May 2013-October 2014 over which the Fed first cut back
and then ended its asset purchases. Similarly, the Fed lift-off - ending the near-zero interest
1In its Global Financial Stability Reports, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) repeatedly warn countries
with substantial dollar-denominated debts of severe risks from higher US interest rates.
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rate policy- that started with the first rise in December 2015 led to a substantial withdrawal
of capital from EEs. Given the scale of foreign currency exposure, as mentioned above, it is
clear that there are significant risks from the impending US interest rate rise not just for the
indebted countries but also for the global economy as a whole.
Although the significance of the Fed lift-off is well-understood in policy circles, there is, as
yet, no systematic analysis of how best a country can respond to an external shock of the kind
presented by the US move towards contractionary monetary policy. The growing literature on
the spill-overs of US post-crisis monetary policy on other economies is currently of empirical
nature and focusses on main drivers of the resulting capital inflows to other countries (Chen
et al. (2012b) and Ahmed and Zlate (2014)); the impact of interest rate setting in other
countries (Taka´ts and Vela (2014)); and the impact of announcements regarding exit from QE
(Eichengreen and Gupta (2015) and Aizenman et al. (2014)).
This paper examines how a small open economy can defend against a foreign interest rate
rise by presenting a comparative analysis of a set of macroprudential policies (MaP) which
are widely adopted across the world since the global financial crisis. We first explore how
a rise in foreign interest rate impacts on the domestic economy. We then propose a set of
macroprudential policy measures and systematically evaluate the effectiveness of each measure
in the domestic economy’s defense against the foreign rate rise. Subsequently, we analyse
whether the level of financial integration, the type of exchange rate regime and the degree
of financial development alter the effectiveness of macroprudential policies. As a measure
of effectiveness, we calculate the volatilities of key macroeconomic and financial variables,
and examine whether a combination of monetary policy with a particular MaP is effective in
dampening fluctuations in those variables.
Macroprudential measures have been widely used by both advanced and emerging market
countries in the aftermath of the 2008-09 global financial crisis. According to a joint report
by the IMF, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS) in 2016, MaP is the use of primarily prudential tools to limit systemic risks across the
financial system (IMF-FSB-BIS, 2016). A central element in this definition is the notion of
systemic risk, i.e. the widespread disruptions in financial intermediation caused by the failure
of part or all of the financial system, with serious consequences for the real economy (IMF-
FSB-BIS, 2016). Cerutti et al. (2017) document that macroprudential policies are used more
frequently in emerging economies than in advanced economies, suggesting higher exposure in
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the former to external shocks given the less developed financial systems with more ‘market
failures’.
Another empirical regularity has been the use of a wide range of macroprudential insti-
tutional arrangements and policies, suggesting that there is no ”one-size-fits-all” approach
(IMF-FSB-BIS, 2016). Widely adopted tools towards addressing the systemic risk include (a)
capital-based tools; (b) asset side tools/loan restrictions; and (c) liquidity-related tools (CGFS
2012, ESRB 2014, IMF 2014).
In this paper, we consider a set of Taylor-type macroprudential measures that are tied to
a range of financial indicators as their bases for the macroprudential tax/subsidy, focussing
on lender’s side restrictions. While the MaP on the borrower-side are also implemented in
some EEs, this type of prudential policies has been more frequent in the advanced economies
(Cerutti et al., 2017). The lender-side of macroprudential policies tackle key externalities
and market failures, directly affecting financial institutions’ ability and willingness to lend to
the real sector. In our model, there are global banks located in the centre economy which
lend internationally to local banks in the EE. This cross-border bank lending and borrowing
activities serve as a key channel for international propagation of shocks from the advanced to
the emerging economy linking monetary policy in the centre economy with the leverage of the
global banks and hence to capital flows into the recipient economies.
Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, we show that macroprudential policy
targeting foreign bank borrowing and loan-to-GDP ratio are very effective in limiting the
effects of a foreign interest rate rise on a small open emerging economy. Secondly, we find that
the effectiveness of macroprudential policy improves under restricted capital mobility, reducing
fluctuations in most financial variables quite significantly. This is in line with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) report in 2011 stating that the application of prudential measures or
capital controls in response to capital inflows may be appropriate for several countries based
on their current circumstances (IMF, 2011). In the end of 2006 Thailand adopted a capital
mobility restriction in the form of a withholding tax on non-resident interest earnings and
capital gains applied only to state bonds. The withholding tax appears to have had positive
impact in slowing volatile portfolio inflows, albeit temporarily. This is similar with South Korea
experiences with adopting macroprudential policy aiming at foreign borrowing. In November
2009 the South Korean authorities implemented a more stringent foreign currency liquidity
standards, continued by the reduction of the banks’ short-term external debt in June 2010.
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The measures were able to reduce the banking system vulnerabilities by preventing banks’
external debt from returning to pre-crisis levels, although the measures could not be applied
on the off-shore banks using the non deliverable forward contracts (IMF, 2011).
In the long run, however, impediments to capital mobility prevents the economy from
reaping the benefits in the form of lower cross-border borrowing rate and greater capital inflows.
The choice of the exchange rate regime also plays a key role in the impact of the Fed lift-off
on the domestic outcomes, with the unfavourable impact of the foreign interest rate rise on
the domestic outcomes greater under a fixed exchange rate regime. Interestingly, however,
limiting the exchange rate flexibility improves the effectiveness of the macroprudential policy.
In sum, our results highlight the importance of adopting a combination of policies against
global financial disturbances including macroprudential measures, restrictions to capital flows
and restricting exchange rate flexibility.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the main features of
the benchmark model for both the core (advanced) and the peripheral (emerging) economy
as well as the specifications of the policy formulation. Section 3 and 4 discuss our calibration
strategy and the policy experiments. Section 5 presents our analysis of the implications of
the Fed lift-off on the domestic economy as well as the effectiveness of macroprudential policy
on limiting such effects. Sections 6 and 7 explore the role of varying the degree of financial
integration and the type of the exchange rate regime in the emerging economy on both the
implications of the foreign interest rate rise and the effectiveness of macroprudential policy in
defence against those implications. Section 8 repeats the same exercise for the role of financial
sector development. Finally, Section 9 presents the main conclusions.
4.2 The model
Our framework is a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) two-
country - core-periphery- model that features financial institutions a´ la Gertler and Karadi
(2011); interactions between international financial institutions in the core economy (the global
banks) and those in the domestic EE (the local banks) as in Banerjee et al. (2016). The centre
(core) country (CC) is assumed to be large relative to the peripheral country.
Each economy is populated by households, production firms, capital goods producers,
and financial intermediaries (banks). Although asymmetric in size, the domestic and the
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advanced economy (AE) share the same market structure, technology, and preferences for
consumption and capital goods. There is a global capital market for one-period risk-free bonds
EE households participate in. CC households deposit with the global banks at the risk-free
rate, and can hold one-period nominal CC government debt, which may also be traded in
international capital markets.2 Global banks use the deposits together with their own net
worth to invest in risky CC technologies as well as in emerging market banks. The fund EE
banks receive from the global bank together with their own net worth are used to fund capital
production in the EE.
Banks in both countries finance purchases from the capital goods producers, and rent this
capital to goods producers in respective countries. The model contains two levels of agency
constraints; global banks must satisfy net worth requirement to be able to borrow from the
CC’s households, and in turn, the local EE banks must satisfy capital requirements to secure
borrowing from international banks. In both countries, production firms use rented capital
and labour to produce final goods which are sold to retailers. A fraction of EE final goods
is exported to the CC, and vice versa. In essence, the EE mirrors the AE except that the
EE households do not invest in EE banks, but rather engage in international consumption
smoothing through the purchase and sale of centre currency denominated nominal bonds. The
net worth constraint faced by banks in both the EE and AE are motivated along the lines of
Gertler and Karadi (2011).
In what follows, we present the key features of the model for both economies. A full list
of model equations is represented in the Appendix.
4.2.1 The Emerging Economy (EE)
4.2.1.1 Households
A fraction n of the worlds’ population lives in the EE where households consume, work, and
act separately as bankers. The household members that are bankers have a probability θ of
continuing as bankers upon which they will accumulate net worth. There is a probability 1− θ
of exiting the banking profession and rejoining the household as a consuming/working member.
In every period, there are non-bank household members randomly assigned as bankers thus
2The terms ’centre country (CC)’ and ’advanced economy (AE)’ are used interchangeably throughout this
paper.
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keeping the population of bankers constant. Although the EE households do not have access
to investment in local financial firms, they can purchase international bonds (Bet ). Households
receive utility from consumption and provide labour to the production firms. The households
also own the firms in the economy and therefore receive profits from these firms.
















where superscript e is used to denote variables for EE, Cet is a composite consumption index,
Het is hours of work, Et is the mathematical expectation conditional upon information available
at t, β is the representative consumer’s subjective discount factor where 0 < β < 1, σ > 0 is
the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and ψ > 0 is the inverse elasticity of
labour supply. We assume, in addition, that within each basket goods are differentiated and
within-country elasticities of substitution are σp > 1. Total measure of the world economy is
normalized to unity, with sizes of the domestic and foreign economies having measures n and
(1− n), respectively.
Households own firms in the domestic economy and thus are recipients of profits earned by
banks and capital producing firms net of new capital infusion into banks, Πet . They consume
home and foreign goods bundled together by retail firms Cet . The households purchase a
complete set of Arrow-Debreu securities Bet at the rate R
∗
tΨt
3. The foreign interest rate faced





t − Be) − 1)2, where Ψt is country-specific interest rate premium and Ψ is a
constant parameter. Other sources of income for the representative household are wages W et ,
and new borrowing net of interest payments. The representative household’s budget constraint
















where P et denotes the price of consumption in the EE and St denotes the nominal exchange
rate in period t, defined as the price of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency.
The representative household chooses the paths for {Cet , Het , Bet }∞t=0 in order to maximize
its expected lifetime utility in (4.1) subject to the budget constraint in (4.2).
3This specification is introduced mainly for technical purposes to induce stationarity, as is common in small
open economy models with incomplete asset markets, as proposed by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003).
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4.2.1.2 Retail firms
There are three types of firms in the model: retail firms, intermediate goods firms, and capital
producing firms.
Retail firms purchase intermediate goods at price Pe,t relative to the domestic consumption
price index P et , and produce the non-tradable final good using the technology:














where νe > 0 measures the degree of home bias in domestic demand, −η > 0 is the trade of
elasticity, and Yjt is the country j = {e, c} production of the traded intermediate good.
The EE price level consistent with the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function
shown in technology equation (4.3) is thus implicitly defined by the following CES aggregator
1 = (νeP
1−η
e,t + (1− νe)(RERtPc,t)1−η)
1
1−η . (4.4)
where RERt is the price of the CC consumption basket in terms of domestic consumption
basket, and Pc,t is the CC producers price relative to the CC consumption-price index P
c
t .
4.2.1.3 Intermediate goods producers
Each intermediate goods production firm combines labour Het and capital K
e
t to produce a






where Ae,t denotes total factor productivity in the intermediate goods sector in EE, K
e
t denotes
capital provided by the entrepreneur, as is explored in the following subsection, and Het is the
composite labor input. Given that the price of each input is taken as given, intermediate
goods producers minimize their costs subject to (4.5). The production function is subject to
the AR(1) total factor productivity shocks (Ae,t) and the AR(1) capital-quality shock (ξt).
Intermediate goods producers have some market power and they segment domestic and
foreign markets with local currency pricing, where PH,t(j) and PX,t(j) denote price in domestic
market (in domestic currency) and price in the foreign market (in foreign currency).
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To purchase capital the entrepreneurs obtain funds by selling securities Zet = K
e
t to do-








where MCet is the real marginal cost of production in terms of the domestic consumption-price
index P et .
The model assumes a Calvo pricing formulation which implies the following specification





















et + (1− φ)Π∗,(1−σp)e,t ; (4.10)
where Π∗e,t denotes the inflation rate of newly adjusted goods prices, and
σp
σp−1 represents the
optimal static markup of price over marginal cost.
4.2.1.4 Capital producing firms
A set of competitive firms use newly purchased investment goods as input, Iet and combine it
with old capital Ket , depreciated at rate 1−(1−δ)ξt (where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the rate of depreciation),













Capital producers buy back the old capital from banks at price Qet and produce new
capital from the final good in the EE subject to the adjustment cost function. Consequently,
the aggregate stock of capital evolves according to the following law of motion
Ket = I
e
t + (1− δ)ξtKet−1. (4.11)
The optimality condition for the unfinished capital producing firms with respect to the
choice of Iet yields the following nominal price of a unit of capital Q
e
t :

























where ς denotes the adjustment cost of investment.
4.2.1.5 Monetary Policy
We adopt a standard formulation of monetary policy which adjusts domestic policy rate to















where Y e and Re denote the steady-state level of output and interest rate, and ρMP,et is a
monetary policy shock.
4.2.1.6 EE Banks
The specification of the banking operation is motivated by the concept of imperfect financial
intermediation, along the lines of Gertler and Karadi (2011). Bank i begins with some be-
queathed net worth N ei,t from the households to start the bank’s operation. In addition to net
worth transfer from the household, EE banks borrow an amount V ei,t in units of the domestic
consumption bundle from the global bank at the real interest rate Rbt. At the end of t, bank
i that survives decides how much to invest in capital Ket,i at price Q
e
t .












is the real exchange rate, as defined earlier.
Bank i′s net worth is the difference between the return on previous period’s investment
and its debt payments to the global bank:







where Rek,t is the gross return on capital defined as
Rek,t ≡ ξt
ret + (1− δ)Qet
Qet−1
.
where ret is the marginal return on capital, as specified in Equation (4.6).
The imperfect financial intermediation introduces limited enforceability problem, as in
Gertler and Karadi (2011). Ex ante, banks have an incentive to abscond from the operation
and revert back to their household unit with probability 1− θ, and a probability θ to continue
the bank’s operation, before the investment is made. Consequently, conditional on their net
worth, bank leverage must be limited by a constraint that ensures there is no incentive to
abscond.
Since banks have an incentive to abscond with the proceeds of the part of the loan and
their existing net worth, the borrowing from the global banks have to be structured such that
the value of absconding does not exceed the value of EE bank’s investment. If this is not the
case, bankers would prefer to ’default’. This is the incentive compatibility constraint (ICC)
condition. The fraction of EE banks’ net worth that can be absconded is defined as κe, a
parameter that represents the degree of the agency problem. Hence denoting the bank’s value
function by Jei,t, the incentive compatibility constraint requires that
Jei,t ≥ κeQei,tKei,t+1. (4.15)
The parameter governing the degree of agency problem in the EE banks κe is assumed to
represent the scale of financial frictions in the EE banking sector which serves as a proxy for the
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stage of financial sector development of the economy. In this sense, an economy with higher
degree of agency problem is assumed to represent an economy with less developed banking
system.







t+1[(1− θ)(Rek,t+1QetKet+1,i −RERt+1Rb,tV et ) + θJei,t
subject to balance sheet constraint (Equation 4.14) and the incentive compatibility constrain
(Equation 4.15).
The evolution of net worth averaged across all EE banks, taking into account that banks
exit with probability 1 − θ, and the new banks receive infusions of cash from households at
rate δT times the existing value of capital, can be written as:





















The first term on the right hand side denotes the increase in the net worth of the surviving
banks given the return on investment, while the second term shows the value of ’start-up’ from
household to newly established banks.
4.2.1.7 Macroprudential policies (MaP)
In this section we introduce MaP rules, defined as a countercyclical time-varying tax/subsidy
scheme, along the lines of Gertler et al. (2012) and Levine and Lima (2015). The countercyclical
tax/subsidy is levied on the EE banks’ net worth directly. The timing of the macroprudential
regulation scheme is as follows. In period t, tax or subsidy rates τ et are set to be paid or
received on the value of end-of-period t (or beginning of period t + 1). The net worth of the
banks then evolves according to:


























where δT denotes the transfer rate to new bankers.
Equation (4.17) suggests that the net worth is equal to the gross returns minus gross costs
of cross-border borrowing from the global bank, net of subsidies (plus taxes) carried over from
the previous period, plus infusions of cash from households.
The dynamics of the tax/subsidy is affected by the dynamics of a financial indicator on
which the tax/subsidy is calculated. We consider four different financial indicators and hence
four types of MaP measures in our experiment; bank’s leverage ratio (LR); loan-to-GDP (LG);
credit growth (CG) and foreign borrowing (FB). These measures closely correspond to the
MaP measures widely adopted by EE in practice, particularly since 2009 (see, for example,
Lim et al. (2011)). Macroprudential tools with respect to bank’s leverage ratio in general fall
under the classification of capital-based tools, whereas loan-to-GDP ratio and credit growth are
categorized as asset-side tools/loan restrictions. Finally, macroprudential tools with respect to
foreign borrowing are similar to restrictions on capital flows and affect banks’ liabilities side.
The specification of the four financial indicators can be characterized as follows:
(
1 + τ et




1 + τ et−1

























, and the cross-border bank borrowing V et at time t, whereas X
denotes the respective steady-state values.
In Equation (4.18), ρτ , measures the degree of persistence of macroprudential instrument,
αX , denotes the responsiveness of the MaP measure to the deviation of the relevant indicator
from its steady-state value. When the financial indicator in question (either of total credit,
loan-to-GDP ratio, credit growth, and foreign borrowing) is high relative to its steady-state,
taxes on banks are raised, decreasing their net worth and ability to extend loans to non-financial
sector, and hence dampening the business cycle. We set the degree of response of the MaP,
αlev, αQKY , αcg, αV > 0 to ensure a counter-cyclical MaP rule. The type of macroprudential
policy implemented is mutually exclusive, i.e. we consider the effect of each MaP measure on
the economy one at a time. For example, when the leverage ratio is the basis of the MaP, we
set αlev > 0, αQKY = αcg = αV = 0.
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4.2.2 The Advanced Economy (AE)
4.2.2.1 Model structure
The AE’s households and production functions are identical to those of the EE, except that
the population size of the AE is larger than EE and thus introducing home bias. As with
the EE, the AE economy also imports a fraction of EE’s production to make the final goods
composition for the AE.
The banking sector of the AE is slightly different from that of EE banks, as AE’s financial
intermediaries (the global bank) receive deposits from AE household and guarantees them the
risk-free interest rate in return, whereas EE banks only receive deposits from AE banks and
not from domestic households. Deposits together with the bank’s own net worth (retained
earnings) makes up the global bank’s value, which is then invested in the EE bank as well as
the AE technology. Given that the specification for households and firms of the AE is similar
to EE, other details are presented in the Appendix.
4.2.2.2 AE (global) banks
The global banks have a similar incentive compatibility constraint as faced by the EE banks.












where superscript c (centre) denotes variables for AE, V ejt is the investment in the EE bank,
and QctK
c
j,t is the investment in the CC capital stock. N
c
j,t is the global banks’ net worth (the
retained earnings), and Bct are deposits the global banks received from AE’s households. All
variables are denominated in real terms (in terms of the CC CPI).
The global banks’ value maximization problem can then be written as:






Λct+1[(1− θ)(Rck,t+1QctKcj,t +Rb,tV ejt −R∗tBct ) + θJcj,t+1], (4.20)
where Λct+1 is the stochastic discount factor in the core country, Rb,t is the real interest rate
received by global banks from investing in the EE banks, and R∗t is the risk-free interest rate
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paid to CC households.
As with the EE banks, the global banks also face the no-absconding constraint:
Jjt ≥ κct(RER−1t V ejt +QctKcj,t), (4.21)
where κc is the parameter that measures the degree of agency problem in the global banks,
similar to κe in the EE banks.
As in the EE banks, we can describe the dynamics of the global banking system’s net
worth by assuming that all global banks are identical, and then averaging across surviving
banks, and including the net worth provided by the core country’s households as ’start-up’ for
the new banks. This results in the following law of motion for the global banking system:
N ct+1 = θ((R
c
k,t+1 −R∗t )QctKct + (Rb,t −R∗t )V et +R∗tN ct ) + δTQct+1Kct−1, (4.22)
The first order conditions for the global banks maximization problem is presented in the
Appendix. Again, the details of the households and firms optimization problem of the AE are
identical to those of the EE. Also the AE implements a standard Taylor rule in the making
of monetary policy, similar to the EE. However, in order to focus on the effectiveness of MaP
measures in the EE, we maintain that the AE does not implement any MaP.
4.3 Parameterization
For the majority of parameters governing preferences and technology we follow the calibration
in the existing work on core-periphery models featuring international banks, such as Banerjee
et al. (2016) and Age´nor et al. (2017), as outlined in Table 4.1. We calibrate our banking
parameters to match the World Bank data of average interest rate spread and leverage ratio
during 2005-2016.
Time is measured in quarters. For the household sector, we set the discount factor β at
0.99, implying a riskless annual return of approximately 4 per cent in the steady-state. The
inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply is set to 0.276, implying elasticity of labour
supply 11+ψ of 0.8. Both parameter values are in line with Banerjee et al. (2016). The risk
aversion parameter σ is set at 1, implying a standard separable utility function with logarithmic
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consumption, as in Age´nor et al. (2017).
The parameters of the wholesale firms are standard; the capital share in production α is
taken to be 0.3, implying the share of hours in production (1−α) = 0.7. The depreciation rate
is set δ = 0.025, as is widely used in the existing literature. The parameter in the adjustment
cost technology of the capital producing firms ζ is 2, as adopted by Age´nor et al. (2017).
Following Banerjee et al. (2016), the Calvo parameter for the retail firms φ is taken to
be 0.8, corresponding to a probability of changing prices in a quarter (1 − φ) of 0.2. The




We follow Age´nor et al. (2017) for the parameters concerning the retail sector. The degree
of home bias in domestic demand, νe and νc, are set at 0.80 and 0.97, respectively. The
Armington trade elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods (η) is 1.5, firmly
within the range of the empirical estimates [-0.9− 3.54](see, for example, Saito (2004)).
Three parameters governing the financial sector (i.e. θ, κe, and δT ) are set as follows: the
parameters of incentive compatibility constraint κe = 0.3 together with the transfer rate to
new bankers δT = 0.004 are set to meet the target values of the spread earned by banks on
their assets (100 bps) and the leverage ratio to be around 8.4 Following Age´nor et al. (2017),
the survival probability of banks θ is set to 0.9.
Finally, the coefficients of the Taylor rule and the macroprudential policy rules are also
presented in Table 4.1. The parameters concerning the monetary policy are in line with
Banerjee et al. (2016). The Taylor rule persistence parameter λr is set to be 0.85, whereas the
Taylor rule parameter with regard to inflation λp and growth λy are 1.2 and 0.2, respectively.
To make the three macroprudential experiments comparable, we assume that the coefficients
of the macroprudential policy rule under each macroprudential instrument are the same.
4The World Bank data shows that the average of the leverage ratio across the world during 2005-2016 is
around 10. The ratio for the US is 8.37, quite close to those of big emerging economies like Turkey and Indonesia,
which are 8.62 and 8.03, respectively.
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4.4 Policy experiments
We first look at the effect of the Fed lift-off on the EE’s financial and macroeconomic outcomes
in the benchmark case under full capital mobility (full financial integration) and a flexible ex-
change rate. This is applied to our model framework by imposing a 0.5% shock in the monetary
policy Equation (4.13). We then examine how effective the benchmark monetary/MaP mix is
in reducing domestic macroeconomic and financial volatility following the foreign interest rate
hike in the benchmark.
In our second set of experiments, we relax the capital mobility assumption by introducing
a barrier to capital mobility in the banking sector. In particular, we ask whether a lower capital
mobility alters the effect of foreign interest rate rise on domestic stability. We then investigate
how macroprudential policy effectiveness is changed under this condition.
In the third set of experiments, we explore the case where the EE forgoes its monetary
policy independence and implement a fixed exchange rate regime. We then evaluate the im-
plication of a fixed exchange rate regime on the effectiveness of the macroprudential policy.
In formalizing the restrictions to capital mobility, we follow Age´nor and Jia (2017) by
introducing a premium that induces a wedge between the effective cross-border lending rate
and the unadjusted cross-border lending rate:
Reb,t = Rb,t(1 + ∆t), (4.23)
where Reb,t is the effective cross-border lending rate, Rb,t represents the unadjusted cross-border
lending rate, and ∆t is the premium that is linked to the scale of financial integration, F
e ≥ 0;
and the level of cross-border bank lending, V et :
∆t = F
eV et . (4.24)
where F e = 0 corresponds to full financial integration - the benchmark case.
The relationship depicted by Equation (4.23) and (4.24) implies that, everything else
constant, a greater financial integration reduces the premium, ∆t, leading to the realized
lending rate that is not too different from the unadjusted (optimal) rate. The premium depends
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positively on the level of cross-border lending, which implies that as borrowing increases, so
does the associated risks, and hence the required risk premium. In our experiments, we set
F e = 0 for full integration, and F e = 0.005 for the case of lower financial integration.
In studying the impact of foreign interest rate hikes on the domestic (EE) economy, in
addition to the impulse responses, we also calculate volatilities of each variable as a deviation
from the relevant steady-state level in each policy regime. This allows us to assess numeri-
cally the performance of each macroprudential instrument as defence against the Fed-lift off,
separately.
Our volatility measure is based on empirical moments obtained from 2000 simulations in
each scenario. The effect is averaged throughout the total periods of shocks which we consider









(Yi,t − Y ∗i )2 (4.25)
where volatTi represents the volatility of variable i, T is the time since the onset of the shock,
Yi,t represents the value of variable i at time t, whereas Y
∗
i is the steady-state value of variable
i.
4.5 Fed lift-off and the emerging economy
In our experiments, policy-makers in both countries implement monetary policy through the
use of standard Taylor Rule. To evaluate how the Fed lift-off affects the domestic economy, in
this sub-section, we abstain from any use of MaP.
4.5.1 The impact of foreign interest rates on emerging economy
We start by looking at the impact of the rise in the foreign interest rate on the foreign economy,
as depicted in Figure 4.1. As is clear in Figure 4.1, the rate rise in the CC reduces aggregate
demand on impact in the centre economy. The increase in the lending rate is higher than the
increase in the deposit/saving rate, hence the interest rate spread widens, curtailing investment
demand and thus reducing asset prices. As a result, aggregate credit drops on impact and
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continues to contract until about ten periods (2.5 quarters). As the credit to the non-financial
sector falls, bank’s profitability is reduced and so is the net worth. This pushes up bank
leverage (ratio of aggregate credit to bank’s net worth) on impact which then falls gradually.
As business and consumption activity slows down, GDP in the centre economy drops on impact,
but gradually returns to the steady-state.
The response of the domestic economy to the rise in foreign interest rate is depicted in
Figure 4.2. The cross-border transmission of shock from the AE to the EE in this model
works through the cross-border bank lending from the global bank to the EE bank, in addition
to the international risk-sharing activity by the EE households who buy the internationally
traded AE bond. To the extent that the profit maximising global bank determines cross-border
lending rate and the rate at which it is provided, a monetary contraction in the AE impacts
the financial and macroeconomic outcomes in the EE.
The higher lending rate in the AE together with the slowing down of the economy causes
a drop in the cross-border bank lending from the global bank to the EE bank. Because of this
surge of capital outflows, the net foreign asset (the net amount of EE lending abroad minus
EE foreign borrowing) increases on impact, leading to real exchange rate depreciation in the
EE. As a result, EE inflation overshoots although this is quite short-lived - about a year after
the shock. The spikes in inflation prompt the monetary authority to raise domestic interest
rate to contain the rise in inflation in the long-term. The monetary contraction in the AE does
not only increase the policy rate in the EE, but also the marginal rate of capital (or the cost
of investment in the non-financial sector), leading to a fall in investment and aggregate credit.
The real exchange rate depreciation improves the EE’s terms of trade, increasing its ex-
ports, raising GDP increases and hence consumption, around one year following the foreign
interest rate hike.
4.5.2 Macroprudential policy (MaP)
Now we turn to assessing the effectiveness of different MaP measures as defence against the
foreign interest rate rise.
Figure 4.3 displays the response of the domestic economy under four separate MaP regimes
and Table 4.2 presents the associated volatilities under high capital mobility and a flexible
exchange rate regime (the benchmark case). As set out in Equation (4.18), we adopt a macro-
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prudential rule that reacts to four financial conditions; leverage ratio (total credit/self-funded
net worth); loan-to-GDP ratio (total credit/GDP); credit growth; and foreign bank borrowing.
The MaP experiment for each instrument is mutually exclusive, by examining one measure at
a time.
Figure 4.3 reveals that financial variables that are most affected by the MaP are net foreign
assets, cross-border borrowing, bank leverage, and the aggregate credit. The effect of MaP on
these variables is then transmitted onto outcomes such as investment, consumption, and GDP.
In order to take a closer look at the effect of each MaP, Table 4.2 presents volatilities
of selected key variables following the foreign interest rate increase. For ease of comparison,
the right panel presents relative volatilities, calculated as the volatilities under each MaP rule





where relvolMaPi represents the relative volatilities, volat
MaP
i represents volatilities of variable
i under MaP, whereas volatnoMaPi refers to volatilities under no MaP implementation. Volatil-
ities are calculated for a set of macroeconomic, financial and policy variables, as listed in the
first column in Table 4.2.
Negative values (in bold numbers) of a particular variable indicate that, following the
foreign interest rate shock, the variable in question is less volatile relative to the benchmark
case of no MaP. Hence, a negative value denotes that a particular MaP is effective in reducing
fluctuations. In Table 4.2 all values are calculated for the cases of full financial integration and
a flexible exchange rate regime.
In analysing the effectiveness of macroprudential instruments in reducing volatilities, we
firstly focus on the ability of the different type of macroprudential policies to reduce the
volatility of credit growth as it is mostly the objective of MaP implementation. The results
reveal that, almost all specific MaP measures are effective in reducing the fluctuation of the
credit growth except when MaP is based on the leverage ratio (LR). This is due to the fact
that leverage ratio is determined by banks’ net worth which is highly affected by the policy,
and therefore very volatile.
If the aim of MaP is to reduce volatilities in asset prices, the policy on leverage ratio (LR)
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and foreign borrowing (FB) does the best job. If the stability of foreign capital inflows is the
main concern, a policy that is directed towards credit growth (CG) is better, as the foreign
banking borrowing is more effectively stabilized under this MaP instrument.
Comparing across different MaP instruments, it is clear that MaP that is tied to cross-
border bank borrowing (FB) performs better than the other macroprudential policies followed
by the instrument that targets loan-to-GDP ratio (LG), with the former reducing fluctuations
in almost all key variables, except investment and interestingly, foreign bank borrowing. The
failure to stabilize FB should not come as a surprise given that the foreign borrowing is the
major channel of external contagion to the domestic conditions in EE in our framework, making
the volatilities of this variable difficult to curb, hence the erratic response of foreign borrowing
to the shock in the foreign interest rate.
4.6 The effects of barrier to capital mobility
4.6.1 The impact of the Fed lift-off under lower financial integration
Our analysis in the previous section maintained that there was high financial integration be-
tween the EE and the centre economy, with clear implications for the scale of cross-border
lending and the prevailing interest rate. An issue worth exploring is how the domestic econ-
omy’s response to the foreign interest rate rise is impacted upon under a lower degree of
financial integration.
Figure 4.4 depicts the response of the domestic economy to the foreign interest rate rise
under two levels of financial integration; high as in the benchmark versus low. The straight
(dashed) line represents the case of full (low) financial integration. As earlier, there is no MaP
in the benchmark.
An EE with a low level of financial integration experiences a smaller drop in borrowing
from the global bank. The smaller reduction in the cross-border lending, in turn, reduces real
exchange rate depreciation. Since the foreign lending the global bank extends to local EE bank
(the only source of EEs fund, in addition to own net worth) drops by less under low financial
integration, the unfavourable impact on the domestic economy is smaller. In general, a foreign
monetary policy rate shock under low financial integration reduces the GDP by less in general,
and reduces consumption by more in the short run but then increases by more in the long run.
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There is no clear difference on inflation under high versus low financial integration.
Table 4.3 lists the ranking of the steady-state values under two different levels of financial
integration. It turns out that, even though the reduction of foreign borrowing from the global
bank is smaller under restricted capital mobility, in the long run greater financial integration
delivers greater benefits. In particular, financial openness allows the global bank to lend more
to the financially integrated EE bank at a lower rate. With greater cross-border lending, the
cost of investment (return on capital) is lower, reducing the need for the local banks to build
up more self-funding net worth. As a result, greater financial integration yields more efficient
provision of capital, and hence more investment, and output. This finding supports previous
studies’ result that capital mobility is beneficial for economic growth through its effect on
the capital market deepening supporting finance investment projects, particularly in emerging
economies (Levine, 2005; Haldane, 2011).
Table 4.4 presents the volatilities of key variables arising from the foreign interest rate
shock, as calculated by Equation (4.25). The first two columns represent the percentage devia-
tion from the steady-state, our measurement of volatilities. Column four presents volatilities of
the variables under low financial integration relative to the benchmark where negative numbers
(marked by bold numbers) correspond to lower volatilities as compared with full integration,
and vice versa for the positive numbers.
It is evident from Table 4.4 that out of the 13 variables considered, 8 exhibit increased
volatilities under low financial integration whereas 5 others are more stable following monetary
policy contraction in the centre economy. The magnitude of the volatilities confirm our earlier
observation from the impulse responses; foreign bank borrowing and real exchange rate are
more stable under low financial integration (with imperfect capital mobility). The table also
shows that all financial related variables -asset price, leverage ratio, spread, and net worth of
banks- are more unstable with less integration. Two real variables -GDP and investment- also
become more unstable after the shock. Nevertheless, this is not a negative outcome. In fact,
the more volatilities in the GDP and investment level under low financial integration are due
to a higher increase in the two variables that materialize around ten quarter after the shock.
Overall, in the face of a foreign interest rate rise, an EE with impediments in capital
mobility is better off as capital inflows drop less and the aggregate credit conditions are less
unfavourably affected. This leads to higher level of macroeconomic variables like the GDP and
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consumption. Nevertheless, fluctuations in financial variables such as asset prices, the leverage
ratio, spread, and net worth of banks are greater with less capital mobility. Furthermore, in
the long run, impediments to capital mobility hold back the EE from reaping the benefits of
financial integration such as lower cross-border borrowing rate and greater capital inflows in
the banking sector.
4.6.2 Financial integration and the effectiveness of MaP
We now turn to the role of financial integration on the effectiveness of different MaP scenarios.
Table 4.5 present the impact of a rise in the foreign interest rate on the outcomes in the
domestic economy under low financial integration and a flexible exchange rate regime. When
we consider restrictions on capital mobility, we find that the effectiveness of MaP improves
markedly. This is particularly the case for MaP that targets the foreign banking borrowing
(FB) and the loan-to-GDP ratio (LG), reducing the volatility of nearly all variables significantly
following the foreign rate shock relative to no MaP.
With low capital mobility, MaP is effective in significantly reducing fluctuations in almost
all financial variables - credit growth, asset price, leverage ratio, the spread between borrowing
and lending rate, and the net worth of banks - regardless of the MaP instrument chosen. Ex-
isting empirical work also points in the same direction. For example, in a recent paper, Cerutti
et al. (2017) finds that the macroprudential policies are less effective in financially more open
economies. Schoenmaker (2011) also points to the possibility that policies that serve domestic
purposes may create domestic instability when the domestic economy is financially integrated
to the rest of the world. This is widely referred to as the financial trilemma which refers to the
notion that (1) financial stability; (2) financial integration; and (3) national financial policies
cannot be achieved altogether. Only two of three conditions can be materialized, but not all
three; one has to give. Consistently, in our framework, national macroprudential policy leads
to greater financial stability once financial integration is reduced.
The effect of MaP on macroeconomic variables depends on the individual MaP measure.
Improvements in stability are significant under the loan-to-GDP ratio (LG) and foreign bor-
rowing (FB) instruments, but not under the credit growth (CG) and leverage ratio (LR)
instruments. It is also surprising to see that foreign related variables (i.e. real exchange rate
and foreign banking borrowing) are more volatile when each MaP instrument is implemented
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in an EE with imperfect capital mobility. This may suggest that MaP introduces more dis-
tractions in the relative rate of returns between the AE and the less financially integrated EE.
Put differently, MaP is effective in minimizing fluctuations in the financial variables at the cost
of more fluctuations in the real exchange rate and foreign flows.
4.7 Does the choice of the exchange rate regime matter?
4.7.1 The impact of Fed lift-off with fixed exchange rate regime
It is well-known that emerging market countries are more likely to adopt fixed exchange rate
regimes, largely due to substantial foreign currency denominated debt - liability dollarization
(see, for example, Hausmann et al. (2001)). A key question arising from our analysis is whether
the choice of exchange rate regime impacts upon the effectiveness of the four MaP measures
as defence against the foreign interest rate shock.
Figure 4.5 depicts the outcomes in the domestic (EE) economy in the face of contraction
of monetary policy in the CC under both fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes. The black
line represents the benchmark case of flexible exchange rate regime, whereas the dashed line
represents a fixed exchange rate economy.
Following a foreign interest rate hike, the domestic economy experiences a greater drop in
cross-border banking flows under a fixed exchange rate regime. The change in interest rate
differential between EE and AE following the foreign interest rate rise induces capital outflows
in the banking sector. When the exchange rate is flexible, capital outflows bring about the
depreciation of the domestic currency, slowing down the outflows where the flexibility in the
exchange rate performs the role of shock absorbing.
The impulse responses reveal that the real exchange rate is more stable with the fixed
exchange rate regime, as expected. Some dynamics still occur in the real exchange rate which
reflects the relative price movements between the EE and AE. To curb large capital outflows,
EE’s monetary authority increases policy rate by a greater margin under the fixed exchange
rate regime.
The greater drop in the foreign lending brings about more reduction in aggregate credit to
the real sector. Local bank’s profitability is also affected more negatively as net worth drops
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more. As a result, EE’s investment falls more on impact and thus the national output contracts
to a greater extent. This condition affects consumption level negatively most noticeably in the
short run.
Table 4.4 compares the volatilities of variables in EE which adopts the hard peg with the
benchmark case of a flexible regime. Column five represents the volatilities of the variables
under the fixed exchange rate EE relative to the flexible exchange rate benchmark, confirming
our observation from the impulse responses in Figure 4.5. An emerging economy which adopts
a fixed exchange rate regime is worse off in the face of an increase in foreign interest rate
than an EE with flexible exchange rate regime. In particular, all key variables exhibit greater
fluctuations under the fixed exchange rate.
4.7.2 Exchange rate regime and the effectiveness of MaP
Table 4.6 compares the relative effectiveness of different MaP measures in fluctuations following
the positive foreign interest rate shock under a fixed exchange rate regime. The first result that
emerges is that, MaP provides better defence against the foreign interest rate shock under the
fixed exchange rate regime, with the exception of the MaP targeting the leverage ratio (LR).
In a hard peg regime, the MaP that use the foreign bank borrowing (FB) as instrument
appears to be the best as almost all variables are less volatile under this MaP implementation,
especially the financial variables i.e. the credit growth, asset price, leverage ratio, interest rate
spread, and bank’s net worth. This is followed by the MaP that is based on the loan-to-GDP
ratio (LG) as the instrument. This MaP is able to reduce all key macroeconomic variables i.e.
the GDP, consumption, employment, and investment.
With fixed exchange rate regime, MaP is effective in curbing fluctuations in the credit
growth, again with the exception of the leverage ratio (LR). As in the real world, the imple-
mentation of MaP is primarily to reduce the credit growth, an EE adopting fixed exchange rate
regime may consider implementing macroprudential policy with the loan-to-GDP ratio (LG),
credit growth (CG), and foreign borrowing (FB) as instruments. Some other countries mainly
focus on curbing the asset price bubbles, then leverage ratio (LR) and FB type of macropru-
dential policy can be considered. The two key monetary variables - inflation and interest rates,
and the real exchange rate are also more stable with MaP implementation. Nevertheless, MaP
with the credit growth (CG) instrument appears to increase volatility in key financial variables,
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i.e. asset price, leverage ratio, spread, and net worth.
4.8 Extension
4.8.1 The role of financial development
Our analyses in the previous two sections focussed on the role of financial integration and the
exchange rate regime on our benchmark results. In this section, we repeat the same exercise
for the role of the level of financial development. We take the degree of financial frictions to
represent the financial system development in the EE, where low financial frictions correspond
to greater financial development. As earlier, in the benchmark case, no MaP is implemented.
In our framework, the different scales of financial frictions taken to arise from the different
degrees of the agency problem facing local banks, as explained earlier. Since the bank has an
incentive to abscond with the proceeds of the loan and its existing net worth, the amount of
global bank lending to the EE bank must be defined such that the bank’s continuation value
from investing exceeds its absconding value. Thus, the bank faces the incentive compatibility
constraint:
Jet ≥ κeQetKet (4.27)
where Jet is the bank’s value function, κ
e is the degree of agency problem, Qet is the price of
capital, and Ket is the capital investment by the EE bank. We set κ
e = 0.3 for the benchmark
case of low financial frictions, and κe = 0.7 for the high financial frictions case.
An economy with a greater agency problem (i.e. higher κe) is the one facing higher financial
frictions. In such an economy, it is optimal for the global bank to lend less to the EE bank
given the higher possibility of lending to be absconded. Thus in the steady-state, an economy
with high financial frictions receives less foreign cross-border flows compared to the one with
lower financial frictions.
In general, an economy with greater financial frictions is affected less by the increase in
the policy rate in the CC. The reasons for this are two-fold. Firstly, this is due to the fact that
the global bank is more constrained to lend to EE bank, reducing its impact in proportion to
total lending. Secondly, the link between the domestic lending and the international interest
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rate is weaker. Hence, an increase in foreign rate increases the spread between the lending and
the deposit rate in the EE a lot less as compared to the impact on the spread in a frictionless
market. Consequently, aggregate credit, investment, and asset prices contract less severely
compared to an economy with fewer frictions. This makes domestic bank’s net worth and
leverage reduce less. As a result, the GDP of EE with higher financial frictions is less affected
in the face of a foreign shock compared to an economy with lower frictions.
Although the dynamic impacts of foreign interest rate rise are favourable for the economy
with greater financial frictions, the comparison of the steady-state values between the two
economies, as shown in Table 4.7, reveals that in the long run, the economy with lower financial
frictions enjoys the benefits of greater cross-border flows. This long-term effect is similar to
the one put forward for the high financial integration case earlier. In particular, because of
the worse agency problem under greater financial frictions, the global bank lends to the EE
bank only at a higher rate, resulting in more limited cross-border lending. This leads to
greater inefficiency in the long run due to the higher cost of investment. In addition, the local
bank needs to also build up more self-funding net worth in the face of more limited outside
financing. In contrast, an economy with lower frictions provides credit to the real sector more
efficiently thanks to greater cross-border borrowing from the global bank secured at lower rates.
Consequently, investment and employment are higher and hence are consumption and GDP.
As above, we also calculate the volatilities of selected key variables following the foreign
rate rise under two different levels of financial frictions. The first and the second columns in
Table 4.8 show the volatilities as the deviation from the steady-state using the same method as
above, whereas the third column represents the volatilities of the variables under high frictions
relative to the benchmark case of low frictions. Negative numbers correspond to less volatility
in the high friction EE following the shock and vice versa.
In line with the profile portrayed in Figure 4.6, it is clear that an economy with greater
financial frictions exhibits much less volatilities following the foreign monetary policy contrac-
tion. Out of all the macroeconomic and financial variables considered, only the real exchange
rate is affected more in less developed financial markets. This finding is supported by Mac-
Donald (2017), who finds that countries with higher market frictions saw less fluctuations in
equity prices, long-term domestic bond yield, and domestic exchange rate on impact from the
US LSAP.
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Overall, an emerging economy with greater frictions in its banking sector is less likely to be
affected by external financial disturbances compared to one smaller frictions. Notwithstanding
this, however, a country with fewer impediments enjoys the benefit of more ample international
borrowing and hence greater funding. It appears that the price of having such benefits is more
synchronization of the domestic macroeconomic and financial conditions with those of the
global economy, particularly during crisis episodes.
4.8.2 The role of financial development and the effectiveness of MaP
Table 4.9 presents the impact of the foreign interest rate rise on domestic outcomes under
greater financial frictions as a proxy for the level of financial development. Clearly the effec-
tiveness of each MaP instrument varies with the scale of financial frictions. MaP that targets
foreign borrowing (FB) is effective in curbing volatilities in almost all variables that we con-
sider, followed by MaP that targets loan-to-GDP ratio (LG). In contrast, MaP that utilizes
credit growth as the instrument (CG) appears to increase volatilities in almost all variables.
If the implementation of MaP is mainly to reduce fluctuations in credit growth, an economy
with high financial frictions is better off with MaP that reacts to the loan-to-GDP ratio (LG)
and foreign borrowing (FB). However if the objective of the MaP is to curb the build-up of asset
price bubbles, then MaP with leverage ratio (LR) and foreign borrowing (FB) as instruments
work better.
4.9 Conclusion
This paper examined how the recent lift-off by the US Fed - the exit from the near-zero interest
rates policy- is likely to impact on emerging economies and the effectiveness of macroprudential
policy as a defence against the unfavourable implications on the domestic economy. It then
explored whether the effectiveness of macroprudential policy in defending against the foreign
interest rate shock varies with the degree of financial integration between the domestic and the
global economy and the type of exchange rate regime in the domestic economy.
Central to our analysis is the cross-border bank lending as the main channel of transmission
of shocks from the monetary contraction in the centre economy. As a consequence, the Fed lift-
off is followed by a slowing down in cross-border bank flows to the emerging economy, leading
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to the real exchange rate depreciation, a reduction in the aggregate credit and investment.
Output contracts in the short run, but improves in the long run due to the terms of trade
gains from the exchange rate depreciation.
In curbing fluctuations arising from the US interest rate rise, the macroprudential policy
that targets the foreign bank borrowing performs best in most scenarios, suggesting that policy
that focuses on the main channel of cross-border spill-overs is an effective defence mechanism.
This is followed by a macroprudential policy that is tied to the loan-to-GDP ratio. In a great
majority of the cases, macroprudential policy is effective in minimizing volatilities in credit
growth, regardless of its type.
We then examined the role of varying the degree of domestic economy’s integration with
the global financial markets on the effectiveness of macroprudential policy in defending against
the foreign interest rate shock. We find that with restricted capital mobility, the unfavourable
impact of the foreign interest rate rise is curtailed; there is a smaller reduction in the foreign
bank flows, thus a smaller reduction in the aggregate credit to the real sector, and hence
in consumption and GDP. However, the domestic economy experiences greater fluctuations
in financial variables such as asset prices, leverage ratio, interest rate spread, and net worth
of local banks in this case. Put differently, low financial integration appears beneficial in the
short-run in the form of fewer fluctuations, yet in the long run, impediments to capital mobility
prevents the economy from reaping the benefits in the form of lower cross-border borrowing
rate and greater capital inflows. We show that the effectiveness of macroprudential policy
improves under restricted capital mobility, reducing fluctuations in most financial variables
quite significantly.
The choice of the exchange rate regime also plays a key role in the impact of the Fed lift-off
on the domestic outcomes. We find that the unfavourable impact of the foreign interest rate
rise on the domestic outcomes is greater under a fixed exchange rate regime. This is mostly
due to the loss of exchange rate as a shock absorber, which takes the form of depreciation
under a flexible exchange rate regime and hence reversal of some of the costs arising from the
foreign rate rise. Interestingly, however, limiting the exchange rate flexibility improves the
effectiveness of the macroprudential policy.
Overall, our results point to the importance of adopting a combination of policies against
global financial disturbances including macroprudential measures, restrictions to capital flows
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and restricting exchange rate flexibility. Our findings point to the interaction between macro-
prudential and capital flow policies as playing a key role in successfully defending against global
financial challenges.
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β Time preference factor 0.99 BDL
σ Household risk aversion 1 AKGLS
ψ Elasticity of labour supply 0.276 BDL
Wholesale firms
α Capital share 0.3 BDL
δ Capital depreciation 0.025 BDL
Capital producing firms
ς Adjustment cost of investment 2 AKGLS
Retail firms
ψ Calvo parameter 0.8 BDL
σp Micro elasticity of substitution 6 BDL
n Population’s size of EE 0.15 BDL
νe
νc




υ Trade elasticity 1.5 AKGLS
Financial intermediaries
θ Exit rate of bankers 0.9 AKGLS
κe = κc ICC parameters 0.3 AKGLS
δT,e = δT,c Transfer rate to new bankers 0.004 BDL
Monetary policy
λr Taylor rule autocorrelation parameter 0.85 BDL
λp Taylor rule inflation parameter 1.2 BDL
λy Taylor rule growth parameter 0.2 BDL
Macroprudential policy
ρτ Macroprudential policy persistence 0.1
αlev MaP response to leverage 0.005
αQKY MaP response to loan-to-GDP 0.005
αcg MaP response to credit growth 0.005
αV MaP response to foreign borrowing 0.005
steady-state values matched
Leverage ratio CE Ratio of asset over capital 8.68 8.03-8.62
Leverage ratio EE 8.28 8.37
Spread CE (annual bps) Lending and deposit spread 405 467
Spread EE (annual bps) 403 450
Note: BDL: Banerjee, Devereux, and Lombardo (2016), AKGLS: Agenor, Kharroubi, Gamba-
corta, Lombardo, da Silva (2017).
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Table 4.2: The impact of foreign policy rate rise on volatilities in EE with full financial inte-
gration and a flexible exchange rate (the benchmark case).
High Financial Integration + Flexible ER
Variables Volatilities Relative to no MaP
No MaP LR LG CG FB LR LG CG FB
Macroeconomic
GDP 11.82 14.60 11.34 12.04 11.36 0.235 -0.040 0.019 -0.039
Consumption 7.87 9.65 7.60 7.94 7.63 0.226 -0.034 0.009 -0.031
Employment 15.52 19.11 14.88 15.84 14.88 0.232 -0.041 0.021 -0.041
Investment 44.57 55.23 43.96 44.33 45.08 0.239 -0.014 -0.005 0.012
Financial
Credit 12.45 16.71 12.04 12.41 12.26 0.342 -0.033 -0.003 -0.015
Asset price 19.08 15.09 19.35 20.59 19.06 -0.209 0.014 0.079 -0.001
Leverage ratio 156.49 159.56 147.40 338.03 137.31 0.020 -0.058 1.160 -0.123
Spread 9.24 5.85 9.61 10.72 9.17 -0.367 0.039 0.160 -0.008
Net worth 177.91 176.85 172.31 348.24 164.44 -0.006 -0.032 0.957 -0.076
Monetary
Inflation 1.28 1.50 1.24 1.29 1.25 0.172 -0.028 0.008 -0.022
Interest rate 1.09 1.33 1.05 1.11 1.05 0.222 -0.035 0.018 -0.031
Foreign related
RER 16.00 19.63 15.40 15.67 15.47 0.227 -0.037 -0.021 -0.033
Foreign borrowing 10.97 12.24 11.19 10.25 11.48 0.115 0.020 -0.066 0.046
Note: The table compares the magnitude of volatilities under each macroprudential regime
against a benchmark of no macroprudential policy implementation. Bold numbers represent
lower volatilities compared to the benchmark. In all scenarios, monetary policy is implemented
through a standard Taylor rule. MaP: Macroprudential policy, LR: leverage ratio, LG: loan-
to-GDP, CG: credit growth, FB: foreign borrowing.
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Table 4.3: Comparison of steady-state values across two different levels of financial integration.
Steady-state values greater under low financial integration
Return on capital
Rate for foreign bank lending
Spread
Net worth bank











Table 4.4: The impact of foreign policy rate rise on volatilities in EE with low financial
integration and a fixed exchange rate regime.
Volatilities Relative to Benchmark
Variables Benchmark Low FI Fixed ER Low FI Fixed ER
Macroeconomic
GDP 11.82 12.04 17.94 0.019 0.518
Consumption 7.87 6.83 9.13 -0.132 0.160
Employment 15.52 14.68 21.51 -0.054 0.386
Investment 44.57 46.91 68.48 0.053 0.537
Financial
Credit 12.45 13.14 18.25 0.055 0.466
Asset price 19.08 19.86 30.00 0.041 0.572
Leverage ratio 156.49 160.63 215.51 0.026 0.377
Spread 9.24 9.66 13.97 0.045 0.511
Net worth of banks 177.91 184.57 248.21 0.037 0.395
Monetary
Inflation 1.28 1.23 1.64 -0.034 0.286
Interest rate 1.09 1.09 2.40 0.007 1.210
Foreign related
RER 16.00 14.28 17.48 -0.108 0.092
Foreign borrowing 10.97 8.05 13.00 -0.266 0.185
Note: The first column is the benchmark case with high financial integration and a flexible
exchange rate regime. The second column presents volatilities under low financial integration
with flexible exchange rate, whereas the third column exchange rate is fixed but financial
integration is high. The forth and fifth columns present the second and third columns relative
to benchmark values. Monetary policy is implemented in all scenarios, but no macroprudential
policy is implemented.
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Table 4.5: The effectiveness of macroprudential policy with low financial integration and flex-
ible exchange rate.
Low Financial Integration + Flexible ER
Variables Volatilities Relative to no MaP
No MaP LR LG CG FB LR LG CG FB
Macroeconomic
GDP 12.04 12.10 11.24 44.88 11.32 0.005 -0.067 2.726 -0.060
Consumption 6.83 7.32 6.62 25.64 6.63 0.071 -0.032 2.752 -0.029
Employment 14.68 15.07 13.90 54.84 13.94 0.026 -0.053 2.735 -0.050
Investment 46.91 44.50 39.50 48.24 40.34 -0.051 -0.158 0.028 -0.140
Financial
Credit 13.14 12.99 11.56 31.90 11.85 -0.012 -0.120 1.428 -0.098
Asset price 19.86 16.51 16.54 16.51 16.41 -0.168 -0.167 -0.169 -0.173
Leverage ratio 160.63 57.06 58.64 60.42 56.01 -0.645 -0.635 -0.624 -0.651
Spread 9.66 7.35 7.96 7.79 7.72 -0.240 -0.177 -0.194 -0.201
Net worth 184.57 77.09 78.54 81.10 76.25 -0.582 -0.574 -0.561 -0.587
Monetary
Inflation 1.23 1.28 1.20 4.14 1.21 0.038 -0.026 2.356 -0.016
Interest rate 1.09 1.10 1.02 4.09 1.03 0.003 -0.070 2.743 -0.061
Foreign related
RER 14.28 16.40 14.97 58.98 15.13 0.148 0.048 3.131 0.060
Foreign borrowing 8.05 9.86 8.87 26.15 9.03 0.224 0.102 2.247 0.122
Note: The table compares the magnitude of volatilities under each macroprudential mea-
sure relative to the benchmark of no macroprudential policy. Bold numbers represent lower
volatilities compared to the benchmark. MaP: Macroprudential policy, LR: leverage ratio, LG:
loan-to-GDP, CG: credit growth, FB: foreign borrowing.
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Table 4.6: The effectiveness of macroprudential policy with high financial integration and fixed
exchange rate.
Fixed ER (High Financial Integration)
Variables Volatilities Relative to no MaP
No MaP LR LG CG FB LR LG CG FB
Macroeconomic
GDP 17.94 22.63 17.32 18.09 17.43 0.262 -0.035 0.009 -0.029
Consumption 9.13 11.41 8.87 8.94 8.94 0.250 -0.028 -0.021 -0.021
Employment 21.51 26.71 20.80 21.68 20.93 0.242 -0.033 0.008 -0.027
Investment 68.48 86.63 67.61 67.93 69.02 0.265 -0.013 -0.008 0.008
Financial
Credit 18.25 25.12 17.72 17.88 17.99 0.376 -0.029 -0.020 -0.014
Asset price 30.00 25.55 30.12 32.90 29.84 -0.148 0.004 0.097 -0.005
Leverage ratio 215.51 223.01 201.92 477.35 189.53 0.035 -0.063 1.215 -0.121
Spread 13.97 9.44 14.32 16.73 13.78 -0.324 0.025 0.198 -0.013
Net worth 248.21 250.09 239.78 488.75 230.15 0.008 -0.034 0.969 -0.073
Monetary
Inflation 1.64 1.82 1.63 1.63 1.63 0.110 -0.011 -0.006 -0.006
Interest rate 2.40 2.69 2.38 2.37 2.39 0.121 -0.010 -0.011 -0.005
Foreign related
RER 17.48 22.96 16.70 16.84 16.83 0.314 -0.044 -0.036 -0.037
Foreign borrowing 13.00 14.73 13.31 12.16 13.58 0.133 0.024 -0.065 0.044
Note: The table compares the magnitude of volatilities under each macroprudential instrument
implementation relative to the benchmark of no macroprudential. Bold numbers represent
lower volatilities compared to no macroprudential policy. MaP: Macroprudential policy, LR:
leverage ratio, LG: loan-to-GDP, CG: credit growth, FB: foreign borrowing.
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Table 4.7: Comparison of steady-state values across two different levels of financial frictions.
Steady-state values greater under high financial friction
Return on capital
Rate for foreign bank lending
Spread
Net worth bank











Table 4.8: The impact of foreign interest rate rise on volatilities in EE with high financial
frictions.
Volatilities Relative to benchmark
Variables Benchmark High friction High friction
Macroeconomic
GDP 11.82 11.74 -0.007
Consumption 7.87 7.52 -0.044
Employment 15.52 15.22 -0.019
Investment 44.57 38.40 -0.138
Financial
Credit 12.45 11.48 -0.078
Asset price 19.08 11.12 -0.417
Leverage ratio 156.49 69.11 -0.558
Spread 9.24 4.17 -0.549
Net worth of banks 177.91 84.62 -0.524
Monetary
Inflation 1.28 1.26 -0.014
Interest rate 1.09 1.06 -0.024
Foreign related
RER 16.00 16.23 0.014
Foreign borrowing 10.97 9.44 -0.140
Note: The table compares the magnitude of volatilities assuming no macroprudential policy
implementation. Bold numbers represent lower volatilities compared to benchmark case of low
financial frictions. In all scenarios, monetary policy is implemented according to a standard
Taylor rule.
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Table 4.9: The effectiveness of macroprudential policy on volatilities in EE with high financial
frictions.
High Financial Friction (High Financial Integration + Flexible ER)
Variables Volatilities Relative to no MaP
No MaP LR LG CG FB LR LG CG FB
Macroeconomic
GDP 11.74 12.20 11.21 12.34 11.07 0.039 -0.045 0.051 -0.057
Consumption 7.52 7.69 7.30 7.98 7.23 0.023 -0.030 0.061 -0.038
Employment 15.22 15.63 14.54 16.24 14.33 0.027 -0.044 0.067 -0.058
Investment 38.40 38.68 38.48 38.63 38.58 0.007 0.002 0.006 0.005
Financial
Credit 11.48 12.06 11.12 11.79 11.06 0.051 -0.032 0.027 -0.037
Asset price 11.12 9.29 11.26 12.09 10.73 -0.164 0.013 0.088 -0.035
Leverage ratio 69.11 50.35 60.19 141.28 52.30 -0.271 -0.129 1.044 -0.243
Spread 4.17 3.19 4.27 4.84 3.93 -0.234 0.024 0.161 -0.056
Net worth 84.62 64.98 76.93 154.80 69.35 -0.232 -0.091 0.829 -0.180
Monetary
Inflation 1.26 1.30 1.22 1.30 1.22 0.031 -0.029 0.034 -0.034
Interest rate 1.06 1.10 1.02 1.11 1.01 0.034 -0.039 0.048 -0.050
Foreign related
RER 16.23 17.26 15.66 16.54 15.63 0.063 -0.035 0.019 -0.037
Foreign borrowing 9.44 10.09 10.15 8.81 10.68 0.069 0.075 -0.066 0.132
Note: The table compares the magnitude of volatilities under each macroprudential measure
relative to the benchmark of no macroprudential. Bold numbers represent lower volatilities
compared to the benchmark. MaP: Macroprudential policy, LR: leverage ratio, LG: loan-to-
GDP, CG: credit growth, FB: foreign borrowing.
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Figure 4.1: The impact of positive shocks to R* on outcomes in CC in the benchmark case, in
percent deviation from steady-state.
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Figure 4.2: The impact of positive shocks to R* on outcomes in EE in the benchmark case, in
percent deviation from steady-state.
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Figure 4.3: The effectiveness of the four macroprudential measures as defense against the
positive shock to R*, in percent deviation from steady-state.
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Figure 4.4: The impact of positive shocks to R* under different financial integration levels, in
percent deviation from steady-state.
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Figure 4.5: The impact of positive shocks to R* under fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes,
in percent deviation from steady-state.
129
Figure 4.6: The impact of positive shocks to R* under different levels of financial frictions, in
percent deviation from steady-state.
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Chapter 5




International banks have an increasingly important role in facilitating financial globalization.
They provide global liquidity -an ease of financing condition- by providing cross-border and/or
foreign currency financing. In this paper, we study the main determinants of global banking
liquidity, and then map out the international banking interconnection across different countries
and groups of countries in the world. Our research objective is to examine how the activities
of global banks -i.e. financial institutions with international establishments- and monetary
policy decisions by the centre economy affect global liquidity, and how they facilitate monetary
spillovers across borders. Unlike most studies on the cross-border banking activities which use
data on a very small number of countries, we use cross-border banking claims and liabilities
data from 35 countries from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) locational statistics
to establish the banking connectedness network. Our main contribution to the literature is
twofold: (a) we uncover the determinants of global banking liquidity in the aggregate; and (b)
we establish how global banks in different countries are interconnected.
The importance of studying the effects of shocks on global variables to global liquidity; and
global banks’ cross-border dynamics is to explain why certain variables of different countries
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increasingly show co-movement. On a policy front, the global banks’ connectedness map can
help inform policymakers of the existence of a cross-border channel of transmission, which
often intensifies during crisis periods. Another important policy implication is that, if the
international funding liquidity channel is strong, the strength of domestic monetary policy
transmission mechanism in affected economies is subjected to strong influence from foreign
monetary conditions. Foreign monetary influence may dampen or exaggerates the domestic
channel of monetary policy transmission.
This paper uses two sets of analysis to perform the empirical analysis on banking statistics
data. The first set of analysis carries out the analysis on a globally aggregated level using global
variables, whereas the second set of analysis performs the analysis using banking data on the
country level. The aim of the first set of analysis is to examine the relationship between global
liquidity and several selected global economic variables in order to understand potential main
determinants of global liquidity and how they interact. We perform a Vector Auto-Regression
(VAR) analysis to the global liquidity, trade-weighted US Dollars value against major currencies
of trading partners, US monetary policy, T-Bill Euro Dollar (TED) spread, and global credit-
to-GDP gaps. The global liquidity variable is the globally aggregated cross-border banking
borrowing and lending, thus the analysis of the global liquidity does not consider the cross-
country direction of bank funding liquidity. The global liquidity variable is the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) locational statistic on cross-border banking position plus local
lending in foreign currency, aggregated throughout all BIS reporting countries.
The second set of analysis applies the Global Vector Auto-Regression (GVAR) technique
due to Pesaran et al. (2004) on the international banking claims, liabilities, and interbank
conditions across 35 countries from the fourth quarter of 2003 to the third quarter of 2016. In
addition, we include the global liquidity, US monetary policy, and USD value to our GVAR
estimation as global variables that are potentially important for the cross-border banking claims
and liabilities and interbank funding liquidity conditions among the countries. The GVAR
helps to solve the dimensionality problem caused by the large number of countries and variables
used in the analysis, using a certain weighting matrix to sum up the foreign influences to each
country’s VAR model. We use the estimated GVAR model to calculate the General Forecast
Error Variance Decomposition (GFEVD) arising from shocks to each and every variable in the
model. We then use the GFEVD to map international banking connectedness across different
economies as well as groups of economies using the connectedness measure originally developed
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by (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2009; Diebold and Yılmaz, 2014), thereby measuring the direction
and magnitude of funding liquidity across pairs of economies. To the best of our knowledge,
this study is the first to use the BIS LBS in a GVAR framework. Our other novelty is that: we
are the first attempting to exploit the BIS LBS to establish the global banking connectedness
networks and draw them into layered graph presentation. The layered graph presentation
allows us to rank countries (or groups of countries) -represented by nodes- neatly according to
their degree of importance, with the top node being the most influential.
Global liquidity is a broad concept which the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
defines as the “ease of financing in the international financial system” (BIS, 2011; Caruana,
2014; Azis and Shin, 2015). It encompasses the ability of banks and capital markets to fund real
and financial assets. More broadly, global liquidity indicates market participants’ perceptions
and attitude toward risks, valuations, and profits that drive their willingness to provide lending
to real economic activities and financial assets transactions. This ease of financing cycle is
endogenous and tends to be procyclical. It accelerates and ceases with financial institutions’
risk appetite and leverage (Caruana, 2014).
BIS classifies global liquidity into official liquidity – which is created by the monetary
authorities– and private liquidity (BIS, 2011; Domanski et al., 2011). Quantitatively, private
liquidity dominates official liquidity, thus this study only utilizes the private liquidity data.
Although official liquidity is quantitatively smaller, the Federal Reserve’s decision regarding the
official liquidity of the US Dollar, for instance, is not only important in adjusting monetary
conditions in the US, but also globally. This is due to the extensive use of major reserve
currencies like the US Dollar, the Euro, the Pounds, and the Japanese Yen for international
trade and financial settlements that has provided a cross-border channel of global liquidity
interconnection.
Private liquidity is the ease of financing condition that is determined by private financial
institutions’ willingness to provide lending and take risks. Financial institutions induce market
liquidity by their ability to become market makers in financial asset transactions. They provide
funding liquidity to the real sector through credit creation and to other financial institutions
through interbank market. In the international context, global private-induced liquidity is
associated with their willingness to provide cross-border and/or foreign currency financing.
Studies on the liquidity of the financial system have become increasingly important because
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of the financial system’s strong connection to the real business cycle and its tendency to
spillover across borders. The real business cycle paradigm in 1980’s held that the financial
system functions smoothly, justifying the exclusion of financial structures from mainstream
macroeconomic theory. Later studies suggest that the financial cycle is not simply a passive
reflection of the real economic business cycle, but is a major factor contributing to the severity
of boom and bust periods in economic activity (Gertler, 1988; Bernanke et al., 1999). The latest
global financial cycle period shows that excessive funding liquidity can build-up vulnerabilities
in the financing of the real sector; whereas the shortage in funding liquidity can undermine
credit creation and economic growth.
Financial conditions also tend to spillover across borders even when cross-border capi-
tal flows do not seem unusually high (Caruana, 2014). From the point of view of emerging
economies, capital inflows expand economic development opportunities by reducing the cost
of financing. The establishment of foreign financial institutions also allows local financial
institutions to learn from financial best practices as well as introduce competition to lower in-
efficiencies. Moreover, it is commonly agreed that multinational banks contribute to financial
stability in host markets during local financial turmoil. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012a) find
that global banks organization actively allocates funding source across its different affiliates
located in various jurisdictions. Hence, the existence of an internal finance market within
its broader organization helps the foreign bank in emerging economies contribute to financial
stability during a local financial crisis.
Despite the opportunities financial integration has to offer, the 2007-08 global financial
crisis demonstrated that it exposes emerging economies to international financial shocks. Dur-
ing this time, credit tightness in some advanced economies led to capital outflows in emerging
economies which caused tightness in these economies. Global banks play a significant role
here. They increase the risk of importing financial instability to host market during financial
crisis originated in home market, albeit there are many nuances to this finding (Haas and
Lelyveld, 2014; Moreno et al., 2010; Avdjiev et al., 2016; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012a,b,c).
For instance, the loan supply reduction is less if the branch size in the host market is large,
geographically close, more experienced, and when it is integrated into a network of domestic
co-lenders (De Haas and Van Horen, 2012).
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5.2 Literature Review
This study relates closely to two strands of literature. The first strand analyses the fluctuation
of cross-border global banking liquidity and the strategic decision of global banks in their
international operation which affects the dynamics of aggregate lending and borrowing across
countries. The second strand relates to the method used in this study, i.e. the Global Vector
Auto-Regression (GVAR) and the connectedness measures of network models.
The notion of the bank-based global funding liquidity arises from the policy discussion led
by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Committee in the Global Financial System
Report (BIS, 2011), particularly due to the impact of permissive credit conditions in financial
centres that are transmitted across borders. The cross-border credit conditions’ transmission
brings about highly synchronised financial conditions and strong co-movement of debt flows
and credit growth globally (Miranda-Agrippino and Rey, 2015; Rey, 2015).
Understanding the drivers of global liquidity is challenging as the perceived determinants
interact in complex ways with each other and the global liquidity itself. BIS (2011) classifies
three broad categories of global liquidity drivers, albeit intertwined: (a) macroeconomic factors
(e.g. policy rates, interest rate differentials, and exchange rate policies); (b) other public sector
factors (e.g. central bank liquidity policies and financial regulation); and (c) financial factors
(e.g. financial intermediation structure and risk appetite).
Using a model of the international banking where global banks and local banks interact,
Bruno and Shin (2015b) highlight that bank leverage cycle is the most important determinant
of the transmission of financial conditions through cross-border banking flows. The study also
underlines the close association between the bank leverage cycle with host country’s currency
appreciation. The prevalent use of the US Dollar as the major global reserve currency and the
cheaper US Dollar bank funding rate reinforced the global banking system by extending the
‘risk-taking channel’ of monetary policy transmission to the international context (Azis and
Shin, 2015; Bruno and Shin, 2015b). Taka´ts and Temesvary (2016) conclude that monetary
shocks in a currency significantly affect cross-border bank lending flows in that currency, even
when neither the lender nor the borrowing banks’ country use that currency as their own.
Nevertheless, cross-border banking flows can also have feedback effect to the USD exchange
rate fluctuations (Gabaix and Maggiori, 2015). Cross-border bank lending is also influenced
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by bank’s capital position and perceived risks (Azis and Shin, 2015).
Azis and Shin (2015) underline the important role of round-trip capital flows through
the European banks lending in influencing US credit conditions in the run-up of the global
financial cycle. The sharp drop in cross-border bank lending to emerging markets in the second
half of 2011, as the Euro area crisis intensified, was a notable instance (Avdjiev et al., 2016).
The apprehension of European banks activities in intermediating US dollar funding has raised
understanding of the importance of using cross-border gross flows (Borio and Disyatat, 2011),
as opposed to using cross-border net flows that led to the ‘excess saving’ and ‘global savings
glut’ view widely used in studies mostly before the global financial crisis as in (Bernanke, 2005;
Mendoza et al., 2009).
International parent banks manage liquidity on a global scale. They maximize the inter-
national bank holding’s profit by deciding between parent funding and local funding of each
individual affiliate and across all other affiliates given interest rate margins of the parents and
local banks borrowings and lending (Galema et al., 2016; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012a,c).
Thus, global banks have the capacity to insulate from local shock in host countries (including
local monetary policy shock) compared to domestic banks (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012a).
During a financial crisis in the parents’ home countries, the affiliates’ local deposits perform as
a stabilizer for loan supply disruptions, but greater reliance on intra-bank funding disadvan-
tages the affiliates as the parent’s ability to sustain a stable deposit and long-term wholesale
funding position deteriorates (Frey and Kerl, 2015). The lending capacity of foreign affili-
ates during the 2008-09 crisis slowed down twice as fast as domestic banks, and the effect is
stronger if the banks’ parent depends more on wholesale-market funding (Haas and Lelyveld,
2014). Moreover, there is competition for intra-bank funding between the affiliates serving
different countries and an increasing concentration of resources on parent lending to the home
market (Frey and Kerl, 2015). Therefore, the global banks’ international presence contributes
to the international propagation of shocks, as happened during the financial crisis of 2007 to
2009 (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012a; Frey and Kerl, 2015).
Studies classify the global banks’ sources of funding under two broad headings: the inter-
nal and the external capital market. All funding that banks obtain from their broader internal
organization falls under the heading of internal capital market, for example: funding from
headquarters, if they are subsidiaries or affiliates, or from subsidiaries if they are the head-
quarter e.g. (Galema et al., 2016; Frey and Kerl, 2015; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012a,b,c; Haas
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and Lelyveld, 2014; Buch et al., 2016). External capital can be obtained from any sources other
than banks’ organization, like local deposits, other sources from host country, and cross-border
interbank funding (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011; De Haas and Van Horen, 2012; Popov and
Udell, 2012; Tintchev, 2013).
During a crisis, lending supply shocks to balance sheet in the foreign banks in developed-
country has led to substantial supply lending shock to emerging economies (Cetorelli and Gold-
berg, 2011; De Haas and Van Horen, 2012; Popov and Udell, 2012; Cetorelli and Goldberg,
2012b). Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012b) find that on average, local lending by affiliates reduces
by forty to fifty cents for every dollar transferred to the parent bank. The loan supply effect
is significant through all three balance sheet channels: a contraction in direct, cross-border
lending by foreign banks, a contraction in local lending by foreign banks’ affiliates in emerging
markets, and a contraction in loan supply through interbank, cross-border lending (Cetorelli
and Goldberg, 2011). However, the magnitude of the negative shock is heterogeneous, depend-
ing on the branch size, where the internal fund transfer disproportionately bigger for larger
banks (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012b). In addition, global banks reduced funding less from
countries that are geographically close; where they are more experienced; where they operated
a subsidiary; and where they were integrated into a network of domestic co-lenders (De Haas
and Van Horen, 2012).
The second strand of literature relates to the method used in this study, i.e. the Global
Vector Auto-Regression (GVAR) and the connectedness measures of network models. The
GVAR, initially developed by Pesaran et al. (2004), is a global macroeconometric model that
exploits advances in the analysis of cointegration systems to perform analysis in a global
modelling framework. The attractiveness of the GVAR is that it tackles the dimensionality
problem of data with large cross-section dimension and time series, using predefined matrices
to impose the strength of bilateral relationship for each pair of countries in the study.
The rich nature of the data used for the GVAR, such as data for the global economy,
provides a natural extension into the analysis of complex systems in a network type of model.
Two leading examples of such network models are Billio et al. (2012) and Diebold and Yilmaz
(2009, 2014). In these studies, financial institutions are represented as nodes within the net-
work. Billio et al. (2012) model the network using a Granger-causal network, while Diebold and
Yilmaz (2009, 2014) use error variance decomposition to develop the connectedness measures.
The latter method has the advantage of measuring contemporaneous shocks, and it is able to
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not only map out the direction of linkages but also the strength of the connection between two
nodes.
Greenwood-Nimmo et al. (2015a) extends the advances in the network analysis by inte-
grating detailed multivariate country-specific macroeconomic factors into a global system and
then maps the topography of the resulting global network. This study generalizes the originally
developed connectedness measures which have been utilized to study either the multi-country
univariate case or the single-country multivariate case. Greenwood-Nimmo et al. (2015b) ap-
plies the connectedness measures on the price and order flow of important currency markets
in order to study the transmission of information between currency spot markets.
5.3 Econometric Methodology
5.3.1 First Analysis: VAR to Global Variables





CjYt−j + t, (5.1)
where the variables of interest for the VAR is the global liquidity variable, global credit-to-
GDP gaps, US Dollar value, and US monetary policy rate, and TED spread. The structural
white noise shocks are t, with maximum lags j equal to 4 due to quarterly data.
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with
ut = St = A
−1t; Bj = A−1Cj (5.3)





′] = Σ. (5.4)
For the impulse response functions, we use the generalized impulse response function
(GIRF) as proposed by Pesaran and Shin (1998) for unrestricted vector autoregression models,
which is built on Koop et al. (1996). Unlike the traditional orthogonalized impulse response
analysis, the GIRF approach does not require orthogonalization of shocks and is invariant to
the ordering of the variables in the VAR.
The GIRFs are defined by
GIx(n, δj ,Ωt−1) = E(xt+n|jt = δj ,Ωt−1)− E(xt+n|Ωt−1) (5.5)
where δj is the size of shock hitting the global economy at time t, Ωt−1 is the non-decreasing
information set denoting the known history of the economy up to time t− 1, and n is the n-th
period ahead impulse response.
Assuming that t has a multivariate normal distribution,
E(t|jt = δj) = (σ1j , σ2j , . . . , σmj)′σ−1jj δj = Σejσ−1jj δj . (5.6)
where σjj is the (j, j) element of Σ, and ej is a vector having unity at the j-th position and
zeros elsewhere.
The m × 1 vector of the (unscaled) generalized impulse response of the effect of a shock








, n = 0, 1, 2, . . . (5.7)
where Dn is the n-th coefficient matrix from the moving average representation of the VAR
model.
By setting δj =
√
σjj , the scaled GIRF is
ψgj (n) = σ
− 1
2
jj DnΣej, n = 0, 1, 2, . . . , (5.8)
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which measures the effect of one standard error shock to the jth equation at time t on expected
values of x at time t+ n.
5.3.2 Second Analysis: Cross-country Banking Interconnection
We follow the connectedness measure originally developed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) and
Diebold and Yılmaz (2014), and extended by later studies such as Greenwood-Nimmo et al.
(2015a) and Greenwood-Nimmo et al. (2015b). The connectedness measures are based on the
forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) of a p-th order vector autoregression for the
m× 1 vector of endogenous variables yt. The use of the FEVD is based on the notion that the
dynamics of variable i caused by shock to variable j provides a directional measure of the asso-
ciation between these variables. An interesting feature from this approach is that the FEVDs
are based on the estimated parameters and covariance matrix of the VAR system without any
additional restrictions apart from the usual estimation and identification restrictions.
The claims in country i can be written as follows:








it + ξcit, (5.9)
whereas the liabilities is as follows:








it + ξlit, (5.10)
where Cit denotes the cross-border claims of country i to rest of the world, Lit is the cross-
border liabilities of country i to rest of the world, λi is the long-run (equilibrium) impact
of the cross-border liabilities in the i-th economy on the cross-border claims of economy i,
γi is the long-run (equilibrium) impact of the cross-border claims in the i-th economy on
the cross-border liabilities of economy i. L∗it = (L1t, . . . , Li−1,t, Li+1,t, . . . , LKt)
′ is a (K −
1) × 1 vector recording the cross-border liabilities in the remaining K − 1 economies, C∗it =
(C1t, . . . , Ci−1,t, Ci+1,t, . . . , CKt)′ is a (K − 1) × 1 vector recording the cross-border claims in
the remaining K − 1 economies, λ∗′ci = (λ1, . . . , λi−1, λi+t, . . . , λK) is a (K − 1) × 1 vector of
parameters capturing the long-run impacts of these K − 1 liabilities on the claims of economy
i, and , γ∗′ci = (γ1, . . . , γi−1, γi+t, . . . , γK) is a (K − 1) × 1 vector of parameters capturing the
long-run impacts of these K − 1 claims on the liabilities of economy i.
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Estimating the dynamic form of equation 5.9 and 5.10 as a VAR is infeasible with available
datasets due to the curse of dimensionality. With K economies in which we observe both
the cross-border claims and liabilities, the dimension of the p-th order VAR model would be
2K(2Kp + 1). To overcome this issue, we follow the GVAR approach due to Pesaran et al.
(2004).
Following this approach, we estimate a set of K market-specific VAR models, each of which
does not include the foreign cross-border liabilities directly but rather a weighted average of
these (K − 1) foreign cross-border liabilities. The aggregate foreign cross-border claims with
respect to economy i is defined as L∗′it =
∑K
j=1wijLjt, where wij ≥ 0 are the set of granular
weights which satisfy
∑K
j=1wij = 1 and wii = 0. The weight assigned to economy i against j
is based on economy i’s consolidated positions of its internationally active banking groups in
economy j from the BIS consolidated banking statistics. The weight matrix is time-invariant.
The matrix is calculated such that the greater weight is assigned to country j where country
i international banks has the larger exposure.
With the use of the weighting matrix, equation 5.9 is thus modified as follows:








it + ξcit, (5.11)
whereas equation 5.10 is as follows:








it + ξlit, (5.12)
where λ∗ci and γ
∗
ci capture the cross-border claims impact of the weighted-average foreign lia-
bilities and foreign claims respectively, whereas γ∗li and λ
∗
li represent the cross-border liabilities
impact of the weighted-average foreign claims and foreign liabilities, respectively. Embedding
the long-run relationship, (5.11), into an otherwise unrestricted VAR(p) model and assuming
that L∗it and C
∗









Γij∆Zi,t−j + it, (5.13)
where Xit = (Cit, Lit)
′ is a 2 × 1 vector of endogenous variables containing the cross-border
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′ is a 2×1 vector of weakly exogenous vari-






βi is vector of cointegrating parameters, and αi is vector of adjustments parameters.
The inclusion of the foreign cross-border liabilities variables in the market-specific VAR
models explicitly accommodates the modelling of linkages among different economies’ cross-
border bank positions. With the K estimated market-specific VAR models, we can then
combine them into the GVAR framework due to Pesaran et al. (2004). First, equation 5.13
can be rewritten equivalently as:
Ai0Zit = Ai1Zi,t−1 + Ai1Zi,t−2 + · · ·+ Ai,pZi,t−p + εit, (5.14)
where Ai0 = (I2,−Λi),Ai1 = Ai0 + αiβ′i + Γi1,Aij = Γi,j+1 − Γi,j for j = 2, . . . , p − 1, and
Aip = −Γip.
We then define the m × 1 vector of global variables Xt = (X′1t, . . . ,X′Kt)′ where Xit =
(Cit, Lit)
′ and m = 2K. It is possible to express Zit compactly as:
Zit = WiXt, i = 1, 2, . . . ,K, (5.15)
where Wi is the (2 + 1)× 2K link matrix. We construct the Wi’s as follows:
Wi =
Ri1 Ri2 Ri3 . . . RiK
Wi1 Wi2 Wi3 . . . WiK






 if j 6= i
I2 if j = i
 (5.17)
{Wij}Kj=1 = [0 wij ], i = 1, . . . ,K, (5.18)
and wij is the weight assigned to economy j in creating the weighted-average foreign cross-
border liabilities variable from the perspective of economy i. Using equation (5.14) and (5.15)
and stacking the results we obtain:
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2t, . . . , ε
′
Kt)









′ for j = 0, 1, . . . , p. The
reduced-form GVAR is finally obtained as:
Xt = G1Xt−1 + G2Xt−2 + · · ·+ GpXt−p + ξt, (5.20)
where Gj = H
−1
0 Hj , j = 1, 2, . . . , p and ξt = H
−1
0 t. As in the GVAR literature, we allow the





for t = t′ and 0 otherwise.





where the Bj ’s are evaluated recursively as: Bj = G1Bj−1+G2Bj−2+· · ·+Gp−1Bj−p+1, j =
1, 2, . . . , with B0 = Im, Bj = 0 for j < 0.
















for i, j = 1, . . . ,m where σε,ii is the standard deviation of the residual process of the i-th
equation in the VAR system, ei is an m× 1 selection vector whose i-th element is unity with
zeros elsewhere and ej is an m × 1 selection vector whose j-th element is unity with zeros
elsewhere. Note that ϕ
(h)
j←i denotes the contribution of a one-standard error shock to variable
i to the h-step forecast error variance (FEV) of variable j.
To demonstrate the computation of the spillover and heatwave effects via the Diebold-
Yilmaz method, consider the simplest possible setting with two markets (K = 2) and hence
m = 2K = 4 variables in total, in the order of C1,t, L1,t, C2,t, L2,t. As such, at any forecast










































Note that equation (5.23) is structured such that the total h-step ahead FEV of the i-th
variable in the system is decomposed into the elements of the i-th row of C(h). Meanwhile,
the contributions of the i-th variable to the h-th step ahead FEV of all variables in the system
are contained in the i-th column of C(h). Therefore, based on equation (5.23) and following
Pesaran and Shin (1998) and Pesaran et al. (2004), the aggregate h-step ahead heatwave and









where e is an m × 1 vector of ones. Furthermore, we are also able to see the effect from the
economy/country level as opposed to the variable level (via C(h)) or the systemwide aggregate























































































2←1 = 100 by construction. The net connectedness





2←1 − S(h)1←2 and N (h)2 = S(h)1←2 − S(h)2←1
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Obs 103 103 103 103 103
Mean 4.39 2.50 86.93 1.71 0.49
Median 3.30 3.04 86.67 1.21 0.42
Max 21.60 6.53 111.59 10.95 2.45
Min -11.10 -2.89 69.56 -4.38 0.15
Std. Error 0.75 0.27 1.00 0.31 0.03
Std. Dev 7.62 2.79 10.19 3.14 0.35
In a more general setting with K markets, the sign of N
(h)
i indicates whether market i is a net
transmitter of shocks to the system (N
(h)
i > 0) or a net receiver of shocks from the system
(N
(h)
i < 0). using these market connectedness measure we can examine the relative importance
of the within-economy (heatwave) and cross-economy (spillover) information in explaining the
cross-border borrowing and lending activity in each country.
5.4 Descriptive Statistics
5.4.1 First Set of Analysis: Global Liquidity and Its Determinants
5.4.1.1 Global Liquidity
Table 5.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the global liquidity flows and the several US and
global data that are potentially important in explaining global liquidity. The data are quarterly
starting from the first quarter of 1991 until the third quarter of 2016, 103 time points. Our
data sources are shown in Table 5.2.
Figure 5.1 shows the plot of the global liquidity series. The global liquidity data is ob-
tained from Table E1 of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) data on global liquidity
indicators. It is the non-seasonally adjusted flow of international banks’ claims, which consists
of globally aggregated data on interbank cross-border claims and banks’ foreign currency local
claims to local banks. The unit of the global liquidity flows is year-on-year change. On average,
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Figure 5.1: Global liquidity, source: Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
Table 5.2: Data source
Variable Source
Global liquidity Bank for International Settlements
US policy rate Wu and Xia (2016) US shadow rate
Trade-weighted USD value Datastream
Global credit-to-GDP gaps Bank for International Settlements
TED spread FRED US Federal Reserve St. Louis
the global liquidity flows increased by 5% y-o-y change throughout the period of observation,
with the highest value of 22% in the last quarter of 2007 and the lowest value of -11% in the
third quarter of 2009.
Figure 5.2a to 5.5 shows the scatter plot of global banking liquidity variable against its
potential determinants which includes the TED spread, US policy rate, US Dollar value, and
global credit-to-GDP gaps. The scatter plots describe the simple correlation between the global
liquidity series and each of the other global variables, although the simple correlations do not
necessarily say much about the magnitude or direction of causal relationship between the pair
of variables.
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(a) Global liquidity and TED spread (b) Scatter plots
Figure 5.2: Global liquidity and TED spread, source: BIS and Datastream.
5.4.1.2 TED Spread
The first variable that we consider important for global liquidity is the interbank funding liq-
uidity condition in the most important market. Two most important proxies for interbank
funding liquidity condition are the spread between the London Interbank Offered Rate (LI-
BOR) and the Overnight Index Swap (OIS) for pound sterling. The other option is the TED
spread - the spread between the 3-month LIBOR Rate based on US Dollar and 3-month US
Treasury Bill. Because the OIS data are only available from 2006, the TED spread is used
instead.
The TED spread is used as a perceived credit risk in the interbank market, because the
LIBOR Rate is the rate participant banks offer to other banks in the LIBOR market for bor-
rowing and lending, while the T-Bill rate is considered the risk-free interest rate. The higher
the TED spread, the higher the credit risk participant banks perceive in their counterparty.
Also, when the credit risk is high, the funding liquidity is low because banks with more liq-
uidity become more resistant to lend. The scatter plot of the TED spread and global liquidity
shows almost no correlation between the two series. However, a closer look seems to suggest
that during the global financial crisis, the correlation becomes positive which is counterintu-
itive. This is possibly because the TED reacts to the crisis much faster than the slow-moving
international banking liquidity flows.
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(a) Global liquidity and US policy rate (b) Scatter plots
Figure 5.3: Global liquidity and US policy rate, source: BIS and Datastream.
5.4.1.3 US Policy Rate
We include the US monetary policy rate in the VAR model due to the fact that the US Dollar
is the most significant international currency used in the global liquidity, which includes US
Dollar denominated local lending as well as US Dollar denominated cross-border lending. The
value of USD in the global market is significantly determined by the US Federal Reserve
monetary policy stance. More importantly, two important channels through which the Federal
Reserve aims to influence the real economy, i.e. the monetary policy transmission channel,
is through the credit channel and risk-taking channel. We use the US monetary policy rate
variables calculated by Wu and Xia (2016) which provides hypothetical US monetary policy
rate when it was at the zero lower bound. Figure 5.3a shows the line graphs of the US monetary
policy rate and the global liquidity, as well as the scatter plot between the two series.
It is surprising that a positive correlation emerges between global liquidity and the US
monetary policy rate. We divide the periods into before and after 2004 when the Federal
Reserve aggressively reduces policy rate to combat recession. Furthermore, in Figure 5.3b we
divide the post-2004 period further into two periods, i.e. before and after the global financial
crisis. All scatter plots in various periods suggest a positive correlation between US monetary
policy and global liquidity. In other words, a high US policy rate seems to be associated with
the boom in the global liquidity, and the other way around.
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(a) Global liquidity and US dollar value (b) Scatter plots
(c) Scatter plots
Figure 5.4: Global liquidity and US dollar value, source: BIS and Datastream.
5.4.1.4 US Dollar Value
The inclusion of US Dollar value in the group of global variables is meant to capture the risk-
taking behaviour of banks in the international market. Shin (2016) argues that following a
depreciation of US Dollar, there is a tendency of higher cross-border banking lending due to the
willingness of foreigners to borrow in the US Dollar. Furthermore, the US Dollar is the highest
denomination in the global cross-border banking lending and borrowing. The US dollar value
we use is the trade-weighted US Dollar value against a basket of major counterparty currencies
from Datastream. An increase in the US Dollar series means an appreciation of US Dollar.
The scatter plot of the US Dollar value against global liquidity variable seems to show a small
positive correlation. However, a closer look at the scatter plot shows a time-varying correlation.
We divide the sample into three periods: (a) before USD deep depreciation starting in 2002
following aggressive US monetary policy accommodation to combat US recession, (b) pre-global
financial crisis, and (c) post global financial crisis. In the first period, a positive correlation
emerges, while in the following two periods, the correlation becomes negative.
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(a) Global liquidity and credit-to-GDP gaps (b) Scatter plots
Figure 5.5: Global liquidity and global credit-to-GDP gaps, source: BIS.
5.4.1.5 Global Credit-to-GDP Gaps
The other variable to include is the global credit-to-GDP gap. The Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) provided credit-to-GDP ratio data for each 44 reporting countries. The
credit data covers all credit extended to the private non-financial sector from foreign and local
sources. The credit-to-GDP gap is the difference between actual credit-to-GDP and its long
run. The credit-to-GDP long-run trend is calculated using a one-sided Hodrick-Prescott (HP)
filter with a lambda of 400,000 by the BIS. The credit-to-GDP gaps series are aggregated using
simple average across all reporting 44 economies.
The inclusion of the global credit-to-GDP gap data is as a proxy for bank’s capital position
and to capture the willingness of the banks to lend to the real sector which represents the
perceived global state of the economy and the riskiness. Past studies also show that the credit-
to-GDP gap is an important early warning system for the financial crisis as the fluctuation
of credit and asset prices indicate the risk-taking behaviour of financial intermediaries. A
glance at the line plots of global liquidity and a credit-to-GDP gap against time suggests a
small correlation between the two series. However, a closer look suggests that global liquidity
fluctuation seems to lead the credit-to-GDP gap fluctuation by six quarters (1.5 years). If the
global liquidity plot is led by 1.5 years, its trend matches credit-to-GDP gaps trends quite
significantly, and the scatter plots suggest positive correlation between the two series.
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5.4.2 Second Set of Analysis: Cross-border Banking Interconnection
5.4.2.1 Countries’ Cross-Border Banking Claims and Liabilities
The quarterly data on the total cross-border claims and total cross-border liabilities of banks
based on country’s location is obtained from Table A5 of the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS) Locational Banking Statistics (LBS). The BIS locational banking statistics capture the
cross-border claims and liabilities position of internationally active banks located in reporting
countries, including the offshore financial centres, against counterparties residing in more than
200 countries. The recording of the cross-border positions follows the principle of balance of
payment statistics. The total international banks’ positions reported in the locational banking
statistics makes up around 95% of all cross-border interbank business across the globe.
Table A5 in BIS locational banking statistics shows the cross-border claims and liabilities
positions of banks based on the location of the reporting banks, not on the residency of the
banks. As a result, Table A5 records all cross-border banking flows, even if the banks are of
the same holding. For example, the lending Deutsche Bank’s headquarter in Germany extends
to its affiliate in the UK is recorded in the BIS locational banking statistics.
The total cross-border claims data for each reporting economy includes all international
claims to all other economies, all counterparty’s sector, all instruments, and all currency. The
same also applies to cross-border liabilities. As the data for GVAR analysis requires full sample
set for each series and reporting countries started to supply the data to BIS differently, there is
a trade-off between the number of economies and the length of time series to be included in our
analysis. As a result, we started the cross-border banking claims and liabilities data from the
fourth quarter of 2003 to include as many economies as possible, especially emerging economies
which mostly started reporting to BIS a lot later than most advanced economies. The data
ends at the third quarter of 2016, which makes a time series in our data consists of 51 points of
time only. The data covers 35 economies’ data which includes ten advanced economies, eleven
Euro economies, five emerging economies, and nine offshore financial centres.
Figure 5.6 shows the evolution of cross-border net claims positions of each country from
2003 to 2016. The graph shows that international banks located in Japan in aggregate contin-
uously increased their cross-border lending even after the 2007/08 global financial crisis, which
makes Japan the most important banking lenders in the world. The same position as the most
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Figure 5.6: Cross-border banking position, by reporting country, advanced economies, in USD
trillions
important bank lender also applies to Germany but only until the global crisis, because after
the crisis Germany’s position as net lenders continued to decrease significantly. The peak net
international lending positions by the German banks was USD 2.2 trillion in the second quarter
of 2008, but the position continued to decline to USD 0.4 trillion in the third quarter of 2016.
The banks located in the USA as an aggregate has always been the net borrowers globally,
although the net borrowing positions fluctuated with net borrowing of a maximum USD 1.1
trillion in the third quarter of 2014. Although the UK has the most international banking
positions in terms of the absolute total of international claims and liabilities, the UK has
never had the most net borrowing positions nor lending positions in the world. This shows
that the banks located in the UK in aggregate have functioned as the most important financial
intermediation hub across the globe, but do not take a particular position in national aggregate
level as either the largest funding liquidity provider nor largest recipient.
Figure 5.8 shows the evolution of the cross-border banking positions of international banks
located in emerging economies. It is apparent that all emerging economies in the sample have
been the net borrowers in most of the data periods. The amount of net borrowings of the banks
in emerging economies continues to increase even after the onset of the global financial crisis.
Among the emerging economies, the net borrowings position’s trend in India and Turkey are
the steepest.
The bar chart in Figure 5.9 shows the total of claims and liabilities in absolute terms for
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Figure 5.7: Cross-border banking position, by reporting country, offshore financial centres
(according to IMF classification), in USD billions
Figure 5.8: Cross-border banking position, by reporting country, emerging economies (USD
billions)
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Figure 5.9: Cross-border banking position in absolute term (claims + liabilities), average
between 2003 to 2016, in USD trillion
each country, averaged over the first quarter of 2003 to the third quarter of 2016. The bar chart
is intended to compare the magnitude of overall banking activities, i.e. borrowing and lending,
across countries. The upper, middle, and lower part of the bar chart are classified as advanced
economies, emerging economies, and offshore financial centres, respectively. The chart shows
that the cross-border positions of international banks operating in the advanced economies are
far larger than the emerging economies as well as offshore financial centres. More surprisingly,
the absolute cross-border positions of many offshore financial centres like the Cayman Islands,
Hong Kong, Luxembourg, Singapore, and the Bahamas are also far larger than all emerging
countries. This shows the importance of the tax haven destinations in providing global financial
hub services for major financial intermediaries across the world.
The chart shows that the UK has the largest global banks cross-border positions in absolute
terms in the world. Although the UK cross-border net positions have never been significantly
positive nor negative compared to other advanced economies like Germany, the US, or Japan,
the large absolute total positions show that the UK as the most important financial centre
in the world. The UK’s absolute cross-border banking position on average from 2003 to 2016
stood up to USD 9.5 trillion, almost doubled than USA’s average position which was USD 5.7
trillion.
Figure 5.10 shows the average of net claims of cross-border positions for each economy
in the sample. The quarterly net claims data is obtained from the total cross-border claims
subtracted by the total cross-border liabilities from BIS locational banking statistics. We take
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Figure 5.10: Cross-border net claims banking position, average from 2003 to 2016, by reporting
country (USD trillion)
a simple average of the net claims positions over the periods from 2003 or whenever the data
become available for each economy, until the second quarter of 2016. Taking the average across
51 quarters (13 years) periods, the graphs show that the United States, Australia, and Italy
are the largest net borrowers in the world. This means that in aggregate the banks located
in the three economies hold the largest net liabilities international positions in the world with
USD 550 billion, USD 280 billion, and USD 100 billion net borrowings positions, respectively,
as an average throughout the past thirteen years period. Japan, Germany, and the UK are the
largest net lenders with the amount of cross-border net lending positions of USD 1.5 trillion,
USD 1.2 billion, and USD 250 billion respectively.
Figure 5.11 and Figure 5.12 divide Figure 5.10 into net borrowers and net lenders only.
The bar chart for advanced economies is in blue, emerging economies in orange, while offshore
financial centres in green. The figures show that some advanced economies are net borrowers,
while some others are net lenders. Almost all emerging economies are net borrowers, whereas
most of the offshore financial centres are net lenders. The most important offshore financial
centres with the largest net lending positions are Luxembourg, Hong Kong, and Chinese Taipei
with average net lending positions of USD 230 billion, USD 220 billion, and USD 100 billion
respectively.
The largest net borrowers from the emerging economies group are India, Brazil, and Turkey
with average net borrowing positions of USD 70 billion, USD 40 billion, and USD 38 billion
respectively. This shows the importance of the global banks’ activity in extending funding
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Figure 5.11: Cross-border banking position, by reporting country, average between 2003 to
2016, net lenders only (USD trillion)
Figure 5.12: Cross-border banking position, by reporting country, average between 2003 to
2016, net borrowers only (USD trillion)
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(a) Global cross-border lending, by currency
(b) Global cross-border and local lending, by
currency
Figure 5.13: Global cross-border and local banking lending, by currency. Source: BIS, Loca-
tional Banking Statistics.
liquidity to banks located in emerging economies. In terms of magnitude, the cross-border
banking positions of most advanced economies are far larger than the cross-border positions
of banks in emerging economies. The unbalanced nature of cross-border magnitudes between
the two groups of economies makes the banking activity in the emerging economies much
more susceptible to changes in international positions of advanced economies’ banks’ positions
in emerging economies’ banks. In other words, because the national capacity of emerging
economies banks is small, a cross-border position change that is considered small by an ad-
vanced economies’ banks can be very significant by an emerging economies’ banks.
By currency, the US dollar is the most important currency for cross-border banking activi-
ties with a total of USD 13 trillion of cross-border bank activities in the second quarter of 2016
as shown in Figure 5.13a. The Euro was almost as important as the US Dollar for the periods
up until the 2007-08 global financial crisis. Following the crisis, lending in the Euro decreased
steadily and currently, it is used in USD 7 trillion worth of cross-border banking activities
which is only a little more than half of the portion of cross-border banking denominated in the
US Dollar. The decreasing trend of Euro-denominated cross-border lending is consistent with
a decreasing trend of Germany’s banking lending activities.
As shown in Figure 5.13b cross-border lending is distributed mostly in foreign currencies,
whereas local lending is apparently dominated by local currency denomination with USD 60
trillion lending globally. There is also, however, a small portion of local lending (i.e. made by
local banks to local borrowers) that are denominated in foreign currencies, which is accounted
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for USD 0.5 trillion globally in the second quarter of 2016. The ’global liquidity’ figure that we
discuss in Section 4.1 consists of these two figures, i.e. cross-border lending and local lending
in foreign currency.
5.4.2.2 Interbank Market Rates
The interbank market rates series are quarterly 3-month interbank offered rate data for each
economy from Datastream. The series are considered as proxies for the banking funding
liquidity. The average of interbank market rates across all economies in the sample is 2.4 with
maximum 6.3 and minimum 0.1. The measure of skewness shows that interbank market rates
for most economies are positively skewed with an average skewness magnitude of 0.7 indicating
that rates are lower than the median in most periods of data. Put differently, higher interbank
rates are rarer than lower rates. The measure of kurtosis for most economies is less than 3
with the mean of 2.5 across all economies which indicates fat-tailed distributions, i.e. outliers
are more common in this series’ distribution compared to normal distributions.
Figure 5.14 plot the interbank market rates according to its groups of economies. The
graphs show the relative synchronization of interbank market rates in advanced economies,
particularly in the run-up and after the 2007-08 global financial crisis. For this group of
economies, Australia in general has the highest interbank rates with a mean of 4.6 whereas
Japan’s interbank rates are the lowest with the average of 0.3. The emerging economies’
interbank rates do not seem as closely synchronized, which indicate weaker inter-linkages of
banking sector cross-border activities among the economies in this group. From economies that
are categorized as offshore financial centres, only Hong Kong that owns an interbank market,
since all other offshore financial centres are small jurisdictions and thus have no large banking
sectors.
For the Euro Area countries, the individual countries’ interbank rates are merged to Euri-
bor since January 1999 except for Greece’s interbank rate that merged to Euribor in January
2001. Thus, the interbank market rates for the Euro area countries which are included in this
study is almost identical throughout the period of study from 2003 to 2016.
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(a) Advanced economies (b) Euro economies
(c) Emerging economies
Figure 5.14: Interbank market rates, by group of economies. Source: Datastream.
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5.4.3 Bilateral Consolidated Positions
The GVAR model requires a weighting matrix to establish ’foreign’ variables for each economy
in order to solve the dimensionality problem. The matrix maps out the strength of connectivity
across economies, allowing the estimation of the impact of any foreign variable changes to
the domestic economy model. The weighting matrix can be built using any measurement of
bilateral relationships between each pair of economies, which describes the relative strength of
connection of every pair of economies.
We use the BIS consolidated banking statistics to build our weighting matrix. The BIS
consolidated banking statistics capture the worldwide consolidated positions of internationally
active banking groups which are headquartered in reporting countries. Like the BIS locational
banking statistics, the BIS consolidated banking statistics is also reported on an aggregated
(nation-wide) basis, rather than individual banking level. The difference between the locational
and consolidated banking statistics is that, the BIS consolidated banking statistics considered
one banking holding as one entity even if they are located in different jurisdictions. Thus, the
consolidated banking statistics does not include cross-border lending and borrowing within one
bank holding.
The BIS consolidated banking statistics is designed to measure the international exposures
of internationally active banks of different nationalities, arising from their lending to various
countries and sectors. One example of the international exposures is the inability of foreign
borrowers to pay back the lending extended by the international bank in its headquarter,
as well as its affiliates located in the other economy. Although the main purpose of the
consolidated banking statistics is to measure the global exposures of internationally active
banks, the statistics can also be used to measure risks faced by emerging economies of the
reversal of international funding liquidity provided by international banks. Moreover, from
the point of view of a country, the magnitude of foreign lending provided by international
banks to its local banks not only determines the reversal risks but also provides international
spillover funding liquidity channel from the country where the international banks’ headquarter
is located. Risk-taking channel of cross-border monetary policy spillovers can potentially work
through this international bank lending.
Figure 5.29 shows the weighting matrix that we build from the consolidated banking
statistics. The banking statistics measure cross-border position from one side only, which is
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claims to other economies, instead of liabilities. The economies in each row are the nationalities
of the international banks that have foreign claims on banks located in economies in each
column. Thus, in aggregate national terms, the foreign banking lending goes from economies
in each row to economies in each column. The order of the country is sorted by their importance
in global financial markets, therefore most advanced economies are in the most left and top
order. The blue and red colour in each cell represents the relative magnitude of bilateral
cross-border positions of the pair of economies, where blue colour represents larger and red
represents a lower magnitude of cross-border positions. In relative terms, the magnitude of
cross-border banking positions is very high in the top left corner of the table suggesting that
the global banking flows are dominated by the advanced economies, in particular USA, UK,
Germany, and Japan. The red cells which are dominant on the table indicate that most pairs
of economies have relatively low cross-border positions, compared to the cross-border positions
of a few major economies. In other words, the distribution of the cross-border positions is very
much skewed to the left. Some economies with blank rows are non-reporting BIS consolidated
banking statistics economies. One of the reason for an economy not being a reporting economy
is because it does not have an internationally active bank headquartered in its jurisdictions.
These economies only have international banking liabilities arising from international lending
from banks in advanced economies, but do not have international banking claims.
5.5 First Analysis Results: Global Liquidity Determinants and
Relationship with the Other Variables
In order to study the potential major determinants of the global liquidity and how the global
liquidity interacts with the other global variables, we perform a VAR to the global liquidity, US
policy rate, trade-weighted US Dollar value against major trading currencies, global credit-to-
GDP gaps, and TED spread. We include four lags of every variable into the VAR system due
to the quarterly frequency data. The lower and upper confidence band of the point estimate
is obtained by bootstrapping method of 1000 draws with 90% confidence band.
Figures 5.15 to 5.19 show the generalized impulse response function (GIRF) graphs of the
VAR system. In general, the GIRFs show that the shocks to all selected global variables, i.e.
US monetary policy rate, US Dollar value, global credit-to-GDP ratio, and TED spread are
significant for the global liquidity variable. On impact, the effect of the increase in the US
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Figure 5.15: GIRFs of global variables from 1 SD shock to global liquidity
policy rate and global credit-to-GDP gaps is to increase global liquidity (Figures 5.16 and 5.18).
On the other hand, the effect of positive shocks to the US Dollar value (USD appreciation)
and TED spread (Figures 5.17 and 5.19) is to decrease global liquidity. Most of the effects are
significant and reach its maximum in around 1 to 1.5 years.
Figure 5.15 shows the generalised impulse response functions of the global variables from
a positive standard deviation shock to the global liquidity variable. The GIRFs demonstrate
that the effect of positive global liquidity shocks is slightly negative on the US monetary policy
rate in the short run and positive in the medium run (although the impact is not highly
significant); negative on USD value in the medium run (positive in the short run); positive
on global credit-to-GDP gaps and the TED spread. Higher cross-border banking lending as
indicated by a positive shock in the global liquidity variable apparently increases global credit
extension to the private non-financial sector and the effect remains significant in the short and
medium term. The USD depreciation following higher global liquidity in the medium term
suggests that cross-border banking liquidity is dominated by capital outflows from the US
banking system. The higher US policy rate implies the US Federal Reserve tightening policy
to contain future inflationary pressure following higher credit extension.
A positive standard deviation shock to the US monetary policy rate has large positive
effect on global aggregate cross-border lending on impact with maximum effect in 1.5 years
(Figure 5.16). However, the effect becomes negative in around 2.5 years. This increase in the
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Figure 5.16: GIRFs of global variables from 1 SD shock to US monetary policy
global liquidity seems to be dominated by higher cross-border banking lending to US banking
system following higher US interest rate expectation. This conjecture is supported by the USD
appreciation in the medium term following the same positive US policy rate shock, although
the appreciation is not significant. The effect of positive US policy rate shock is positive on the
TED spread indicating the tightening of the cross-border interbank funding liquidity condition.
The tightening of the interbank funding liquidity condition reduces the global credit extension
to private non-financial sectors as shown by lower credit-to-GDP gaps, although the immediate
impact is not significant. Interestingly, in the medium term (2 to 4 years) the US policy rate
shocks affects the global credit extension to the non-financial sector positively, possibly due to
the loan supply effect as banks expect a higher return from lending.
Figures 5.17 show that on impact the global liquidity is affected negatively by a positive
shock on the USD value against major trading partners (i.e. USD appreciation) and the
effect is quite significant for around 1.5 years. This seems to suggest that a USD depreciation
causes global liquidity to increase, which supports the international transmission of ’risk-taking
channel’ where a cheaper dollar tends to cause international banks to take more risk and, thus,
lend more. This is also supported by the global credit-to-GDP ratio response to USD shock,
where the effect of a negative shock on the USD value (a USD depreciation) is positive and
significant to the global banking credit disbursement to non-financial sectors across the globe.
This evidence also underlines the importance of USD value as the most important global
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Figure 5.17: GIRFs of global variables from 1 SD shock to US Dollar value
reserve currency in the ’risk-taking channel’. There is also a strong negative response in the
TED spread to the USD appreciation shock, which seems to indicate that stronger dollar
reduces the tightness of interbank market borrowing and lending and the effect is persistent
until around three years after the impact.
Figures 5.18 show the impulse response functions of global variables associated with a
positive standard deviation shock to the global credit-to-GDP gaps. The global credit-to-
GDP gaps is a proxy for global banks’ capital position and their willingness to take risks from
lending to the non-financial sector. Obviously, higher global credit extension is associated with
higher global cross-border banking lending and the effect is significant on impact for around 2
years after the shock. The positive shock to global credit has negative effect on USD value (a
USD depreciation) quite significantly in the short to medium-term. An increase in the global
credit-to-GDP gaps reflects an international loan demand shock which induces higher demand
for global liquidity, which then leads to USD depreciation as capital outflows from the US
economy emerge. However, the shock to global credit-to-GDP gaps does not seem to affect US
monetary policy and TED spread significantly.
Figures 5.19 show the dynamic impact on global variables following a positive standard
deviation shock to the TED spread. The TED spread variable is a proxy for credit risk of the
counterparty, where larger TED spread indicates higher credit risk and thus tighter interbank
market condition. There is a significant decrease in the global liquidity to a positive shock
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Figure 5.18: GIRFs of global variables from 1 SD shock to global credit-to-GDP ratio
to TED spread. This suggests that a higher perception on counterparty banks’ credit risks is
associated with a significant reduction in the cross-border banking lending internationally with
the strong effect remaining until around 2 years post the shock. The tighter global interbank
condition appears to cause the Federal Reserve to accommodate the US monetary condition
by lowering the policy rate, although the effect is not significant. The effect of a positive TED
spread (an increase in the perceived credit risk in the banking sector) is to increase USD value
suggesting an increase demand for the USD as the safe haven currency, although the effect is
significant only in 4 quarters.
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Figure 5.19: GIRFs of global variables from 1 SD shock to TED spread
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Figure 5.20: Heatwave and spillover, aggregated globally across all economies
Note: The measurement is percentage such that for every forecast horizon, the aggregate
heatwave and aggregate spillover adds up to 100 per cent.
5.6 Second Analysis Results: Measuring the Connectedness of
Banking Liquidity in the Global Economy
To study the international spillovers of the banking liquidity, first, we perform the GVAR
on the cross-border claims and liabilities, and interbank market rates of the 35 countries in
our dataset, including three global variables (i.e. global liquidity, US monetary policy, and
US Dollar value). The estimates from the GVAR are then used to produce the Generalized
Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (GFEVD) of shocks to each of the variables on the
horizon of 40 quarters. The GFEVD shock is presented as a three-dimensional array where
the first dimension lists every variable in every economy where the shock is from, the second
dimension lists to which variables the shock is to, and the third dimension contains the full 40
forecast horizons. For every horizon, the main diagonal element represents the heatwave effects,
whereas the off-diagonal elements show spillover effects. The three-dimensional GFEVD array
is then utilized to build the various connectedness measure as in (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2009;
Diebold and Yılmaz, 2014; Greenwood-Nimmo et al., 2015a,b).
Figure 5.20 shows the systemwide heatwave and spillover effects that are calculated by
aggregating the effects across all variables of all economies in the dataset as shown in equation
5.24 and equation 5.25. The aggregate heatwave and spillover effects are plotted against the
forecast horizons to observe how the effects evolve throughout the forecast horizons.
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The notable observation from the two graphs is that in aggregate the heatwave effects
recede with the forecast horizon while the spillover effects tend to grow over the forecast hori-
zon. The observation that global spillovers intensify over time suggests that the international
transmission of shocks occurs gradually, replacing some part the impact coming from the do-
mestic economy. The second observation is that, the globally aggregated spillover is greater in
magnitude compared to the aggregate heatwave, as the spillover effect comes from every other
country in the system. Figure 5.21 disaggregates the systemwide heatwave effects into each
economy’s heatwave effects, shown by the shaded area in the subfigures. It is the within coun-
try connectedness (H
(h)
j←j) across horizons. When disaggregated across different economies, it
is shown that most of the heatwave recede over time (as it is the case in the aggregate heat-
wave). The heatwave effects appear to be stronger in many offshore financial centres like the
Bahamas, Bahrain, and Taiwan.
Figure 5.22 shows the spillover effects of each economy which are plotted through forecast
horizon. Unlike the heatwave effects that are focused on the impact of shocks within one
economy, the spillover impact measures the implication of shock to one economy on the rest of
economies in the system. For each subfigure containing the j-th country, the from contribution
(S
(h)
j←•) is plotted as blue line, whereas the to contribution (S
(h)
•←j) is plotted as red line. The
from contribution measures the total spillover from all other economies to economy j (i.e. the
total from contribution affecting economy j), whereas the to contribution measures the total
spillover to all other economies from economy j (i.e. the total to contribution arising from
economy j). The net connectedness is shown by the shaded region.
In the large majority of cases, the net connectedness of the k-th economy does not change
sign over the forecast horizon. This implies that the choice of forecast horizon is unlikely to
change our results decisively. In most cases, the net connectedness of the countries is positive
suggesting that the banking condition of these countries are more likely to receive shocks from
foreign banking condition than to influence them. The net connectedness measurement is
negative for the USA and global variables only, which means that the cross-border claims and
liabilities, and interbank rate in the USA, as well as the global variables (global liquidity, US
monetary policy, and US Dollar value), are significant in influencing the global cross-border
banking activities. For some countries, the net connectedness is almost zero throughout the
forecast horizon, implying that their degree of influence to other economies is almost as large
as the influence they receive from outside banking condition. Including in these group are
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Figure 5.21: Time-varying heatwave for each economy, for horizon up to 40 quarters
Note: Aus: Austria, Aul: Australia, Bhm: the Bahamas, Bhr: Bahrain, Bel: Belgium, Ber:
Bermuda, Bra: Brazil, Can: Canada, Cay: Cayman Islands, Chi: Chile, Den: Denmark,
Fin: Finland, Fra: France, Ger: Germany, Gre: Greece, Hkg: Hongkong, Ire: Ireland, Ind:
India, Ita: Italy, Jap: Japan, Lux: Lumbeourg, Mac: Macao SAR, Mex: Mexico, Net: the
Netherlands, Nor: Norway, Pan: Panama, Por: Portugal, Sin: Singapore, Spa: Spain, Swe:
Sweden, Swi: Switzerland, Tai: Taiwan SAR, Tur: Turkey, Uki: the United Kingdom, Usa:
the USA, Liq: global liquidity
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Figure 5.22: Time-varying connectedness for each economy, for horizon up to 40 quarters
Note: Blue line plots the from contribution, red line plots the to contribution, and the shaded
region shows the net connectedness.
economies with important international banking presence i.e. France, Germany, Italy, and the
Netherlands; some offshore financial centres i.e. the Bahamas, Bahrain, and Taiwan. The only
emerging country that has almost the same from and to influence is Mexico.
In Figure 5.23 we present the heatwave and spillover effects in a heatmap presentation
which presents the heatwave for each economy together with the spillover effects along the pair
of economies. The heatmap presentation shows a matrix of connectedness of pair of economies
that are averaged across the full horizons. The strength of connectedness between the pair of
economies is represented by the colour of the heatmap boxes, i.e. the darker the colour the
stronger the connection is. Each box represents the strength of impact from the economy listed
in the rows, to the economy listed in the columns. The row-wise list presents the economies
where the shock comes from, whereas the column-wise list presents the economy where the
shock is directed to.
The main diagonal elements of the matrix presents the within connections for each econ-
omy, i.e. the impact from shocks that coming from domestic variables (e.g. claims, liabilities,
or interbank market rates) within a country back to the same country. The heatmap shows
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Figure 5.23: Heatmap presentation of all economies
Note: Row-wise lists the economies where the shock from, while the column-wise lists where
the shock goes to.
an obvious darker colour for within connections compared to the rest of boxes, implying that,
shocks from variables in the domestic economy are still more important to each country than
any foreign variables. The within connections appear to be stronger in the offshore financial
centre such as the Bahamas, Bahrain, and Taiwan. Another observation is that, the effect
from the global variables (which contain the global liquidity, US monetary policy, and US Dol-
lar) dominates the spillover effects to the rest of economies, implying that shocks from global
variables are likely to be the second important foreign impacts to each economy. The next
important shocks are coming from the USA.
We then group the economies into four different groups of economies, i.e. the advanced,
the Euro, emerging economies, and the offshore financial centres; and one separate group for
the global variables. By grouping the economies we can observe a typical pattern of the groups
and how each group is connected to every other group. The economies’ matrix connectedness
is aggregated for each different group of economies as shown in Figure 5.24. As in Figure 5.23,
the rows show which groups of economies the shocks are from, while the columns show which
groups of economies the shocks affect to.
A few observations emerge here. First, the shocks from the global variables dominate
the whole system as the row belong to the global variables group are significantly darker and
larger in magnitude. Global variables shocks are even larger compared to the within economies’
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Figure 5.24: Heatmap presentation of groups of economies
Note: The numbers shown in each box are the connectedness magnitudes averaged across all
forecast horizons. The magnitudes are resized such that the largest connectedness magnitude
in the heatmap is 10, which happens to be the within shock of the global variables.
shocks (as presented in the main diagonal elements of the matrix) for every group of economies,
except the emerging economies. The global banking in the advanced economies group appears
to be the second important group with the magnitude of influence to the cross-border banking
position in other groups ranging from 0.33 to 0.55. The advanced economies group appears to
influence the Euro economies group more than others. The global banks located in the Euro
area is the next influential group, affecting mostly to emerging economies, then the advanced
economies. The global banks located in the emerging economies do not seem to be influential
for the banking condition in the other groups, but they receive influence mostly from the global
variables (with magnitude 1.99), the global banks in the advanced economies group (0.45), then
from the Euro area (0.43), and the offshore financial centres (0.34).
Figure 5.25a present the connectedness matrix of groups of economies in a directed graph
of gross connectedness. Every node represents a group of economies. Every pair of nodes
representing a pair of economies’ groups is connected with two edges with arrows that show
the direction of the connection. The figure is simplified further by presenting only the net
connectedness between a pair of nodes, as in Figure 5.25b. The figure shows that, from all
pair of connections in the system, the strongest impact is the impact of shocks from the global
variables to the Euro countries, followed by the shock from the global variables to the offshore
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(a) Gross connectedness of groups
(b) Net connectedness of groups
Figure 5.25: Directed graphs representing the connectedness of cross-border banking positions
across groups of economies.
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Figure 5.26: Directed graphs representing the connectedness of cross-border banking positions
across groups of economies.
Note: UMP: US monetary policy, USD: US Dollar value against major trading partner, LIQ:
global liquidity, ADV: advanced economies group, EUR: Euro economies group, OFC: Offshore
financial centres group, EME: emerging economies group.
financial centres, and the advanced economies group. Between the advanced and Euro area,
the magnitude of international banking influence is almost equal, but the net connectedness
goes from the advanced economies to the Euro area. The emerging economies group appear
to be affected the least by the global variables shocks in terms of magnitude, compared to the
other groups of economies.
Figure 5.26 sums up the net connectedness direction graph more neatly in a layered ranking
graph, which ranks the nodes according to the strength of influence in the whole system, where
the strongest node is presented at the top of the layered graph, followed by the second strongest
in the next below position, et cetera. The width of the edges shows the strength of influence.
The layered graph shows that the US monetary policy is the most influential transmitter
of all the global variables and the cross-border banking position of all groups of economies.
It net affects every other group in the system but none of them net affects the US monetary
policy. The second most important transmitter is the USD value which is net affected by the
US monetary policy only, and net positive transmitter to all nodes in the system. The third
most important transmitter is global liquidity which is strongly net affected by US monetary
policy and weakly net affected by the USD value. This supports the finding in previous section
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showing that the US monetary policy and USD value are important determinants of the global
liquidity.
Among all the group of economies, the most important transmitter in the cross-border
banking liquidity is the advanced economy group, followed by the Euro economies, as for the
pair of groups the direction of impact goes from the advanced to the Euro groups. This suggests
that the global banks located in the advanced economies group and the Euro area is almost
equally strong but the impact from banks in the advanced economies to the Euro area seems to
be stronger than the other way around. The next most important group is the offshore financial
centres’ group, which receives the strongest impact from the US monetary policy, and mild net
impact from USD value, global liquidity, the cross-border banking liquidity of the advanced
and Euro groups. The offshore financial centres’ group has a positive net influence on the
emerging economies group, making the emerging economies group the least important group
in the system. It is probably not really surprising that the global banks located in the offshore
financial centres have more influence on global banking condition compared to banks in the
emerging economies. Even though the offshore financial centres are merely small jurisdictions,
they specialize in providing international banking services which receive significant flows mostly
from the advanced economies and Euro area. The emerging economies group receives positive
impact from the rest of the groups, while it does not give positive net influence to any of other
groups of economies. This shows how prone the monetary condition of the emerging economies
are to the external influence from the international banks located in the advanced economies,
the Euro area, and even the offshore financial centres.
The same layered ranking connectedness analysis can also be applied to the interconnection
between economies. However, as including the whole 36 economies into a web of connection
would be cumbersome, we select the biggest economies in terms of their size of cross-border
banking position in absolute term in the global economy as presented in graph 5.9. These
countries are Germany, Japan, France, Australia, the United Kingdom, USA, and the global
variables group. Figures 5.27 represent the gross and net connectedness of the cross-border
banking influence between pair of major economies.
The US monetary policy is again the most important transmitter for the cross-border
banking activities globally, with positive net impact to variables in the system. Now that we
consider the USA as a single country, it appears that the USA cross-border banking liquidity
is the second most important transmitter. It shows that the US monetary policy net influences
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Figure 5.27: Directed graphs representing the connectedness of cross-border banking positions
across economies with the highest cross-border banking activities.
the USA cross-border banking activities which then affects the fluctuation of the US Dollar
and other major economies. The global liquidity is strongly affected by US monetary policy,
weakly net influenced by the US Dollar, but it also affects US cross-border banking activities.
Of all the pair of connections, the influence from the US monetary policy to the interna-
tional banks’ activities in the United Kingdom is the strongest, which does not seem to be
surprising as the cross-border banking activities in the United Kingdom is the largest in the
world (Figure 5.9). Surprisingly, even though global banks in the UK are the most active
in cross-border transactions, they in aggregate are net receivers from most major economies,
except Australia and Japan. The international banks located in the USA appears to be the
first important transmitter of all country as the banks located in the USA in aggregate have a
net positive influence towards the other major economies.
After the USA, the international banks that are located in France is the next important
banking condition transmitter, followed by Germany. As shown in Figure 5.10, France and
Germany are the important net lender in the global banking system. The United Kingdom and
Australia come next as important cross-border banking net transmitters. The United Kingdom
hosts international banks with the largest total absolute of cross-border activities in aggregate
but without particular net borrowing or lending position, while Australia is the important net
borrower in the world. Japan is the least net influencer among the major economies. Although
global banks located in Japan is the largest net cross-border lender to the global banking
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Figure 5.28: Directed graphs representing the connectedness of cross-border banking positions
across economies with the highest cross-border banking activities - Advanced economies
system, the activities of the global banks in Japan do not seem to be highly influential to other
major economies.
Figure 5.28 depicts the net connectedness layer graphs for the cross-border banking liquid-
ity activities of the countries within the advanced group. The global variables are not included
in the picture to focus on the countries. Among the advanced economies, the USA cross-border
banking liquidity is again the most influential of all advanced economies, followed by Australia,
Canada, Norway, and the United Kingdom. The global banks located in Sweden, Singapore,
Switzerland, Denmark, and Japan follow the position.
5.7 Conclusion
We study the interaction between the global liquidity and a set of other global variables that
includes US monetary policy, US Dollar value against major trading partners, TED spread,
and global credit-to-GDP gaps. We then draw representations of the international banks’
connectedness across different economies and groups of economies. Our research objective
is to understand how the monetary policy decision of the centre economy and the decision
of banks with international establishments give rise to monetary condition spillover across
borders.
We find that the US monetary policy rate, US Dollar, global credit-to-GDP gaps, and
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TED spread are significant determinants of the global liquidity variable. On impact, positive
shocks to the US policy rate and global credit-to-GDP gaps increase global liquidity, while an
appreciation of the US Dollar and an increase in the TED spread have the opposite effect. A
positive shock to US monetary policy rate appears to significantly increase global aggregate
cross-border lending on impact with maximum effect in 1.5 years, but the effect becomes
negative in around 2.5 years. Positive monetary policy shock increases TED spread (as a
proxy for risk perception) and slows down the global bank leverage (as proxied by the credit-
to-GDP gaps) on impact due to the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. Global liquidity
dynamics is in line with the global banking leverage cycle, where higher bank leverage ratio is
associated with higher global liquidity, and vice versa.
Our cross-border banking connectedness network shows that the globally aggregated within
connectedness measure recede overtime, while the spillover effects tend to grow, suggesting that
the international transmission of banking shocks occurs gradually. In net terms, the banking
system in almost all countries is affected by the rest of the world, while only the USA is
the net transmitter to the global banking system. International banks in several countries
influence the global banking system almost by as much as they are influenced, e.g. some
advanced countries (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands), some offshore financial centres
(the Bahamas, Bahrain, Taiwan), and one emerging country (Mexico).
US monetary policy is the most significant net transmitter of cross-border banking position
across the globe, followed by the value of the US Dollar, and the aggregate global liquidity
variable. The groups of economies ordered by their degree of systemically important financial
institutions in the global banking system are the advanced economy group, followed by the
Eurozone, the offshore financial centres, and the emerging countries group. This shows that
emerging economies group is the most prone to shocks from external monetary conditions.
Among the economies with the largest cross-border banking positions, the USA is the globally
most influential, followed by France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Japan



















































Concluding Remarks and Further
Research
An ever-increasing process of international financial integration has allowed the intensification
of financial spillovers across national borders. The international financial integration also fa-
cilitates policy spillovers, where the extent of a policy impact from a centre economy broadens
far beyond its national border. Global banks play a significant role in this respect by their
ability and willingness to provide global liquidity. This development poses crucial challenges
for policymakers in small open economies. In particular, policymakers in these economies need
to understand the implications of monetary and policy spillovers on the stability of their juris-
dictions. More importantly, they need to be prepared for accurate policy actions to maintain
domestic stability in the face of external spillovers. This thesis has attempted to extend our
understanding of these developments. By using a combination of empirical and theoretical
frameworks, this thesis has studied the consequences of the US QE and its unwinding -as a
notable occurrence of large monetary spillovers- on the global economic condition and poli-
cymaking. It has analysed the pivotal role of global banks in facilitating the spillovers and
influencing the global liquidity dynamics. Finally, this thesis has investigated policy strategy
by the emerging economies and discussed their effectiveness.
The second chapter has analysed the macroeconomic and financial implications of the US
QE episodes on the US and the global economy and monetary policymaking using the GVAR
framework. We find an asymmetric impact of different QE episodes, with QE1 having the most
significant impact on the US, the other advanced, and emerging economies macroeconomic
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variables compared to QE2 and QE3. QE1 appeared to have been successful in halting the
recession following the global financial crisis in the global economy. There is evidence of
substantial appreciation pressures in non-US countries following QE1 which may suggest the
existence of a massive influx of capital flows. However, as the impact of QE1 began to come into
effect, inflationary pressures increased notably in the emerging economies. There is evidence
that the US QE was trailed by monetary easing across the globe that materialised through
either the long or short rates. The results show the effectiveness of QE1 in reducing long-term
rates in the US economy as expected. The tendency of lower rates at the longer end of US
yield curves and the reduction in global risks seemed to spillovers to other economies. This
finding provides some support for the “portfolio-balance channel” that the reduced supply of
US long-term securities led investors to seek alternative investments in emerging economies,
therefore increasing demand and reducing yields of long-term securities in other economies.
In order to model the US QE formally, the third chapter has utilized an open economy
DSGE model to study the implications of a negative foreign interest rate shock and then
analysed whether an emerging economy’s strategy of the reducing domestic interest rate could
neutralise the pressure from the foreign interest rate reduction. Our findings suggest that a
foreign monetary policy reduction increases capital inflows into emerging economies, mainly due
to higher foreign borrowings by entrepreneurs. Foreign rate reduction decreases the external
finance premium, encouraging domestic entrepreneurs to take more risks by borrowing more
and then invest more in capital production. This finding supports the international risk-
taking channel of monetary policy (Bruno and Shin, 2015a) which maintains that a domestic
currency appreciation following a centre country monetary easing makes lending in foreign
currency cheaper. Nevertheless, there is a currency appreciation that reduces export product
competitiveness. The implications of a responsive domestic monetary policy easing depend
on some factors, e.g. the scale of liability dollarization, the size of the capital-intensive sector
in the economy, and the primary concern following the foreign negative interest rate shocks.
We find that a domestic monetary policy reduction can be successful in slowing down capital
inflows, which is desirable if inflows are destabilizing. If capital inflows are the source of
funding for capital investment projects however, the effect of domestic monetary easing can be
detrimental. Moreover, the effect on the rest of the economy is more detrimental if the relative
size of the capital-intensive sector is immense. If inflationary pressures and asset price bubbles
following the foreign interest rate reduction are more of a concern, then responsive domestic
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monetary policy is preferable as it might ease the pressure.
The fourth chapter has examined the impacts of the US Fed interest rate rise (the lift-
off) on the emerging economies with capital mobility and flexible exchange rate regime and
discussed the effectiveness of a set macroprudential policies as a defence against these impacts.
This chapter has extended the DSGE framework used in the third chapter: it is a two-country
DSGE model; it establishes global-local bank interactions as the source of global liquidity
dynamics; and it enlarges policy options to include macroprudential policy and fixed exchange
rates. We find that the cross-border bank lending from the global bank to the local bank (the
global liquidity) is the primary channel of cross-border transmission of shocks from the Fed
lift-off. A Fed lift-off is expected to be followed by a slowing down in cross-border banking
flows to emerging economy, leading to the real exchange rate depreciation, and a reduction in
the aggregate credit and investment.
To curb fluctuations in the domestic economy in the aftermath of the shock, we find
that monetary policy combined with the macroprudential policy that targets foreign banking
capital inflows performs best in most scenarios, suggesting that a policy that focuses on the
main channel of cross-border monetary spillovers is preferable. In general, macroprudential
policy is effective in minimizing volatilities in credit growth, regardless of the macroprudential
instruments. An emerging economy with low financial integration experiences less reduction
in the foreign banking flows, but more fluctuations in financial variables such as asset prices,
leverage ratio, interest rate spread, and net worth of local banks. Although foreign interest rate
shock seems to benefit an emerging economy with low financial integration, in the long run,
impediments to capital mobility hold back the economy from reaping the benefits of financial
integration like lower steady state cross-border borrowing rate and larger capital inflows in
the banking sector. The choice of the exchange rate regime matters for how the emerging
economy is affected by the Fed lift-off. In particular, an emerging economy which adopts a fixed
exchange rate regime experiences a more significant reduction in the foreign banking flows and
greater volatilities in all leading variables. Interestingly, the implementation of macroprudential
policies by an emerging economy with a fixed exchange rate regime improves macroeconomic
condition as volatilities of leading macroeconomic and financial stability reduces significantly
with macroprudential policies.
The fifth chapter has studied the interaction between the global liquidity and a set of global
variables that include US monetary policy, US Dollar value against major trading partners,
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TED spread, and global credit-to-GDP gaps using a VAR framework. We find that the US
monetary policy rate, US Dollar, global credit-to-GDP gaps, and TED spread are significant
determinants of the global liquidity variable. On impact, positive shocks to the US policy
rate and global credit-to-GDP gaps increase global liquidity, while an appreciation of the US
Dollar and an increase in the TED spread have the opposite effect. A positive shock to the
US monetary policy rate significantly increases the global cross-border lending on impact with
maximum effect in 1.5 years, but the effect becomes negative in around 2.5 years. Global
liquidity dynamics is in line with the global banking leverage cycle, suggesting that a higher
worldwide banks’ willingness to extend credit to the real sector is associated with higher cross-
border banking supply of funds. Global liquidity dynamics is also strongly determined by USD
value, where a USD depreciation causes global liquidity to increase, implying that a cheaper
dollar tends to cause international banks to take more risk on overseas markets. The global
liquidity is also very sensitive to TED spread, a proxy for credit risk of the counterparty, where
a higher TED spread significantly reduces global liquidity with the substantial effect remains
until around two years post the shock.
We then used a GVAR framework and a connectedness measure to build a cross-border
banking connectedness network. The result reveals that the globally aggregated within con-
nectedness measure recedes overtime, while the spillover effects tend to grow, suggesting that
the international transmission of banking shocks occurs gradually. The connectedness network
shows that US monetary policy is the most significant net transmitter of cross-border banking
positions across the globe, followed by the value of the US Dollar, and the aggregate global
liquidity variable. The groups of economies ordered by their degree of systemic importance
in the global banking system are the advanced economy group, followed by the Eurozone, the
offshore financial centres, and the emerging countries group. This finding shows that emerg-
ing economies group is the most prone to shocks from external monetary conditions. Among
the economies with the largest cross-border banking positions, the USA is the globally most
influential, followed by France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Japan is the
least influential among the major economies even though it is the most significant net lender
globally.
The findings in this thesis give rise to some crucial policy implications. First, this thesis
shed some light on the vital role of US monetary policy stance for the global stability via the
global banks’ connectedness network. In particular, US policy stance significantly affects global
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banks’ willingness and ability to extend cross-border liquidity. The fluctuations of the global
liquidity influence domestic credit condition, and thus, the monetary and financial stability
in the rest of the world. This finding should advise policymakers in the core economies on
the increasing global dimensions of their tasks. In particular, the implications of their policy
stance is increasingly linked to the monetary condition, and thus policymaking in the rest of
the world. Hence, this awareness should encourage core economies’ policymakers such as the
Federal Reserve -and may also apply to the European Central Bank and the Bank of England-
to internalise the possible international implications of their policy stances in every decision
making.
In addition to the US policy stance, the global banks also play a pivotal role in the global
liquidity dynamics. The global banks’ willingness and ability to extend foreign lending facilitate
cross-border liquidity spillovers via the international banking network, which determines the
global liquidity fluctuations. This result should advise relevant international authorities such as
the Bank for International Settlements and the International Monetary Fund to strengthen the
international cooperation for banking supervision and encourage policy coordination among
national authorities on the cross-border banking supervision.
Also, the ranking of countries (or groups of countries) in the importance of the global
banking network provides policy-relevant information about the handling of possible banking
crisis spillovers in the future. In particular, international authorities should give more super-
vision focus on the most influential countries (or groups of countries) in the banking network,
as a banking crisis in a particular country tends to have a more severe implication globally
the higher the position it is in the network. Hence, a banking crisis in the advanced or the
Euro countries can have major international ramifications, while a banking crisis in emerging
economies is more likely to be localised. As another example, although the United Kingdom
is neither a significant net lender nor a significant net borrower globally, its banking activities
is more prominent than Japan which is the most dominant net lender globally.
This thesis also reveals essential policy implications for the emerging economies. First,
monetary policy in most emerging economies may not be as independent as suggested by the
standard macroeconomic theory, even after the implementation of a flexible exchange rate
regime. In particular, the extent to which domestic independence can be achieved by an
emerging economy varies across time depending on the magnitude of the external spillovers.
When the external spillovers, either from financial condition or policy-based, are massive, the
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independence of domestic monetary policy in the emerging economies is profoundly jeopardized.
The global financial crisis and QE1 were two examples of times when external spillovers are
significant for emerging economies. During a massive external spillover, domestic monetary
policy transmission may not be as powerful in achieving its policy target such as driving
market interest rates, managing domestic credit activities, and maintaining domestic stability
in general. To recognise periods of massive external spillovers through global liquidity, emerging
economies’ policymakers should keep track on the movement of the US monetary policy, USD
value, TED spread, and the global credit-to-GDP gaps as important origins for the global
liquidity dynamics. During the period of massive external spillovers, emerging economies need
to supplement monetary policy with additional measures such as macroprudential policy and
capital flows management, thus providing more leeway for monetary policy manoeuvre.
The findings in this thesis provide support for the currently growing research area in the
optimal policymaking which takes into account cross-border spillovers. In particular, as the
impact of policymaking in particular countries might be observed far beyond their national
borders, there is a scope for the first-best solution of policy coordination across economies.
Although monetary policy coordination across countries seems politically infeasible, at least a
second-best solution which is an internalisation of each others’ policy stance is worth consider-
ing (Eichengreen, 2013; Taylor, 2013). Possible future research in this regard could be directed
towards policy coordination to improve macroeconomic management in affected economies as
the external spillover impact can be consequential. Similarly, as global banking activities facili-
tate significant liquidity spillovers, future research can be extended in the ways the cross-border
banking supervisions be improved to increase global financial stability.
Another clear avenue for future research in this area is regarding the modelling framework.
In the fourth chapter, we have examined the spillover effects through the cross-border banking
borrowing and lending in the face of centre country’s policy shock. Empirical regularity shows
that there is a significant effect for unexpected policy announcement, even before the actual
policy is implemented. Hence, future research avenue will be to add the model’s framework with
an additional channel of contagion from policy announcement that shifts market perception
towards future policy rates and financial conditions. In this chapter, we also have analysed
the effectiveness of macroprudential instruments. A promising future research is to embed the
model framework with asymmetries in macroprudential policy effectiveness. In particular, it
would be interesting to explore how the results change when we allow the effectiveness of the
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macroprudential policy to be different in times of boom and bust; in the intensity of market
failures; or in the phases of the financial cycle.
In the fifth chapter, we have established the global banking connectedness network. The
future research opportunities for the banking connectedness network is to analyse the network
in different periods of time. For instance, one can divide the data into two subsets of data by its
period: the normal period and the crisis period. The GVAR estimation and the connectedness
measurement can then be applied to the two subsets of data. It would be interesting to see
whether the connectedness network will change if the dataset is divided into a period in around
the crisis and normal times. The same chapter discusses the role of offshore financial centres
in the global banking network only briefly. Although most of the offshore financial centres are
small countries with very small population, their role in the global banking network is crucial,
far more crucial than emerging economies with notably more population. Hence, a fruitful
future research could be directed towards examining the role of offshore financial centres on
the global liquidity dynamics, the countries that are important for offshore financial centres,
and the international supervision towards the centres.
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Appendix A
Appendices to Chapter 2
A.1 Global Vector Auto Regression/Global Vector Error Cor-
rection Model
For each economy, there is a VAR model containing a set of equations that relates the vector
xit of ki domestic variables to the global economy via foreign variables x
∗
it plus deterministic
variables such as time trends and global exogenous variables (here, world financial oil and VIX
index). We consider the VARX*(pi, qi) structure:
xit = ai0 +ai1t+Φi1xi,t−1 + · · ·+Φipixi,t−pi +Λi0x∗it+Λi1x∗i,t−1 + · · ·+Λiqix∗i,t−qi +uit, (A.1)
t = 1, 2, ..., T ; i = 0, 1, 2, ..., N
where Φipi is a ki × ki matrix of lagged coefficients, Λiqi are ki × k∗i matrix of coefficients
associated with the foreign-specific variables, and uit is a ki×1 vector of idiosyncratic country-
specific shocks.
The ECM form of the VARX*(2, 2) specification can be written as VECMX*(1, 1) model
∆xit = ci0 −αiβ′i[zi,t−1 − γi(t− 1)] + Λi0∆x∗it + Γi∆zi,t−1 + ui,t (A.2)





′, αi is a ki × ri matrix of rank ri and βi is a (ki + k∗i)× ri matrix of
rank ri.
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The VECMX is estimated using reduced regression techniques. In this case, x∗i t are treated
as ‘long-run forcing’ or I(1) weakly exogenous with respect to the parameters of the VARX*
model. The VARX* model is estimated for each country separately conditional on x∗i t. Then
we can recover the number of cointegrating relations ri, the speed of adjustment coefficients
αi and the cointegrating vectors β
′
i for each country model. The rest of parameters of the
conditional model are then estimated by OLS regressions 1
∆xit = ci0 − δiECMi,t−1 + Λi0∆x∗it + Γi∆zi,t−1 + uit (A.3)
where ECMi,t−1 are the error correction terms corresponding to the ri cointegrating relations
of the ith country model. The corresponding cointegrating VARX* models are estimated and
the rank of their cointegrating space is determined using the error-correction form of the
individual country models given by equation A.1 and computed using Johansen’s trace and
maximal eigenvalue statistics as set out in Pesaran et al. (2000).
Although estimation is done on a country by country basis, the GVAR model is solved for
the world as a whole, i.e. in terms of a k×1 global variable vector, k = ∑Ni=0 ki, taking account
of the fact that all the variables are endogenous to the system as a whole. In particular, after
estimating the VECMX* model as in model A.3, we recover the VARX* (pi, qi) models for
each country
xit = ai0 +ai1t+Φi1xi,t−1 + · · ·+Φipixi,t−pi +Λi0x∗it+Λi1x∗i,t−1 + · · ·+Λiqix∗i,t−qi +uit, (A.4)
From the country-specific models, we define the (ki + k
∗





and rewrite model A.4 as
Ai0zit = ai0 + ai1t+ Ai1zit−1 + · · ·+ Aipizit−pi + uit, (A.5)
where
Ai0 = (Iki,−Λi0), Aij = (Φij ,Λij) (A.6)
1We use the procedures provided in the GVAR Toolbox provided by Vanessa Smith and Alessandro Galesi.
The GVAR toolbox can be downloaded from https://sites.google.com/site/gvarmodelling/gvar-toolbox
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for j = 1, . . . , pi.
The dimensions of Ai0 and Aij are (ki + k
∗
i ) × 1, and Ai0 has a full row rank, that is
Rank(Ai0) = ki. Collecting all the country-specific variables together in the k × 1 global




1t, . . . ,x
′
Nt)
′ where k =
∑N
i=0 ki is the total number of the endogenous
variables in the global model, it can be seen that the country specific variables can all be
written in terms of xt:
zit = Wixt, i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N (A.7)
where Wi is a (ki + k
∗
i )× k matrix of fixed (known) constants defined in terms of the country
specific weights. Thus, Wi can be viewed as the ‘link’ matrix that allows the country-specific
models to be written in terms of the global variable vector, xt.
Using that in model A.5 we have:
Ai0Wixt = ai0 + ai1t+ Ai1Wixt−1 + · · ·+ AipiWixt−pi + uit, (A.8)
Stacking equation A.8 for all countries yields:







































for j = 1, 2, . . . , p,
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0 G1xt−1 + · · ·+ G−10 Gpxt−p + G−10 ut, (A.12)
to obtain the GVAR(p) model










j , j = 1, 2, . . . , p, εt = G
−1
0 ut.
Equation A.13 can be solved recursively and used for further analysis like forecasting or
impulse response analysis.
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A.2 Principal Component Analysis
The principal component analysis is a statistical procedure to reduce data dimension of a set of
observable and possibly related variables into some variables of a lesser dimension that capture
most variations of the original variables. Each principal component is a linear combination
of the original variables. The principal components are obtained from eigendecomposition of
the dataset’s covariance matrix such that the first principal component captures the largest
variance of original datasets, the second principal component has the second largest variance,
and so on. In addition, the decomposition is such that each principal component is orthogonal
to each other so that no redundancy of data would occur between different series of principal
components.
We consider an n−dimensional stochastic vector x = (x1 . . . xn)′ such that E[x] = 0, and
we define Γx = E[xx
′]. The covariance matrix Γx is a symmetric and positive definite matrix
and can always be factorized as
Γx = PDP
′ (A.14)
where P in an n×n orthogonal matrix of eigenvectors, i.e. PP′ = P′P = I and P = (p1 . . .pn),
and D = diag(λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λn > 0) contains the ordered eigenvalues.
Then,








To obtain the eigenvalues, it is essential to recall that the eigenvalues solve
det(Γx − λjIn) = 0, (A.17)
then once we have the eigenvalues, the eigenvectors can be found by solving
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(Γx − λjIn)pj = 0. (A.18)
The linear combination p′jx is called the j-th principal component of x.
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A.3 Conditional Forecasts
Conditional forecasts are basically forecasts of the global model which are obtained subject to
a set of restrictions, written more generally as
ΨxT+j = dT+j , j = 1, 2, . . . , H¯, (A.19)
where Ψ is an m × k matrix, m is the number of variables to be restricted, and dT+j is a
m × 1 vector of known constants. For example we have m = 2 with k0 = 6 (the number of
endogenous variables in the US model). The matrix Ψ is then defined as
Ψ =
01×(k−k0) 0 0 0 1 0 0
01×(k−k0) 0 0 0 0 1 0
 (A.20)





′, j = 1, 2, . . . , H¯ contains the predefined values for the US short
and long run interest rates for each future quarter j.
Point forecasts of XT+h under the restrictions are given by
µ∗h = E(xT+h‖IT ,ΨXT+j = dT+j), j = 1, 2, . . . , H¯. (A.21)
It is assumed that the restriction do not affect the GVAR parameters, Fi = 1, 2 and the
covariance matrix, Σε, associated with the residuals, εt, of the GVAR model.
First we consider that the ex-ante forecasts are normally distributed so that
xT+h ‖ IT ∼ N(µh,Ωhh), (A.22)












and Σε = Cov(εT+h−i)
We have







The restrictions now imply that
ΨξT+j = dT+j −Ψµj (A.27)
Setting gj = dT+j −Ψµj , equation A.27 can be written as
(IH¯ ⊗Ψ)ξH¯ = gH¯ , (A.28)




T+2, . . . , ξ
′
T+H¯)
′ and gH¯ = (g′1,g′2, . . . ,g′H¯)
′.
Under joint normality of the shocks, we have
E(ξT+h ‖ IT , ΨxT+j = dT+j , j = 1, 2, . . . , H¯)
= E(ξT+h ‖ IT , (IH¯ ⊗Ψ)ξH¯ = gH¯)




is a H¯ × 1 selection vector with unity as its hth element and zeros elsewhere, and
ΩH¯ is the kH¯ × kH¯ matrix
ΩH¯ =

Ω11 Ω12 · · · Ω1H¯





ΩH¯1 ΩH¯2 · · · Ω1H¯H¯

(A.30)
The diagonal elements of ΩH¯ , that is {Ωii}H¯i=1, are given by equation A.23, while off-










lΣF′l)S′, i > j
(A.31)
where Σ is defined by A.24.
Hence, the conditional point forecasts are given by
µ∗h = µh + (ζ
′
hH¯ ⊗ Ik)ΩH¯(IH¯ ⊗Ψ′)[(IH¯ ⊗Ψ)ΩH¯(IH¯ ⊗Ψ′)]−1gH¯ (A.32)
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Appendices to Chapter 3





i∗ = i (B.2)
S = 1 (B.3)
RKN = 1 (B.4)
RKX = 1 (B.5)
HeX = 1 (B.6)
HeN = 1 (B.7)
P = 1 (B.8)
PN = 1 (B.9)
PM = 1 (B.10)
P ∗M = 1 (B.11)
P ∗X = 1 (B.12)
YN = 0.7 (B.13)
YM = 0.3 (B.14)
HN = 1 (B.15)
D = 1 (B.16)
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B.2 Steady State Equations
QN = P (B.17)










RN = QN (RKN − 1 + δ) (B.21)













IX = δKX (B.26)
IN = δKN (B.27)
W eN =




































ν(RKNQNKN − (1 + i∗)QNKN )
1− ν(1 + i∗) (B.36)
ZX =
ν(RKXQXKX − (1 + i∗)QXKX)









































ωN − 1 (B.43)




W˜t = ψH˜t + P˜t + σC˜t (B.45)
i˜t+1 = −1 + i
i
(σC˜t + P˜t − σC˜t+1 − P˜t+1) (B.46)
i˜t = i˜∗t + S˜t − S˜t−1 (B.47)
C˜Nt = −ρP˜Nt + ρP˜t + C˜t (B.48)












W˜t = M˜CNt + Y˜Nt − H˜Nt (B.51)
W˜t = P˜Xt + Y˜Xt − H˜Xt (B.52)
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R˜Nt = M˜CNt + Y˜Nt − K˜Nt−1 (B.53)
R˜Xt = P˜Xt + Y˜Xt − K˜Xt−1 (B.54)
Y˜Nt = ANt + αK˜Nt−1 + Ω(1− α)H˜Nt (B.55)










Mt + S˜t) (B.58)
P˜Xt = S˜t + P˜ ∗X (B.59)






































































(RKNQNKN R˜KNt−1 + (QNKN (1 + i∗ +RKN ))(Q˜Nt−1 + K˜Nt−1)+




(RKXQXKXR˜KXt−1 + (QXKX(1 + i∗ +RKX))(Q˜Xt−1 + K˜Xt−1)+









D˜eNt = −S˜t−1 + (SDeN )(QNKN (Q˜Nt−1 + K˜Nt))− ZN Z˜Nt (B.72)























(R˜KXt+1 − i˜∗t − S˜t+1 + S˜t − P˜t + P˜t+1) (B.76)
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˜leverNt = K˜Nt + Q˜Nt − Z˜Nt (B.77)
˜leverXt = K˜Xt + Q˜Xt − Z˜Xt (B.78)



























(µpipiP (P˜t − P˜t−1)) + (µsS
S¯
S˜t) + ϑt (B.81)
Exogenous Shocks
i˜∗t = ρii˜∗t−1 + ei
∗ (B.82)
ϑ˜t = ρϑϑ˜t−1 + eϑ (B.83)
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Appendix C
Appendices to Chapter 4
C.1 Model Equations






t + (1− φ)pi∗,e(−σp)t (C.1)


























































































Labour market clearing condition
Aet (1− α)MCet (ξtKet−1)αCe(−σ)t = He(ψ+α)t P et (C.12)
Accumulation law of capital
Ket = I
e
t + (1− δ)ξetKet−1 (C.13)
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Asset pricing equations / investment Euler equation




























































Aggregate demand for EME goods





































BOP equation / capital inflows
capflowt = V
e















Optimal lending contract between center country banks and EME banks























αv,et (1− γet )
RERt
RERt+1
− Λet+1(1− θ + θαv,et+1)Rb,t = 0 (C.21)







t − κeZQetKet = 0 (C.22)
The aggregate net worth of EME bank:






























t + (1− φ)pi∗,c(−σp)t (C.25)































Price level expression (indirectly marginal cost)
1 = φ(pi
ppi,c(σp−1)



















































Labour market clearing condition
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Act(1− α)MCct (ξtKct−1)αCc(−σ)t = Hc(ψ+α)t P ct (C.35)
Accumulation law of capital
Kct = I
c
t + (1− δ)ξctKct−1 (C.36)




Asset pricing equations / investment Euler equation






































Aggregate demand for EME goods















































(Y ct − Y ct−1)λy
)(1−λr)
ρmp,ct (C.40)
Optimal choice of assets by centre country banks


















where ωt denotes total assets of centre country banks.
Centre country banks efficient investment in EME banks (asset pricing equation):







Envelope condition for centre country optimal plan:
−αv,ct (1− γct ) +






t − ωtκc = 0 (C.44)
Net worth of centre country banks:
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